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Modern states feature an extensive government bureaucracy, whose role is
present in virtually all functions of the economy. The unifying theme of the three
distinct papers in this dissertation is the role of government in a modern economy.
In the first chapter, I look at taxes on bequests, the transfers of wealth from
parents to their children when they pass away, and how they affect the labor supply
of the parents, exploiting a policy change that reduced taxes. A tax cut implies a
higher net-of-tax estate value, creating a wealth effect, which reduces labor supply,
and a price effect, which raises it. Results indicate a clear reduction in participation,
with the wealth effect dominating. I find an approximate reduction in participation
of around 10% over the baseline.
The second chapter looks at the effect of unemployment insurance (UI) on
crime. Crime fell sharply in the United States during the Great Recession, at a
time of rising joblessness. This was a puzzle: crime is expected to rise, not fall,
when unemployment rises. I show that UI extensions can account for part of the
puzzle, explaining why crime did not rise. The higher propensity to commit crimes
associated with higher unemployment was mitigated by the fact that UI was more
generous. State-level variation in extension rules provide exogenous identifying vari-
ation in benefit length. I estimate that in places with an additional $1,000 rise in
UI per-unemployed-person (annually), crime would have been 1.5% higher were it
not for the extensions.
The final chapter studies how government policies may have hindered recovery
in Greece during the recent crisis. Despite a large reduction in labor costs, Greece
failed to engineer an export-led growth. I examine how taxes and trade costs can
explain this. Energy tax hikes raised the cost of wholesale energy. VAT also rose, dis-
proportionately affecting tradables, while there was no reduction of the substantial
trade costs burdening Greek exports. Using a small-scale New-Keynesian small-
open-economy model, I find that a 20% reduction in trade costs would mean 8%
more exports within 10 quarters. VAT and energy costs can partially explain why
exports fell.
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Chapter 1: Labor Supply and Bequest Taxation
1.1 Overview
I study the effects of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, which lowered the
unified exemption to the estate tax, on the labor supply of future bequest givers
(bequestors). To my knowledge, this is the first paper to empirically document such
a response. The hypothesis is straightforward: a tax cut implies a higher net-of-tax
estate value, and hence creates a wealth effect, which reduces labor supply, and a
price effect, which raises it. Results indicate a clear reduction in participation for a
group for which the tax cut represented a pure wealth effect, and a similar reduction
for the group which faced opposing wealth and substitution effects, but for which
the tax gain as a fraction of total wealth was much higher. I find an approximate
reduction in participation of around 10% over the baseline for both groups.
1.2 Introduction
When a person dies, a legal entity called the estate is created, and controls
the assets of the deceased. In the United States, the main way through which
intergenerational wealth transfers are taxed is through a tax on the estate, which is
1
equivalent to what is more commonly known as a bequest tax. The recent focus on
the growing inequality of income and wealth in the United States has sparked new
interest in researching the taxation of bequests, and wealth in general (Kopczuk
2013b). At the same time, at the onset of the Great Recession, the burden of the
federal bequest tax, called the estate tax, in the United States, was continuing its
gradual downward trajectory, as enacted by the Economic Growth and Tax Relief
Reconciliation Act (EGTRRA) of 2001. The federal estate tax was entirely repealed
in 2010, and was reinstated in 2011 at historically-low rates.
Recent papers in the optimal tax literature (Piketty & Saez 2013, Farhi &
Werning 2013, Kopczuk 2013a) give different rationales for why there is scope for re-
distribution, through bequest taxation, within the inheritor generation (i.e. amongst
the heirs). This is in stark contrast to one of the classic results in public finance,
namely that the optimal taxation of capital (and hence bequests) is zero. Such
models are complemented by an empirical literature that has, on the one hand,
addressed the motives behind bequests, and, on the other, behavioral responses to
bequest taxation. Both these empirical strands are vital in feeding into theoretical
models, in order to provide coherent policy recommendations (see Kopczuk 2013b
for a recent review). The literature on behavioral responses to bequest taxation
has focused predominantly on the possible ways individuals avoid bequest taxes;
these are primarily inter vivos giving, charitable contributions, and more sophisti-
cated accounting techniques, such as minority discounting. An important feature of
bequest taxation, its effect on work incentives, has been largely unaddressed. This
dimension is crucial because it represents an incentive effect (and so affects efficiency
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costs) and has revenue consequences. A handful of papers have looked at the labor
supply of inheritance recipients, but not changes in taxation, and have found non
trivial negative effects (Brown et al. 2010, Joulfaian & Wilhelm 1994, Holtz-Eakin
et al. 1993).
In this paper, I instead focus on the effect of estate taxes on the labor supply
of future givers. The logic is straightforward: a reduction in estate taxes would lead
to a mechanically higher net-of-tax value of estates to be bequeathed. If leisure is a
normal good, the wealth effect would reduce the labor supply of future givers. The
price effect of a fall in marginal estate tax rates would have an opposite, counter-
balancing effect, as the marginal dollar left in the estate would be taxed at a lower
rate. The estate tax in the US is characterized by a high initial exempt amount,
and a highly progressive schedule after the exemption, and is thus characterized by
a prominent wealth effect. This is in contrast to income taxation, which typically
has negligible wealth/income effects, and the focus in on substitution effects.1 I
exploit time-series and cross-sectional variation of the estate tax that followed the
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (TRA97), which raised the maximum amount exempt
by the estate tax by 66%, but did not change marginal rates. Importantly, even
though the wealth gain occurs at death and cannot be directly consumed at the
time of the policy change, lower taxes imply that individuals can work/save less
now without reducing the net-of-tax value of the estate. The case of income and
substitution effects from estate taxation was formally death with very recently in
1It is standard in the optimal tax literature to impose preferences which are quasilinear in
labor, and hence have no wealth/income effects.
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Hines (2013), though Stiglitz (1978) does allude to the possibility of such effects.
More specifically, TRA97 raised the lifetime exemption for transfers for $600,000
to $1 million for single decedents, and from $1.2 million to $2 million for couples.
Two groups of individuals are affected. The Middle Wealth (MW) group are those
whose expected wealth at death was between the two thresholds before the tax
change and who thus face counteracting wealth and price shocks. The High Wealth
(HW) group are those individuals who were above the new threshold before the
reform, and consequently face only a wealth effect. Those whose expected wealth
at death was below the original exemption are unaffected and hence form a control
group - these individuals are called henceforth the Low Wealth (LW) group. I ex-
ploit this classification and conduct a difference-in-differences (DiD) analysis for the
two treatments groups relative to the control group.
There are several reasons why it is important to study the effect of estate
taxation on the labor supply of givers. First, the amount is of wealth passed down
every year as bequests is very large, currently over $2 trillion. At the same time, due
to successive reductions, the tax now affects less only the very top, and so receipts
are less than $15 billion.2 The taxation of wealth transfers is hence a potentially
important source of revenue, and studying how they affects work incentives is an
important step in properly designing such taxes. Second, during the period I am
studying, the tax base was broad enough to have meaningful revenue implication. In
1997, the exemption was only $600,000 ($1.2m for couples due to full deductibility
of spousal bequest) until 1997. The number of households where the male head was
2Source: IRS Statistics of Income Division, Tax Stats.
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aged between 60 and 70 in 2000 and who were expected to die with wealth higher
than the exemption were 1.1 million (7% of households). Note that this number
does not include any cohorts of baby-boomers, so it is even higher in future years:
in 2003, had the exemption only risen by inflation ($688,000 for singles, $1.37m for
couples), the number of eligible households would have been 1.75 million.3
Furthermore, since estate taxes are only imposed after death, individuals will
need to have engaged in estate planning to be affected by the tax, and it is hence
standard to consider individuals at the end of their work-cycle or later. The behavior
of workers as they approach retirement has been the subject of a very large amount
of scholarly work, due to the demographic implications it has, mostly related to
the large social insurance programs for the elderly and retired, Social Security and
Medicare. Even though the individuals under study are unlikely to rely on transfers,
their behavior can still have effects on Social Security and Medicare finances. Social
Security benefits are actuarially fair (the expected lifetime payout is independent
of the retirement decision), so the date of retirement is what is relevant for the
trust fund, as higher participation implies more contributions.4 In addition, since
the 1990s, there has been a significant reduction in the number of retirees receiving
health insurance from former employers (Blumenthal 2006), so delaying retirement
also eases strain on Medicare, since individuals can use employer-based coverage
instead of Medicare.
The primary contributions made here are on the literature on bequest taxes,
3Source: Author’s calculations from the Survey of Consumer Finances.
4The latter is not necessarily true for Medicare, as Part A (Hospital Care) is mostly financed
by payroll taxes, but parts B and D are financed by members contributions.
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and the literatures that look at the labor supply of the wealthy and those near
retirement. A secondary contribution of this paper is in the literature on wealth
effects, which are at the core of many interesting issues in economics. For example,
on the macro side, changes in wealth can trigger redistributive effects between bor-
rowers and savers, shaping the evolution of inequality over time. On the micro side,
wealth effects on consumption and labor supply decisions can be crucial in assessing
the effects of tax policy changes. At the same time, estimation of wealth effects
has proven a daunting task. For instance, regarding labor supply, even though it is
widely accepted that leisure is a normal good and positive wealth shocks should lead
to a reduction in labor supply, robust empirical estimates of such effects are difficult
to obtain, as labor supply is affected by a number of unobservable characteristics.
The literature has mostly focused on unearned income and wealth shocks (see Blun-
dell & MaCurdy 1999 for a survey) as a way to overcome this issue. In this paper,
I instead exploit the tax change as an unexpected shock to earned wealth. This ap-
proach is closest in spirit to that Brown et al. (2010), who look at how unexpected
inheritances affect the labor supply of inheritance recipients.
I use two different datasets for this analysis, leveraging their different at-
tributes. First, I use the 1995, 1998, and 2001 waves of the Survey of Consumer
Finance (SCF), a stratified sample of household level data on asset and income,
which oversamples the wealthy. The SCF contains a substantial sample for the top
group, but it has few observations for the middle group. As such, I then turn to
the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), a longitudinal sample of individuals over
age 50, and their spouses. The HRS is designed to be approximately representative
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of the population near retirement which makes it suitable for studying the middle
group (which occupies approximately the 90th to the 95th percentile of the household
wealth distribution).
The results suggest that for males age between 50 and 80, there is a non-trivial
reduction in labor force participation as a result of the fall in estate taxes. Partici-
pation falls by around 10% for both groups, confirming a long-standing theoretical
argument in favor of capital taxation, namely that is raises labor supply (Diamond
& Saez 2011). This result also provides partial support to the joy-of-giving over
the wealth-in-utility model of giving, as the latter would imply that the givers care
about gross estates, and so they would not respond to tax changes.5
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1.3 provides an overview of the
previous literature and sets the discussion, while also providing some background on
the estate tax. Section 1.4 provides the institutional background to estate taxation,
and a simple theoretical framework to guide the analysis. Section 1.5 describes the
data and outlines the empirical strategy. Section 1.7 provides the results of the
analysis. Section 1.8 provides some robustness checks, and Section 1.9 concludes.
5There are two other motives that the literature has examined. The altruistic motive, where
parents fully internalize the utility of their heirs, and the strategic motive, which views bequests as
a means by which parents induce proper behavior on the part of their children. These have been
less empirically supported in the literature, but it should be noted that the results of this paper
are consistent with the altruistic model.
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1.3 Previous Literature
1.3.1 Literature on Wealth
Even though the literature on the importance of wealth is very old, identifica-
tion is so difficult that there is no real consensus even regarding the size of wealth
accumulation relative to the economy as whole. In a classic debate, Kotlikoff &
Summers (1981) argued that up to 46% of household wealth is comprised of be-
quests, while Modigliani (1988) estimated that lifecycle savings account for over
80% of wealth.6 The cause of this discrepancy rested on different assumptions on
what constitutes inherited wealth, the most important one being whether the inter-
est earned on bequests should be considered self-accumulated wealth or not (Brown
& Weisbenner 2004). Gale & Scholz (1994) look at inter vivos transfers (gifts) and
find that they account for over 20% of wealth (32% if college aid is included). They
also document substantial underreporting of gifts received compared to gifts given,
and this shortcoming of survey data in estimating wealth flows might explain the
wide-ranging nature of estimates.
In a recent paper, Piketty (2011) takes a very different approach, and instead
considers a very large time series of inheritances for France, from 1820 to 2008.
He defines an annual inheritance flow as the total market value of assets either be-
queathed or gifted in a single year, and estimates a U-shaped pattern of inheritance
flows as a fraction of national income, from around 20-25% in the 19th century, then
6In a recent editorial, Summers (2012) estimates that of the total wealth of US households of
$60 trillion, $1.2 trillion is passed through bequests every year, but revenue amounts to only 1%
of this figure.
8
down to around 5% after WWII, up to over 15% after 2000. He argues that this pat-
tern is well explained by the difference between return on investment and growth.7
These figures might be slightly lower in the US (though, as of 2012, population
growth is higher in France), but crucially, these results are the first to empirically
show that the assumption that due to higher upward mobility and the importance of
human capital over social status, inheritances are no longer important, and bequests
are trivial compared to labor income, is wrong.
In the optimal tax literature, there has been a wave of recent papers (Piketty
& Saez 2012, Piketty & Saez 2013, Farhi & Werning 2013, Kopczuk 2013a) that
overturn the classic result of zero optimal tax on capital. The older literature consid-
ered two justifications for this result. In a dynastic infinite horizon setting, Chamley
(1986) and Judd (1985) discuss a long-run framework in a model without stochas-
tic shocks, so capital taxation introduces a distortion whose magnitude grows over
time, and is trivially set to zero. Atkinson & Stiglitz (1976) instead consider a
two-period model with heterogeneous skills, and show that under weak separability,
optimal taxes on all commodities (including bequests) is zero if income taxation
is optimal. These results break down once certain strong assumptions are relaxed,
notably homogeneity in inherited wealth, in which case non-zero taxation is optimal.
7Piketty (2010) addresses the Kotlikoff-Summers-Modigliani debate by arguing that since both
studies rely on a single data point in time and thus have to make steady-state assumptions.
Using his data, he shows that using either definition gives a much higher value of the bequest to
household wealth fraction than either of those studies, when considering an out-of-steady-state,
long run perspective.
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1.3.2 Bequest motives and Behavioral Responses to Estate Taxes
The empirical literature on intergenerational transfers is rich and varied, focus-
ing primarily on identifying bequest motives or documenting strategies that reduce
the size of taxable estate at death. Such responses can be long before, or right
before/after death. As the present paper is concerned with a response long before
death, I will not consider the latter, and instead focus on bequest motives, inter-vivos
transfers, and wealth accumulation.
Information on bequest motives comes primarily from survey questionnaires.
Over 50% of respondents to the SCF (1998) say that leaving an inheritance is im-
portant/very important, only 18% say it is not important; 50% expect to leave a
bequest. Bequest motives rise in wealth: median household wealth of those deeming
bequests very important is $290,000, versus $210,000 for the rest. The structural
literature on bequest motives has reached a consensus that bequest motives do ex-
ist, and are characterized by heterogeneity across and within individuals (Kopczuk
2013b). The motives that have received most attention are the egoistic luxury good
motive (wealth-in-utility), the joy-of-giving motive (net bequests enters parental
utility), the strategic motive (where bequests are behavior-inducing), and the ac-
cidental motive. Kopczuk & Lupton (2007) fit a structural model to the data and
find empirical support for the luxury good motive (bequests rising in wealth), but
not for the rest. Kopczuk (2007) uses a combined dataset of estate and previous
year’s income tax returns, and shows that estates grow until shortly before death
for the very wealthy, while the composition of assets changes shortly before death in
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a manner indicating tax avoidance. He argues that this pattern indicates a trade-off
between control and tax liability-minimization (and thus the desire to leave higher
bequests), since planning earlier is more tax-efficient.
A prominent margin of response is the timing of transfers, which is influenced
by how the tax code treats transfers at death (bequests) and when alive (gifts). First,
both taxes are unified into a single lifetime transfer (gifts and bequests) schedule,
with a single exemption for all transfers. However, allowance is made for an annual
maximum level ($13,000 in 2013) of gifts per recipient, for limitless recipients, which
are not included in the lifetime exempt amount. In theory, an individual could give
enough gifts every year up to the tax-free limit, and a combined sum of bequests
and gifts below the lifetime exempt amount, and not pay any estate tax, regardless
of wealth. Surprisingly, this strategy is extremely underutilized: up to 90% of
individuals who would benefit from making many annual gifts fail to reach the
maximum allowable limits (McGarry 2000, Poterba 2001). Second, gifts are taxed
on a tax inclusive basis: with estate tax τ , the tax on gifts (if taxable) is τ
1+τ
.8 Third,
estates, but not gifts, benefit from a step-up in basis: if an asset with unrealized
capital gains is passed on to the estate, the heir will be required to pay a capital
gains tax upon realizing gains only on the amount by which the asset has appreciated
since the bequest, not since acquisition by the decedent. For a given tax rate, gifts
are preferable, unless the asset to be transferred has appreciated significantly, so
that the estate tax paid on a smaller amount implies a lower tax liability from the
8For example, $100 with a tax rate of 33% has a $33 tax liability if bequeathed. If gifted, then
the tax applies only to 11+τ of the amount, and so the tax liability is $25.
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capital gains tax on the appreciated amount. Lower estate taxes or hikes of capital
gains taxes should hence make gifts unambiguously less attractive.
Bernheim et al. (2004) use TRA97 as a policy experiment, and recognize
that the incentives embedded in the policy are systematically different for differ-
ent groups. Those between the old and new exemption faced a very strong price
effect to reduce their gift giving frequency, while marginal incentives were unchanged
for those below the original exemption, and those above the new exemption. They
find a reduction in gift-giving frequency for those affected of around 10-14 percent-
age points, which is substantial given that only 38% of households made gifts before
1997. Joulfaian (2005) focuses on the relationship between estate and capital gains
taxes. He uses administrative data from the estate tax returns of 1989 with infor-
mation on gifts made from 1977 to 1989, and, using variation for state capital gains,
gift, and estate taxes, he shows that indeed capital gains taxes significantly reduce
gift-giving.
Since bequest taxes ultimately tax wealth, the effect of estate taxes on wealth
accumulation is particularly important. Kopczuk & Slemrod (2001) use adminis-
trative data covering the universe of estate tax returns between 1916 and 1996, and
focus on the richest 0.5% for each year. They note that it is expected lifetime tax-
ation that should govern the responses of wealth accumulation to expected bequest
taxes at death, and use an imputed marginal tax rate at age 45 (based on wealth
at death) as a proxy for expected lifetime taxation. As this is likely correlated with
wealth, they use exogenous tax measures as instruments for this proxy (the top rate,
and rates at 40 and 100 times average wealth), for time series variation, and their
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lags, for cross-sectional variation. They conclude that the elasticity of wealth with
respect to the net-of-tax rate at 45 is 0.16: an estate tax rate of 50% for the top
would reduce reported wealth at death by 10%. Similarly, Joulfaian (2006) calcu-
lates a measure equivalent to marginal tax rate 10 years before death, and obtains a
similar estimate. Both papers identify an effect that is the sum of tax avoidance and
wealth reduction, with the latter being the economically important one. Holtz-Eakin
& Marples (2001) study the effects of estate taxation during wealth accumulation
phase, relying on state-level cross-sectional variation in estate taxes. While they
instrument for state-level estate taxes, this might not be enough to deal with the
endogeneity of location decisions. In addition, federal estate taxes are much higher
than state-level equivalents. Nevertheless, their estimates are in line with the other
two papers, which suggests that at least part of the wealth response to estate taxes
is during the accumulation phase, and not only a result of avoidance. Importantly,
the literature on the timing of transfers and the effect of estate taxes on wealth
accumulation indicates that individuals are responsive to bequest taxes long before
they die.
1.3.3 Shocks Near Retirement
Estate planners are expected to be close to retirement age, and it is hence
crucial to consider the literature on how shocks at older ages affect retirement, in
order to illustrate why it is reasonable to expect labor supply to respond to a change
in the estate tax.
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An obvious such shock naturally concerns pensions. Early evidence from pen-
sion shocks came from window plans, strategies employed by large firms in the US,
starting in the early 1980s, as a way of incentivizing early retirement by older em-
ployees. Lumsdaine et al. (1990), look at the window plan of a Fortune-500 firm
in the early 1980s, with early retirement rewards of up to a year’s salary for those
between 61 and 64. The authors employ the option value method and find dramatic
effects of the plan; the probability of an individual retiring at 60 given that he was
employed at 50 jumps from 37% to 77%. Blundell et al. (2004) exploit the variation
in pension wealth and retirement incentives in the UK and find that an additional
£100,000 of pension wealth raises the probability of retirement by around 20%.9
Another wealth-related shock concerns inheritance receipt. In a classic paper,
Holtz-Eakin et al. (1993) use IRS income tax return data of inheritance recipients
to test the famous conjecture by Andrew Carnegie, who argued that large inheri-
tances lead to lower work effort. They find significant responses, especially for large
amounts: a single individual receiving $150,000 is four times more likely to drop-out
of the labor force than an individual receiving $25,000. More recently, Brown et al.
(2010) use HRS data, which includes ex ante information on inheritance expecta-
tions, as well as expectations of retirement. As such, they are able to get around
the potential endogeneity of inheritance to labor supply, and find significant posi-
tive effects of inheritance on retirement. Regarding wealth shocks more generally,
Imbens et al. (2001) study a sample of lottery winners in Massachusets in the 1980s,
9The literature on the retirement incentives embedded in Social Security is extensive and I will
not consider these here. Interested readers can consult Lumsdaine & Mitchell (1999) or Coile &
Gruber (2004).
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who were surveyed on their demographic and wealth characteristics, and provided
access to their Social Security data. They run regressions of earnings on an annual-
ized metric of the lottery prize and find that the marginal propensity to earn with
respect to wealth is -0.12 overall and -0.14 after 6 years. The largest effect is for
those between 55-65, and is -0.17 after 6 years. Interestingly, there is no effect after
65.
Non-financial shocks have also been shown to have substantial effects on retire-
ment decisions. Two prominent examples are shocks to health-insurance eligibility
before age 65, when Medicare coverage kicks in (Gruber & Madrian 1995, Nyce et al.
2013), as well as shocks to health itself (Coile 2004).
A note on terminology is in order. The income tax literature breaks down
income tax changes into income and price (substitution) effects. In the present
context, there is no change in how income flows are taxed, but only in the taxation
of the transfer of wealth at death. However, the income effect refers to non-labor
income, which is a concept akin to wealth, and I will use those interchangeably. Note
that the wealth effect refers only to changes in the value of wealth. The literature
on savings also uses the term "human wealth effect" to refer to the effect a change
in the interest rate has on the calculation of the present discounted value of lifetime
wealth. In addition, I will interchangeably use the words givers and donors to refer
to individuals that give bequests, foregoing terms more associated with the legal
literature, such as legators or bequestors.
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1.4 Conceptual Framework Institutional Background
The estate tax in the United States has existed in its current form since 1932;
it is characterized by a high initial exemption, and high progressive marginal rates
thereafter. The Tax Reform Act of 1976 saw the first rise in the exemption since
1942, from $60,000 to $120,667, as a way of alleviating bracket-creeping, the un-
wanted, inflation-driven ascent of ever more households in the tax-paying brackets.
It also unified estate and gift taxes into a single unified lifetime transfer schedule,
as outlined above.
TEFRA of 1982 introduced full (used to be half) marital deduction of bequests,
meaning that all transfers through the spouse of the deceased through the estate
is fully tax free. This essentially means that, with minimal estate planning, an
individual can double their exemption. For instance, if the exemption is X dollars,
then, when the individuals dies, he or she can bequeath X dollars to the children
through the estate, and all the rest to the spouse (with no tax). Then, when the
spouse dies, he or she can also bequeath X dollars for free to the children (plus
whatever is left of X, taxable at the respective rates), thereby raising the couple’s
exemption to 2X. Finally, in 1981 a gradual reduction of taxes was instituted, and
by 1987 the exemption had reached $600,000, with rates ranging from 37% to 55%.
This was the last change in the estate tax until 1997.
Currently, the federal estate tax schedule has a very large exemption amount
($5.25 million per individual in 2013) and brackets of 37, 38, and 40% above that
exemption, so it is approximately flat above the exemption. At the time of the
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TRA97 reform it was highly non-linear, with several brackets above the exempt
amount (see Table 1.1 for details). However, the two groups affected were both
treated in a linear fashion. The middle group faced a reduction in rates from 37% or
39% to zero, and the top group experienced no reduction in marginal rates, only a
rise in the exemption, and so a reduction in average taxes. As such, it is convenient
to illustrate the intuition of how the estate tax can affect labor supply through a
simple linear schedule. I closely adopt the framework of Hines (2013), who uses a
simple linear tax schedule. This is the only paper, to my knowledge, that explicitly
looks at the income and substitution effects of the estate tax for givers.10
Consider a static framework, where individuals work in order to consume or
leave a bequest. There is no tax on consumption or a tax on income, only a propor-
tional tax on bequests, given by t. Let y, c, h, w be wealth (or non-labor income in
general), consumption, hours of work, and the wage rate. Leisure l is simply equal
to H − h, where H is the time endowment. Bequests B are positive if labor and
non-labor income are larger than consumption. The only innovation compared to
the standard income tax model is the fact that the estate tax is (effectively) imposed
on earnings only if bequests are made. In essence, the estate tax is a consumption
tax, not an income tax, and so it is the "price" of bequests that is changing, not
a tax on income. The price of bequests p is simply equal to the reciprocal of the
net-of-tax-rate, or p = 1
1−t .
This is seen more easily when the budget constraint is taken into account.
10Kopczuk (2013a) considers implicitly such effects in the context of optimal taxation, but only
through a perturbation involving estate and income taxes to study recipients, so that effects on
parents cancel out.
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Bequests are equal to the net-of-tax difference between income (labor and non-labor)
and consumption:
B = (1− t)wh+ (1− t)(y − c) ⇒ B
1− t
+ c = wh+ y
⇒ pB + c = wh+ y. (1.1)
This also shows why it is more convenient to consider the tax indirectly,
through p; a change in the tax works through a change in p. The individual’s
problem is then given by
max
c,h,B
u(c, h, B) (1.2)
s.t. pB + c = wh+ y
The budget constraint will trivially bind, so that λ > 0. Assuming for
simplicity interior solutions, the solutions to utility maximization are of the form
c∗ = c(p, w, y), h∗ = h(p, w, y), B∗ = B(p, w, y).11 As in Hines (2013), the easiest
way to consider the effect of the tax on labor supply is through the decomposition
















term captures the effect of the tax change on after-tax bequest receipts.
11I am assuming that the government budget does not factor into individual decision. Hines
(2013) more formally assumes that the government budget enters utility in an additively separable
manner, which is qualitatively equivalent.
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As Hines notes (see Appendix A.1), if this term is positive, then bequests are an
inferior good. It will be zero if and only if the parental generation is not affected by
the tax change. I assume it is zero for simplicity, especially since the population of
interest is old itself.
The uncompensated effect of the price of bequests on labor supply can be









Using (1.3), and the fact that dp
dt
= 1













This is the standard decomposition into income and substitution effects. The
first term is negative by assumption of the Slutsky matrix; higher p means higher
taxes at the margin, reducing work incentives. If leisure is a normal good, so that
∂h
∂y
< 0, the second term is negative; higher taxes reduce income and raise labor










Here, ϵh,t, ϵch,p, and ϵI are the uncompensated hours elasticity with respect to
t, the compensated hours elasticity with respect to p, and hours income elasticity,
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respectively, while SB,y is the negative of the ratio of bequests to non-labor income.
The magnitude of the response also depends on |SB,y|, the ratio of bequests to
non-labor income. There is no clear direction for the theoretical magnitude of this
parameter, but if we think that there is a mean reverting relationship between child
and parental incomes, due to progressive taxation perhaps (Farhi & Werning 2010),
then |SB,y| is likely to be lower for the very wealthy, implying larger income effects
for the middle group.
It is intuitively helpful to consider a specific functional form example. The
simplest way in which bequests enter individual utility is the wealth-in-utility model,
most straightforwardly captured by lifetime utility rising in wealth in an additive
fashion. Trivially, estate taxation has no effect in this case, as the individual only
cares about wealth, not the net-of-tax value of the bequest. A more interesting
general case is the joy-of-giving (also known as warm-glow) model, where net-of-tax
bequests enter individual utility, as a consumption good. In this case, individuals
care about the post-tax bequest they leave behind: with additive preferences, as
long as there is some curvature in the bequest motive, consumption, labor, and
bequests will depend on the price of the bequest (the estate tax).












where η ≤ 0, γ ≥ 0, α ≤ 0. I fully solve the problem in Appendix A.1. Here,
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note only that using this functional form, (1.6) can be written as
ϵh,t = (1 + α)
ηSB,y




where Sw,y and 1/Sy is the ratios of wh and c to y, respectively. The direction
of the effect depends on α, which is the coefficient of relative risk aversion with
respect to bequests. if |α| > 1, then ϵh,t > 0, and the income effect trumps the price
effect. See A.1 for details.
1.5 Empirical Strategy and Data
1.6 Estimation
The policy experiment I exploit is the TRA97. Before 1997, the lifetime ex-
emption stood at $600,000, with a progressive system of several brackets thereafter,
starting at 37% and ending at 55%. TRA97 raised the exemption incrementally to
$1 million by 2006, and then indexed it to inflation. It also lowered the capital gains
tax from 15% and 28% to 10% and 20% (two brackets depending on labor income).
As already mentioned, this reform was superseded by EGTRRA01, which further
raised the exemption to $1 million in 2002, and even more aggressively in the future.
EGTRRA01 also lowered marginal income tax rates, thus complicating the analysis.
Conversely, OBRA1993 and the 1991 budget raised the top rates. As such, I focus
in the period 1994-2000, where the incentives are much more transparent and easy
to disentangle than in future years
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Though TRA97 was signed in August 1997, it is almost certain that estate
planners expected changes to occur at least a few months before that (Bernheim
et al. 2004). It is then likely that responses can be seen in 1997. One the other
hand, TRA97 was the first change in the estate tax for ten years, and the first act
to affect the estate tax since ETRA1981.12 Before that, TRA76 was the first change
since WW2. As such, one can assume that the reform was not anticipated before the
debates started, and that it was not expected to be superseded in the near future.13
My identification strategy takes advantage of the fact that the reform created
three distinct groups in terms of how incentives varied.14 For convenience, I repeat
the classification introduced earlier. Those who expect their wealth at the time of
the bequest to be below $600,000 were unaffected, and thus form a natural control
group. I consider those individuals with expected wealth from $300,000 to $600,000,
so as to have as good a control group as possible, and denote by LW. Second, those
who were expecting their wealth to be between $600K and $1m, the MW group,
faced a reduction in their marginal tax rate from 37% or 39% to 0. This group
thus experienced a fall in both average and marginal tax rates, and thus a wealth
effect which would reduce labor supply, and a price effect which would increase it.
However, for this group, the tax gain is a potentially very high fraction of total
12There were minor estate tax provisions in OBRA93, but they involved only the very top
brackets and they were formed to resolve issues in ETRA81.
13Bernheim et al. (2004) note that there was some discussion in Washington about the estate
tax in 1994 and conjecture that individuals could have been expecting a reduction earlier. They
use the SCF to look at how the rise in the exemption affected gift giving, and hence their strategy
is not affected by changes in income taxes. As such, they are able to use the 1992 wave of the SCF
as well and can indirectly test whether there was a change in the frequency of gift-giving before
1997. Their results do not support such a conclusion.
14This is similar to Bernheim et al. (2004), who study the same reform.
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wealth. For instance, the estate of an unmarried individual with wealth at death
of $1 million would have had to pay $153,000 in taxes. For a married couple with
$2 million, the amount would have been twice as much, $306,000, and so this gain
represents an 18% rise in net-of-tax bequest.15 Finally, those who were expecting
their wealth to be above $1m, the HW group, did not have a change in marginal
tax rates (starting at 41%) but they did get an extra exemption of $400K, and so
only experience a wealth effect.
I follow a standard difference-in-differences strategy. The estimation involves
regressing labor supply participation on the treatment, year and interaction dum-
mies. The basic model is given by
yigt = αXigt + λt + δg + βIgt + ϵigt, (1.9)
where Igt = 1(g = MW or HW & t > 1996).
The i subscript denotes individual, g group, and t year. The groups are defined
as above, and the omitted (baseline) group is the LW; the MW and HW dummies are
summarized by the 2-dimensional vector δg.16 Similarly, the year dummies are given
by the λt vector. The Igt term is the vector of the DiD coefficients, the interaction
15Note that technically the system has a bracket structure for any level of estate, starting at
18%, and a unified credit. Until 1997, this credit was $192,800, which worked out to a $600,000
exemption. As such, the total savings of the reform for an unmarried individual who dies with
$1 million are $150,000*0.37 from the 37% bracket applying from $500,000 to $750,000, and the
$250,000*0.39 on the 39% applying from $750,000 to $1 million, so a total of $153,000. For a
married individual with $2m household wealth at death these numbers double, as they occur for
both members of the couple (assuming there is no asset accumulation after the death of the first
spouse).
16(I keep married individuals with expected wealth between $300,000 and $600,000 as an addi-
tional sample in the control group.
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between year and group dummies. The year dummies capture aggregate factors that
would cause changes in the dependent variable even absent the policy change. The
group dummies capture differences between the groups prior to the change. The
interaction terms measure the effects of the policy, and are the variables of interest:
negative coefficients in the interacted year-group dummies would be evidence that
the raise in the unified exemption led to a reduction in participation for the given
group in the given year.
Finally, Xit indicates a number of relevant covariates. It includes age and its
square, income and its square, educational attainment, self reported health status,
marital status, dummies indicating whether the individual had previously received
an inheritance and whether he is expecting one, and the fraction of net worth in un-
realized capital gains (to control for the fact that the capital gains tax also changed).
In the following section I describe why I rely on multiple data sources. The
concurrent use of two different datasets has its drawbacks, most importantly the
fact that some of the variables can be non-nested. In order to be consistent when
comparing results, I decide to define participation by earnings, where I classify
as in the labor market individuals who have non-zero earnings or report having a
business/being self-employed. As participation is quite complex to encode (SCF has
over 20 different possible responses to the participation question), this is the most
straightforward way of comparing the results.
It should be stressed that the sole purpose of this paper is to document whether
individuals respond to estate taxes on the participation margin in plausible magni-
tudes, and discuss the likely consequences. I am not attempting to uncover precise
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structural parameters underpinning behavioral responses. The atheoretical nature
of the DiD approach, which makes it powerful in exploiting policy changes to de-
scribe such behaviors, where more structural approaches would not have helped, is
also a serious impediment if ones tries to identify exact elasticities. As Blundell &
MaCurdy (1999) note, the interaction term of a labor supply DiD regression iden-
tifies an estimate that is a weighted income and substitution effect, but the precise
interpretation of the substitution effect depends strongly on covariates. For instance,
in a standard DiD setting where the treatment group is affected by an income tax
change, the DiD estimate would be interpreted as a Marshallian elasticity if a mea-
sure of static income was included in the regression and the tax had no differential
income effects (Keane 2011). As the wealth effect is so substantial for the treat-
ment group in the present application, this assumption is clearly not satisfied. An
additional complication in this setting is that elasticities are by construction local
measures, capturing responses for small changes in taxes. Here, the marginal tax
rate for the MW group went from 37 or 39% to 0, making the structural interpre-
tation of the coefficients even more difficult. Of course, these issues only apply for
the MW group - the HW group only faces a wealth effect and so interpretation is
straightforward in this case.
Another implicit assumption in this static framework concerns the timing of
the tax. Suppose the exemption rises at time Tn, and recall that the exemption was
set to rise with inflation after 2006. But the gain actually occurs at time Td, where
Td is the expected date of death, and so Td − Tn is life expectancy at Tn. For a 65
year old male who expects to die in 20 years, and a constant real rate of interest at
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2%, the real present value of $306,000 at date Td is $205,000 at date Tn17.
A standard problem that arises when dealing with the estate tax is the fact
that the individuals do not make decisions based on current wealth, but rather
on the amount of wealth they expect to bequeath to their heirs. As such, I need a
measure of expected wealth at death, and I use a method constructed by Attanasio &
Hoynes (2000), and adapted to such problems by Holtz-Eakin & Marples (2001) and
Bernheim et al. (2004) (the latter use a very similar method). To calculate expected
wealth, I run quantile regressions for ten quantiles (5th to 95th in increments of ten)
on income, age (and their squares) interacted with year, a cohort variable, and other
relevant covariates. The sample is then split into deciles of wealth for each year,
and wealth is adjusted using the age coefficients and the cohort variable for the
appropriate decile and year, and the CDC life tables.The implicit assumption for
the validity of this approach is that households expect to face the same taxes in real
terms at the time of death. As mentioned above, TRA97 was the first change in ten
years, and was designed to keep the real value of the exemption constant. $1m in
2006 is roughly $600,000 in 1987 dollars. TRA97 provisioned for the exemption to
rise with inflation thereafter, and so this assumption is not unreasonable. As a check,
I will also use current wealth, which confirms the results. Table 1.3 shows detailed
summary statistics of projected wealth at death, together with current wealth, for
comparison purposes.
Finally, the validity of my strategy rests on the assumption that the control
17This is the tax gain for a married individual with expected wealth at death of $2 million or
more.
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group is not affected by the policy change. Given that decisions are made based on
expected wealth at death, it is possible that individuals at the top of the control
group believe that they will increase their wealth by enough so that they enter the
MW group by the time they die, based on information not captured in my data
(e.g. trends in local house prices). The identification strategy would then be wrong
if that were the case, as the control group would be invalid. It is also conceivable
that individuals in the control group could respond to the change by raising their
participation in order to take advantage of the elimination of the next bracket.
While this is plausible for individuals close enough to the cut-off (especially if labor
indivisibilities are present), it is improbable for the majority of the control group.
For example, consider an individual who is at $1 million, through a combination
of skill and leisure preferences. Such an individual could raise his wealth by an
additional $300,000 by working (and/or saving) more after the policy change, versus
$260,000 before the policy change.18
It is still important to test for this assumption, and one way to do this is to
conduct a "placebo" test within the control group (the top and bottom half); for my
strategy to be valid, there should be no differential effect on the two sub-groups. I
conduct such an experiment in the robustness test section. Another way of showing
this is by restricting the level of expected wealth in the control group (results not
shown).
18Note that the opposite case, where individuals fall from the middle to the low group as
result of the policy change, is implausible, as in that case bequests would be Giffen goods (their
consumption falls as their price falls.
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1.6.1 Data
The nature of the question and the sample of interest in this paper means that
data issues are not trivial. Specifically, I need a large enough sample for all three
groups, with HW and MW being the more difficult ones. Ideally, one would obtain
a large longitudinal sample from an administrative dataset. In the absence of such
data, the next best alternative is to use survey data. As no single survey dataset
can give a large enough sample for both treatment groups, I resort to using two
complimentary surveys, and leverage their specific attributes.
Specifically, for the HW group, I use the Survey of Consumer Finances, the
largest and most comprehensive study of asset and liability stocks and flows in the
United States, together with information about income, labor supply, and other
relevant variables. The survey is conducted every three years, and consists of a ran-
dom stratified cross-section of households. I use the waves of 1995, 1998, and 2001
(which cover the previous respective calendar years), and hence construct a repeat
cross-sectional sample. Crucially, for the purposes of this study, SCF oversamples
the very wealthy: using a two step algorithm, the survey designers select the re-
spondents based on locality and wealth, and construct corresponding probability
weights.19
The dataset contains a set of five imputed values (implicates) of missing vari-
ables, which were constructed by the SCF designers using bootstrap techniques from
19Note that this survey design ensures that the sample is drawn with the same probability
distribution before and after the reform, a requirement for the validity of DiD with repeated cross-
sectional data (Blundell & MaCurdy 1999). This is analogous to the no-attrition requirement for
panel data (Angrist & Krueger 1999).
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a conditional distribution of the data. This allows both a more efficient estimation
that a single imputation, as well as a precise formula to calculate the imputation
variance. Since the survey is protected by strict confidentiality, information about
the stratification of the sample (such as locality) is not available. To remedy this,
the SCF also provides 999 sample weight replicates designed to capture sampling
variation. I use all this information in the analysis presented in this paper, and
standard errors are adjusted according to the formula provided by the SCF design-
ers, which is given by
√
6/5 ∗ imputation variance + sampling variance.20 Due to
the nature of data, it is necessary to use weights both when constructing summary
statistics and when running regressions.
However, the sample size for the MW group is quite poor in the SCF. This
is due to the structure of the survey. The SCF is explicitly designed to provide as
good as possible a snapshot of wealth holdings in the US. It is well documented
that the concentration of wealth is extremely skewed. In addition, the MW group
is particularly small and much harder to define, as it is bounded above and below.
Hence, the SCF has a large sample of individuals at the very top, a considerable
number at the LW group, and few at the MW group.
As such, to gain a better measurement of the MW group, I resort to the
Health and Retirement Study (HRS), a longitudinal survey that is representative
of Americans over the age of 50 (and their spouses). The HRS also has detailed
information on wealth holdings and labor force participation. In contrast to the
20The algorithm is as follows: I run the regression for each of the five implicates, using the 999
replicate weights to bootstrap the standard errors. The average of the errors from each of the five
regression gives the sampling variance, while the variance of the coefficient estimates from the five
implicates is the imputation variance. See Kennickel (1998) for a detailed discussion.
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SCF, it is meant to be a representative study of older-age Americans, not to capture
the distribution of wealth. As such, it contains few very high MW individuals, but
more HW than the SCF. In addition, since the HRS sample is randomly selected
and not capturing wealth, it is much easier to construct the MW group.21 The HRS
began in 1992 and is conducted every two years, and I use the waves from 1994 to
2000 (wave 2 to 5).
For simplicity, I focus on males and drop female-only households. This is due
to the fact that female labor supply was typically much lower for the demographics
and the era under study, but also was on the rise, and so the DiD assumption would
be much more strict in this case. I further restrict the sample of interest to be
aged between 50 and 80, as, on the one hand, I want to focus on individuals with a
high number of work year, who were thus more likely to engage in estate planning,
but, on the other, were expected to live through 2006 (when the full provisions
of TRA97 would have been in effect). Summary statistics are given in Table 1.2,
where I include a column of unweighted means for the SCF, to illustrate the need
for weighting.
1.7 Results
Consider first the results from the SCF sample. Recall that this is used mostly
for the HW group, due to the small sample for the MW group. The results are shown
in Table 1.4, and confirm the central hypothesis of this exercise. Four major themes
21Intuitively, because the wealth distribution in the SCF has extremely fat tails, the distribution
of group sizes is hump-shaped, while in the HRS it is single peaked.
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emerge.
First, notice that the coefficient for MW in 2000 is robust in magnitude and
negative and significant across all models, including model (1), which has no co-
variates expect age. Once covariates are included, the coefficient for HW in 2000
becomes significant and rises in magnitude. Second, for 1997, the coefficients for
both groups are negative, and smaller in magnitude that in 2000, suggesting that
there was perhaps some response to the news of the impending tax change, but the
coefficients are not significant. One possible explanation for this are administra-
tives issue involved with leaving the labor force, and one would expect a certain
lag to occur before some changes take effect. In any case, the coefficient in 1997
is not statistically significantly different from 2000, and still quite sizable. Third,
the uninteracted coefficients for both groups are positive and significant, indicating
that participation was higher compared to the control group before the tax change,
suggesting the reform was significant in altering participation patterns. Finally, the
coefficients for MW after the reform are consistently larger in magnitude (more neg-
ative) than for HW. This confirms the original hypothesis that although MW faced,
in theory, opposing price effects, the wealth effect is more important than for HW,
since the tax gain was a higher fraction of pre-reform net-of-tax wealth. Keep in
mind though that HW coefficients certainly suffer from small sample bias.
The covariate estimates are more or less in line with what theory would suggest.
Age is naturally highly negatively and significantly related to participation, as is bad
health (a categorical variable with four values, from excellent to poor health). More
educated men are likelier to be in the labor force compared to individuals who did
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not finish high school (the omitted category), and so are married men compared to
their single counterparts. Interestingly, while participation is rising in the number of
children living at home, the coefficient for the number of children away from home is
negative (though not statistically significant). Receipt or expectation of inheritance
have no effect on the decision to participate. The coefficient for the fraction of net
worth in unappreciated capital gains is positive and significant. Recall that capital
gains tax was reduced in TRA97 as well, so this might indicate that the substitution
effect dominates for capital gains, but it is well beyond the scope of this paper to
make any value judgments concerning capital gains taxation. See section 1.8.3 for
a formal test regarding capital gains.
As already mentioned, married individuals can double their exemption with
elementary estate planning.22 As such, a potential issue with my strategy is that
once I assume this is the case, then it is likely that the treatment groups are not well
defined. For instance, the MW group consists of single individuals with projected
wealth ranging from $600,000 to $1 million, while for married individuals the range
from $1.2 million to $2 million. The LW, on the other hand (the one omitted in
the regressions), includes men with projected wealth from $300,000 to $600,000 for
singles and up to $1.2 million for married. Simply controlling for marital status
might not be enough, as the construction of the groups in the first place might be
problematic.
In order to address this drawback, Table 1.5 presents results of running the
22What is required is for the first decedent of the couple to die to leave all the estate to their
spouse, except an amount equal to the exemption, which given to the heirs tax-free. Then when
the spouse die, the rest of the estate is passed on to the heirs, with the exempt amount untaxed,
hence doubling the exemption.
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same regressions as in Table 1.4, but only for the married sub-sample, thus ensur-
ing the groups are well defined. The coefficients for the HW groups are larger in
magnitude and the errors are smaller, while those for the MW groups are essentially
unchanged. This makes intuitive sense, as it is the HW that mostly suffer from
such error. As the groups are much better defined in this formulation, all following
estimation will focus on the married subsample. Overall, the coefficient in the year
2000 was approximately -0.10 for the HW group, indicating the policy change led
to a rise in the probability of being outside of the labor force of approximately 11
percentage points, or an approximately 13% rise from the baseline, a sizable num-
ber. To put this number in perspective, it is helpful to juxtapose it with reports
from other studies. Stock & Wise (1990) and Lumsdaine et al. (1994)23 report that a
$5,000 increase in the value of pension wealth leads to a rise in the retirement hazard
of 11.1% for individuals between 55 and 64. In addition, in a study closely related
to the present paper, Brown et al. (2010) find that receipt of $100,000 inheritance
raises the probability of retirement by 10-20% relative to the baseline, for individ-
uals close to retirement. These numbers are not directly comparable with mine
(more below) but they are indicative of the large responses of individuals towards
retirement incentives.
Consider now the HRS sample. As previously mentioned, I use the HRS to
overcome the problem posed by the small sample in the SCF for the MW group. An
additional benefit of the HRS is that, because it is a longitudinal survey, it allows me
to incorporate fixed effects, which can overcome unobserved heterogeneity. On the
23As reported in Gruber & Madrian (1995).
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contrary, the HRS has very few individuals in the HW group, much fewer than the
SCF for the MW group, a consequence of the nature of the survey (representative
of individuals over 51 and their spouses). As such I will not use the HW group in
my estimates using the HRS.
Focusing only on the married subsample, Table 1.6 gives the results of the
same model as Table 1.5 (pooled OLS), but using the HRS sample. As one can
see, the estimates are broadly and qualitatively similar. The interaction coefficients
are less precisely estimated, but still show the same pattern across specifications.
The estimates are not significant for the last year, but this is actually sensible. For
one, the estimates are not statistically significantly different between waves 4 and
5. Second, recall that the HRS is a longitudinal sample of elderly individuals. As
such, average age increases in each successive wave, and by the 5th wave (the last
wave used), the average age in the sample is 65. It is a stylized fact that retirement
rates spike at 65, and so we should expect a large fraction of either group to leave
the labor force at 65 regardless of treatment. The higher average age in the HRS is
also the reason why the absolute magnitude of the coefficient is smaller compared to
the SCF. The proportional change though is quite similar, at around 13% compared
to the baseline.
Table 1.7 shows the results of the basic regression from the HRS sample, but
now exploiting the panel nature of the data, adding fixed effects at the individual
level. The interaction terms are now much more precisely estimated than previously,
and slightly larger in absolute magnitude compared to the pooled OLS model. This
reinforces the message of the previous table, and indicates a significant reduction in
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participation as a result of the policy change.
1.7.1 Other margins
A standard finding in the labor supply literature (see e.g. Keane 2011, Blundell
& MaCurdy 1999) is that individual responses tend to be located on the extensive
margin (participate or not participate), rather than the intensive margin (how many
hours to work). The indivisibility of labor or fixed costs of work are typical expla-
nations for this phenomenon. On the other hand, the population near retirement
is also much more likely to work part-time than the prime-age adult population,
typically defined as 25 to 54 years of age (Friedberg 2000). It is then likely that the
intensive margin is non-trivial for the population under examination.
A standard issue arises when estimating limited continuous dependent vari-
ables, such as hours, concerning the estimation procedure. As is well known, corner-
solution (or censored) variables have a mass at zero, which renders least squares in-
consistent. While it can be shown that this can indeed by a significant problem for
continuous regressors, the regressors in this setting are binary. If we abstract from
covariates and consider the simplest case of a simple difference in means between
control and treatment groups, then least squares gives us a causal estimate of the
treatment-on-the-treated. In the present case, this is equal to the difference of the
product of the means conditional on participation and the probability of partici-
pation, as shown in Angrist (2001).24 Furthermore, the alternatives of generalized
24Using the Rubin Causal Model (RCM) language, this can be written as the difference in
E[Yi|Yi > 0, Di]× P [Yi > 0|Di], where D denotes treatment.
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Tobit models have serious shortcomings; their reliance on strict distributional and
functional form assumptions notwithstanding, there is a conceptual issue that An-
grist (2001) notes. Namely, Tobit models have an implicit latent variable specifica-
tion, which means that some people’s desired hours are negative, which is intuitively
problematic. The two-part model of Cragg (1971) is an attempt to overcome both
of these problems with models, by separately estimating the participation and effort
equation, but it suffers from another problem. As shown by Angrist (2001), the
"conditional-on-participation" estimation has a fundamental flaw in that as it does
not give a causal estimates of the treatment effect, as it compares different groups.25
The two-part model falls victim to this problem. Since the regressors of interest are
binary, I will focus on least squares with the dependent variable in levels. The results
are given in 1.8 for both datasets, and broadly match the participation results.
Finally, it is also interesting to consider the effect on earnings. The income
tax literature has shifted to estimating the response of taxable income, and not
simply participation or hours, to tax changes, as a broader measure of the response
of individuals to taxes (Saez et al. 2012). The argument is that individuals can
also respond on the margin of effort, avoidance, or evasion, and so the elasticity
of taxable income or earnings (ETI) with respect to the net-of-tax rate is a more
complete metric of behavioral responses. Here, an-ETI like measure is quite difficult
to define conceptually. In the income tax literature, ETI measures the response of
taxable income to the net-of-tax rate, as opposed to gross income, precisely to
25Intuitively, even in an experimental setting, the conditional on participation approach is
problematic because the treatment and control groups have fundamentally different probabilities
of participation, if the treatment is to have any effect. This gives rise to a selectivity-bias problem
akin to the standard problem arising with observational data.
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account for evasion and avoidance. However, taxes on estate taxation are not paid
until death, and so a measure of taxable estate would be a misnomer. As such,
the more appropriate measure would be that of the marginal propensity to reduce
earnings per dollar of unearned income, or MPE (Imbens et al. 2001).
The limitations of the DiD approach are more stark here. The variance of
earnings, both within and across groups, is much larger than the variance of partic-
ipation or hours, which are naturally bounded. This is more so for the HW group,
especially since the timeframe under study was characterized by high growth and a
disproportionate rise in top incomes. Furthermore, this rise in top incomes, to the
extent that high wealth is correlated with high incomes, is a confounding factor in
my study; even if my hypothesis is correct and individuals do respond in the way
described, then the rise in top incomes creates similar income and substitution ef-
fects. However, this is only a problem if the trends differ during the timeframe that
I study. As Piketty & Saez (2003) (working paper version) note, the share of income
accruing to the 90-95 percentiles of the wage income distribution was almost com-
pletely flat throughout the 1990s; the 95-99 group shows a small rise but is flat after
1995 (less than 2% rise). Higher fractiles show larger gains, but this is concentrated
at the very top - for instance, the share of the top 0.1% rose by almost 50% from
1995 to 1999. The very top is not expected to have been affected by the reform26.
By contrast, the 99-99.5 group showed a mere 6% rise. In addition, the income effect
of higher earnings will occur only after the earnings have been achieved, while the
26In the following section, I conduct a robustness check where I drop individuals with over $5
million in expected wealth - if they were driving my results, it would be suggestive of spuriousness.
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substitution operates before (it is the opportunity cost). As such, it seems natural
that rising top incomes would, if anything, bias my results upwards. 27
Since the magnitude of interest is the MPE, log transformation of the depen-
dent variable would be the standard choice. Logarithmic transformations are often
used for earnings regressions, as they provide a convenient shorthand to interpret
coefficients: the interacted DiD coefficients give the percentage change of the treat-
ment over the control group as a result of the policy. The problem in this case is
that using logs automatically drops the individuals who do not participate in the
labor market, which is problematic because, on the one hand, it suffers from the
conditional-on-participation problem outlined above, and, on the other, because the
sample is significantly reduced. This is likely to be a problem in this setting.
As an alternative to a log specification, I estimate a Poisson regression. Though
Poisson is more frequently associated with count data, it was proposed by San-
tos Silva & Tenreyro (2007) as an alternative to using logs.28 Results are given in
Tables 1.9. As hypothesized, the estimates are a lot less precise in the SCF com-
pared to the HRS, though the magnitudes are similar, and they accord very well
with those from the participation and hours regression. In addition, the estimate I
get for the wealth shock is around -0.2, very much in line with typical estimates for
the MPE. The smaller estimate for HRS in the final year is here, too, a result of the
27Note that since the rise in top incomes at the time had been secular, not a result of a shock,
standard models of intertemporal labor supply, as in Macurdy (1981), would predict a smoothed
lifecycle response, already built into the labor choice.
28Poisson regression is essentially a restatement of a log regression by means of a monotonic
transformation. Instead of estimating a model of the form log y = Xβ + u, one can simply take
an exponential transformation and estimate y = exp(Xβ + u). Note that Poisson assumes that
the variance is equal to the mean, and so robust standard errors are necessary to obtain consistent
errors.
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fact that the HRS sample gets progressively older in later waves, and the differences
between the groups become smaller, regardless of the policy change.
1.8 Robustness Checks
1.8.1 Data limitations
Since the validity of the preceding discussion rests firmly in the accuracy of
the wealth projection method, it is important to check that it sensible. One way
of doing that is to run the model using treatment and control groups constructed
by current net worth. The obvious downside of this simple technique is that a lot
of information is lost, and that the construction of groups might be misleading. It
should be less of an issue for the high wealth group, as the sample of HW in this
approach is fully nested in the corresponding sample of the wealth projection method
(since the wealth projection method increases average wealth, so any person who is
in HW with current wealth will by construction be in HW with project wealth). The
first column of Table 1.10 shows the results of running the model with the full set of
covariates, for the married subsample. As expected, the coefficients for MW, though
negative, have extremely high errors. However, the coefficients for HW in 2001 are
significant in both regressions, and broadly similar to those of the projected wealth
model, suggesting that the projected wealth approach is suitable for this exercise.
Another potentially problematic data issue is related to the stratified and
limited nature of the data. Since the sample size for the whole SCF is around 4,000-
5,000 households per year, and the scope of of the survey is such that a tremendously
39
large number of information is needed to construct appropriate wealth measures29,
the authors of SCF construct, using complex sampling techniques, five imputations
per households. It is worthwhile to make sure that the results are not driven by
errors in the construction of imputations.
Due to the sheer size of the survey, only 15% of households have no imputations
in the variables used in the regression analysis. Running the models using only
those households (380 observations) yields qualitatively similar results, in terms of
sign and significance, for the HW group, but the coefficient naturally suffers from
small sample bias. The MW group, as expected, vanishes almost completely, a
result of the sampling process and the creation of the groups, a problem already
alluded to earlier. A better solution is to simply focus on the households for which
imputations of the underlying variables do happen, but do not change the group
assignment - that is, a given household belongs to the same group (LW, MW, HW,
or has projected net worth less than $300,000) in each imputation. This shall be
conveniently referred to henceforth as the non-imputed subsample. Running the
model for the non-imputed sub-sample (for married men) yields very similar results
as the full sample for the HW group. The MW sample is still considerably smaller
and thus has much higher errors, as expected, and the MW coefficient interacted
with survey year 1998 is actually positive (but almost zero). Note that there is still a
statistically insignificant discrepancy in coefficients across the five imputations due
to the small difference in weights across imputations. Results are shown in the first
29More than two hundred variables are needed to construct just the net worth measure. For
more information, see Kennickel (1998). The code to construct the wealth measures was taken and
adapted from www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/oss/oss2/bulletin.macro.txt.
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column of Table 1.13.
Finally, another issue relating to the stratification of the SCF is that most of
the sample in the SCF is comprised by individuals so wealthy that are unlikely to
be have tax gains significant enough to be affected. In the unweighted sample of the
married individuals in the HW group (where the cut-off is expected wealth of $2
million), median expected wealth at death is $9.1 million, with the mean being $29
million, as a result of the very fat tail characterizing the distribution of wealth. The
wealth gain of $306,000 (for married individuals) due to the tax change is unlikely to
much affect those individuals, so a concern arises as to whether the result is driven
by their behavior. If so, this would be evident of a spurious result and cast doubt
on the validity of the estimates. As all regressions are weighted, this should be less
of a concern, but it is still worthwhile to check the robustness of the estimation.
The second column of Table 1.13 shows the results of a regression of the model
for the married subsample only for those households whose expected wealth at death
is less than $3 million. Here also I only consider the households that have the same
group assignment across imputations. The reason for doing so is that imputations
are designed with the full universe of observations in mind, and as I reduce the
sample imputation bias rises. The estimates for the HW group are very similar
to those of the whole sample, and actually more negative, which makes intuitive
sense, as the tax gain is much higher (in relative terms) for the group between $2m
and $3m, than for the over $3m. The MW group thus has the same problems as
mentioned previously in this section, and the coefficients are the same as those of
the non-imputed subsample, as the wealth restriction does not affect the MW group.
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As the HW group is is quite broad, it is interesting to further explore inside
that group. A straightforward way to do so in this context is through interactions
with the wealth variable. As such, I run the main model again, this time adding a
full set of interactions of wealth with the year dummies, the group dummies, and
the group-year interaction, as well as wealth in levels. Results (not shown) indicate
small and not statistically significant coefficients for all the wealth interaction terms.
1.8.2 DiD assumption for the HW group
The identification strategy employed in this paper is difference-in-differences.
The validity of this approach requires that the treatment and control groups would
not have experienced different underlying trends before and after the policy was
enacted, in the absence of the policy (common trends assumption). In the case at
hand, I require, for instance, that the HW group was not on a downward trend
in participation compared to the LW group. If this did not hold true, then the
estimates would merely reflect this difference in underlying trends, rather than the
effect of the policy.
The usual method of testing for the common trends assumption is to check
for differential trends before the policy was enacted. If I can see that there is no
change in differential participation before the policy was changed, this would be
evidence of the validity of the assumption. As such, data on two (or more) pre-
treatment periods are needed. The HRS does provide such data, and so the test is
straightforward for the MW group. One issue with using earnings as a classification
42
scheme for participation is that earnings in the HRS are not reported for the wave
year, but for the previous calendar year. This poses a problem when testing the
DiD assumption in the HRS: we need two pre-treatment periods, but earnings data
for the 1994 wave correspond to 1993, a year of rising income taxes, which can
potentially confound my estimates. As such, the DiD test has to be conducted
using self-reported definitions of participation. The results of this test are show in
1.11 and show that, indeed, the common trends assumption is satisfied, since the
coefficient in the 1996 interaction term is zero.
I still need to check for common trends in the HW group, for which HRS
provides a negligible sample. This is not possible using the SCF dataset: changes in
labor income taxes in 1991 an 1993 imply that the 1989 and 1992 will not provide
clean identification and use of other surveys is warranted, in order to obtain data for
the period 1993-1996. The best source of labor supply data in the United States is
the Current Population Survey (CPS), and specifically the CPS March Supplement.
The downside of the CPS is that it has no information on assets, though it still
preferable to other similar surveys, such as the the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID), due to its large size (and hence the high number of wealthy individuals
included).
The challenge is to identify the groups affected by TRA97 in the CPS sample,
and construct them in a manner similar to the one shown here. In the absence of
assets, I have to resort to incomes. Using the expected wealth measure and breaking
the population in 20 quantiles, the median household in the LW group in the 1995
SCF (1994 calendar year) for the subsample of households where the male head is
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between 50 and 80 years old is in the 13th quantile (65th income percentile), so I
include the 11th-15th quintiles (55th to 75th percentile) in the LW group. Similarly,
the second decile (85th and 90th percentiles) comprise the MW group, and the top
10% is the HW group.
Table 1.12 shows the results of this regression, for the married sample, for the
period 1993-2000. The group dummies are highly positive and significant, and the
group-year interaction dummies for 1993-1996 are all insignificant, indicating that
the common trends assumption is valid. Furthermore, I manage to replicate the
post-1997 change in participation for both groups, ensuring that the CPS provides
a proper alternative to check the common trends assumptions. The picture is some-
what less satisfactory for the MW group, for the very same reasons as for the SCF,
since it is by construction less well defined.
The treatment coefficients are significant for the HW group, though smaller
in magnitude than the SCF - approximately -6% over the baseline in the CPS
versus around 13% in the SCF for the year 2000. There are likely two reasons for
this. First, and more obviously, as the groups in the CPS are constructed based on
income, the treatments groups contain individuals that were not actually treated
and should not have had a response, and so it is sensible that the magnitudes are
smaller. Second, the HW group in CPS is by construction composed of individuals
with higher participation than in the SCF (as they have higher income). Similarly,
the HW group in the SCF differs from that in the CPS in containing individuals with
(weakly) lower incomes, so the average price of leisure (the wage rate, conditional on
hours) is lower for them, and it is more likely that the the negative income/wealth
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effect they face will lead to a reduction in participation.
Similarly, the SCF classification includes in the MW group relatively more
individuals with lower current income than the MW group in the CPS, who face
a lower price for leisure and are thus more likely to have larger income than sub-
stitution effects.30 Another consequence of this classification is that the results are
almost identical between the full sample (not shown) and the married subsample.
Finally, recall that the common trends check was successful for the MW group using
the much better suited HRS sample.
Furthermore, the research design is quite different from the SCF, and the
control variables non-nested. For instance, the CPS does not have data on the
total number of children of individuals, only of those living at home, which is why I
use both children and grandchildren in the household as controls. In addition, the
sample in CPS in younger (approximately 58 years of age on average, versus 62 in
the SCF) with fewer high school dropouts and more college dropouts, so slightly
fewer college graduates. Nevertheless, this test is only meant to be indicative and
measure rough trends, not have a causal interpretation, and as such these issues are
of minor importance.
30The MW group in the CPS is only comprised of individuals in the second decile of the income
distribution, while the MW in the SCF also includes people higher and lower than the second
decile. But since the second decile is towards the tail, there exists a much larger mass to its left
than to its right, so SCF has a larger proportion of middle wealth/low income households than the
CPS.
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1.8.3 Further robustness checks
A few additional robustness checks are worth considering. First, the more
interesting question this paper seeks to address is whether the reduction in the
estate tax led to earlier retirements. In the absence of panel data this is not directly
answerable, but I can look at the labor supply behavior of the more relevant group,
those aged between 60 and 70 years of age. This provides also a further robustness
check: ex-ante, theory would suggest higher responses for those aged between 60
and 70 than for those 50 to 60 and 70 to 80. The former group is still considered of
prime working age, and would not even be eligible for early Social Security benefit
if they retired before the age of 62. The latter group already consisted mostly
of retirees even before the reform, while those individuals who still were in the
workforce past age 70, and who thus experience is an actuarial loss in terms of the
presented discounted value of their Social Security receipts, are likely to have very
high taste for work.
As such, there would be a suspicion of spuriousness to the results if I did not
observe larger responses for the 60-70 group, than for the 50-80 group. Column 1
of Table 1.14 presents the results for this subsample. Indeed, responses are larger
for both groups, and much larger for the MW group, though not significant. The
coefficient for the HW is still significant for the year 2000, though there is much
more noise than before, a result of the significant reduction of the sample size by
almost 65%. Overall the pattern of the results is the same as in all other models.
Second, it is important to ascertain that the definition of the dependent vari-
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able is meaningful. The income groups under analysis are hardly typical workers
or retirees, and since the labor supply variable is based on survey data one should
be cautious about how to interpret it. For instance, a former finance professional
might be officially retired but still be engaged in day-trading. Conversely, a retired
law professor could be serving in a non-executive ceremonial position in the board
of directors of an institution or a corporation, and receive non-trivial remuneration
for very few hours of work.
The former does not seem to pose a problem as the SCF designers accounted
for this potential complication. All individuals who are recoded by the interviewer
to be out of the labor force have zero of work (I utilize the recoded labor supply
questions). To control for the latter, I repeat the analysis replacing the self-reported
work status with a binary indicator equal to 1 if the respondent works at least 1000
hours per year (roughly 20 hours per week). Column 3 of Table 1.14 presents the
results of this estimation, and the coefficients of interest change little.
Third, it is important to make sure the control group is well defined. It would
be problematic if individuals within the control group were experiencing differen-
tial employment trends. A straightforward way to test this is to conduct a placebo
treatment test. I split the control group into two groups: those with expected
wealth at death between $300,000 and $425,000 if single ($300,000/$750,000 if mar-
ried), and those with expected wealth at death between $425,000 and $550,000
($750,000/$1.1m if married). The second group is the "fake" or placebo treatment
group - if the year-fake treatment interaction terms are not zero then the control
group is not well defined. Column 4 of Table 1.14 presents the results of this regres-
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sion. The relevant fake dummy - year interactions have both p-values of over 50%,
indicating the control group is well defined.
Finally, as previously mentioned, TRA97 also included a broad reform of cap-
ital gains taxation. First, the law reduced the marginal tax rates from 28% to 20%
and from 15% to 10% (for assets held at least 18 months, longer otherwise). Sec-
ond, an exclusion of $500,000 dollars on the capital gains incurred from the sell of
principal residences replaced a more complex system that featured an exclusion of
$125,000.31 The extent to which capital gains taxes affect work decisions is unclear
and not the object of this study. However, it is clear that capital gains taxes do
affect capital gains realizations. A classic example of that is the surge in capital
gains realizations in 1986, as individuals scrambled to sell appreciated assets before
the new higher rates of TRA86 kicked in the following year. It is thus useful to
control for any such behavior. Similar complications arise from the fact that the
period under studied was characterized by a stock market rally. Table 1.15 shows
several extensions of the basic model to explore these issues. In all cases the results
remain robust.
Note that using unrealized capital gains for the period after the reform is hardly
ideal, as realizations are likely to have already taken place (short term responses are
typically larger than long term responses for capital gains). The nature of the data
does not allow us to do this, but note that the (weighted) mean fraction of wealth
in all unrealized capital gains in the sample falls from 31.6% in 1997 to 26.9% in
31Anecdotally, this feature of the tax code was blamed for the subsequent housing bubble of
the 2000s.
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200032, consistent with the aforementioned stylized fact. In any case, the addition
of those variables is only meant as a control for possible confounders, and it seems
that the capital gains tax reform does not change the results.
1.9 Discussion and Conclusion
Just like income taxes, changes in bequest taxes have income and substitution
effects. In this paper, I provide the first empirical examination of such effects. I
use a difference-in-differences identification strategy, exploiting the Taxpayer Relief
Act of 1997, which raised the initial exemption to the taxation of bequests by two
thirds. I find a statistically significant effect, with participation falling by around
10% relative to the baseline. As a corollary, I also find that the wealth effect (which
reduces labor supply in this case) is stronger than the price effect (which would raise
it).
The findings in this paper are consistent with a small substitution effect, a
common finding in the labor supply and tax literature for men, and a sizable wealth
effect, an outcome of the unique structure of the bequest tax. As income taxes, on
which the labor supply literature typically relies, has negligible wealth effects, the
more relevant literature to compare these results is the literature that has looked
at the response of individuals around retirement age to wealth shocks, which was
analyzed in Section 1.3.3. The more relevant benchmark comparison is with Brown
et al. (2010), who look at the effect of unanticipated inheritance on the labor supply
32This is even more striking given that in 2000, the financial markets were at the peak of the
dot com bubble
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of the recipient. They find that an extra $100,000 of inheritance raises the proba-
bility of retirement by 12.5% relative to the baseline. The wealth effects are larger
than this for both groups affected by TRA97, so my estimate is somewhat smaller
than for Brown et al. (2010), albeit not directly comparable.
The auxiliary specification with a Poisson regression with earnings on the left
hand side, instead of a binary for participation, yielded a marginal propensity to
earn out of unearned income (MPE), which gives the reduction in earnings for a one
dollar rise in unearned income, of -0.19. A related paper to assess how this result fits
into the literature is the work of Imbens et al. (2001), who analyze a panel sample of
lottery prize participants in Massachusetts, matched with earnings data from Social
Security for six years before and after participation in the lottery. They regress log
earnings on an annualized measure of lottery payments, and find an average MPE
of -0.17 for the 55-65 age category, a number very close to my result.
The contribution of this paper is the identification of this previously undocu-
mented margin of response. It follows that the estate tax can be used as a policy
instrument in this way as well. The policy implications of the finding depend on
what the problem or goal is. First, regarding labor supply, one might want to en-
courage higher participation/delay retirement of upper-middle class professionals at
the last stage of their work-cycle. Higher participation implies more social insur-
ance contributions and fewer pension checks. On the other hand, it is plausible that
the government might want to reduce participation of these groups. For example,
increased automation and advances in medicine may mean that the top workers will
have longer work-lives than middle workers in the future, and encouraging earlier
50
retirement may be inequality-reducing.
Second, it is important to note that the individuals affected by the policy
change used in this paper are those just below the top of the wealth distribution. In
his recent influential book, Piketty (2014) uses the term "petits-rentiers", or small
rentiers, to define a group that has significant wealth holdings to be considered
wealthy, but not enough to completely live-off capital income, and roughly defines
this group as having wealth of around $1 to $3 million. The interesting empirical
observation that he makes (using French data) is that this group is larger currently
than at any other point in history. Concretely, the metric he uses is the fraction
of individuals (broken down by year of birth), who inherit at least as much as
the average lifetime income of the average individual in bottom half of the income
distribution. For the cohort born between 1970 and 1980, this figure stands at 14%,
much higher than earlier in the 20th century, and slightly higher than any point in
the 19th century. This is then an increasingly large and politically important group,
and, notably, since it gets incomes from labor, not rents, the correlation of income
and wealth rises with the size of the petits-rentiers. As such, it seems plausible that
within a few decades we may end up with an upper class of many small estates,
as opposed to one with a non-trivial, but nevertheless small number of very large
estates. In that case, the 90th − 99th percentiles of the wealth distribution will hold
and bequeath a substantial amount of total national wealth, and, the estate tax can
then be a useful tool in reducing wealth inequality.
Finally, as previously mentioned, we do have some evidence that wealth accu-
mulation responds to estate taxes. However, this reduction in accumulation could
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be either (for given rate of return) a fall in savings , which becomes comparatively
cheaper, or a reduction in labor supply. The research design laid out in this paper
could have been useful in looking at this other dimension as well, but unfortunately
neither of the datasets used have information on consumption. More importantly,
the ultimate interest is on whether the reform affected bequests, and hence wealth.
The arguments laid out in this paper show that this could have happened through i)
a reduction in labor supply and hence a reduction in wealth ii) a substitution effect
on savings, raising wealth and iii) an income effect, which raises consumption and
reduces wealth.33 Conceivably, such a question could be answered in a few years,
when the individuals affected by this policy change have died and made bequests,
and administrative data on such bequests could be used. The successive changes
in the estate tax in the 2000s, which were initially accompanied by simultaneous
income tax cuts and were fully anticipated initially make identification very diffi-
cult, but the present framework could be used in the future, perhaps using another
country as a case study.
33This is for national wealth (including the government), as dynastic wealth will rise as long as
consumption does not rise by more than one for one.
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Table 1.1: Marginal Estate Tax Rates for 1997
Estate Tax Rate Estate Tax Rate
Value (%) Value (%)
0 – 10 18 500 – 750 37
10 – 20 20 750 – 1,000 39
20 – 40 22 1,000 – 1,250 41
40 – 60 24 1,250 – 1,500 43
60 – 80 26 1,500 – 2,000 45
80 – 100 28 2,000 – 2,500 49
100 – 150 30 2,500 – 3,000 53
150 – 250 32 3,000 – 10,000 55
250 – 500 34 10,000 – 21,040 60
Estate Tax Rate Estate Tax Rate
250 500 34 overxc 21,040 55
Source: McGarry (2000).
Notes:
1. Estate Values are in $1,000s.
2. The top rate of 60 for those between $10 million and $21.04 mil-
lion was introduced to offset the lower rates applied to smaller
amounts. The upper cut-off was lowered to $17.184 million in
1998 (McGarry 2000).
3. The exemption is officially a tax credit. For instance, in 1999,
when the credit was $211,300, making the first $650,000 untax-
able. That is why the schedule maintains brackets up to exemp-









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.3: Deciles of Current and Projected Wealth (SCF, in $1,000s)
Decile
1 2 3 4 5
Year Cur Proj Cur Proj Cur Proj Cur Proj Cur Proj
1994 mean -1.03 26 26 69 59 174 84 188 127 295
std. dev. 113 113 10 30 7.5 64 9 54 14 62
med 1.47 27 26 64 60 159 82 180 127 286
1997 mean -0.04 20 30 82 69 211 103 278 151 344
std. dev. 28 29 11 44 11 83 11 67 17 79
med 1.01 20 30 73 72 190 102 272 150 336
2000 mean 2.73 27 36 99 78 241 129 369 192 461
std. dev. 14 20 10 54 13 94 19 95 19 94
med 2 24 35 84 7 6 219 127 360 191 465
Decile
6 7 8 9 10
Year Cur Proj Cur Proj Cur Proj Cur Proj Cur Proj
1994 mean 174 400 235 573 348 806 565 956 2869 3565
std. dev. 13 78 24 121 37 153 103 173 6668 6674
med 174 397 235 566 343 807 545 961 1310 2077
1997 mean 215 471 305 605 421 828 710 1017 3927 4464
std. dev. 22 97 27 114 44 127 149 182 9239 9240
med 211 470 304 589 415 837 670 1003 1954 2570
2000 mean 272 561 393 660 596 899 1020 1268 5422 5849
std. dev. 25 129 42 125 82 136 182 223 9662 9669
med 268 546 395 642 580 887 1000 1249 3165 3584
Summary statistics on current and projected wealth at death for the SCF, by decile. Sample is men aged 50
to 80, with at least $300,000 in expected wealth at death.
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Table 1.4: OLS Regression of Labor Force Participation for All Men
Projected Net Worth (SCF)
(1) (2) (3)
β s.e. β s.e. β s.e.
MW 0.0777 0.0504 0.0765* 0.0461 0.0773* 0.0441
HW 0.1240*** 0.0433 0.1034** 0.0402 0.0968** 0.0415
MW* Year=1997 −0.0294 0.0796 −0.0421 0.0745 −0.0404 0.0736
MW* Year=2000 −0.1210* 0.0720 −0.1278* 0.0676 −0.1271* 0.0683
HW* Year=1997 −0.0289 0.0542 −0.0308 0.0531 −0.0308 0.0526
HW* Year=2000 −0.0666 0.0455 −0.0865** 0.0421 −0.0872** 0.0420
Age −0.0590*** 0.0159 −0.0536*** 0.0168 −0.0545*** 0.0168
Age Squared 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001
High School 0.0410 0.0409 0.0486 0.0402
Some College 0.0624 0.0434 0.0713* 0.0416
College 0.0739* 0.0385 0.0871** 0.0376
Married 0.0910*** 0.0285 0.0859*** 0.0296
Health Bad −0.0813*** 0.0108 −0.0811*** 0.0108
Kids Away 0.0039 0.0055 0.0036 0.0055
Kids Home 0.0142 0.0100 0.0110 0.0099
R Inheritance 0.0028 0.0038
Exp Inheritance −0.0008 0.0059
% NW in KG 0.0871 0.0474
Year=1997 0.0391 0.0257
Year=2000 0.0784*** 0.0225 0.0814*** 0.0219 0.0801*** 0.0219
R2 0.3792 0.4058 0.4094
Observations 18640 18640 18640
MW: Middle Wealth, projected wealth at death $600,000-$1,000,000 for single men, $1,200,000-$2,000,000 for
married men.
HW: High Wealth, projected wealth at death over $1,000,000 for single men, over $2,000,000 for married men.
Sample is men aged 50 to 80, with at least $300,000 in expected wealth at death. The third models in-
cludes income, equity holdings and net worth, and all are zero. All models include all five imputations
and are calculated using the replicate bootstrap weights, and errors are adjusted according to the formula√
6/5 ∗ imputation variance + sampling variance.
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Table 1.5: OLS Regression of Labor Force Participation for Married Men
Projected Net Worth (SCF)
(1) (2) (3)
β s.e. β s.e. β s.e.
MW 0.1174** 0.0483 0.0939* 0.0479 0.0947** 0.0471
HW 0.1730*** 0.0332 0.1247*** 0.0332 0.1180*** 0.0334
MW* Year=1997 −0.0518 0.0917 −0.0716 0.0870 −0.0675 0.0857
MW* Year=2000 −0.1249** 0.0745 −0.1347* 0.0744 −0.1334* 0.0745
HW* Year=1997 −0.0984* 0.0573 −0.0948* 0.0566 −0.0937* 0.0561
HW* Year=2000 −0.1153*** 0.0417 −0.1193*** 0.0396 −0.1171*** 0.0396
Age −0.0455*** 0.0176 −0.0383* 0.0179 −0.0401** 0.0179
Age Squared 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
High School 0.0340 0.0426 0.0406 0.0423
Some College 0.0581 0.0440 0.0673 0.043
College 0.0791* 0.042 0.0925** 0.0416
Health Bad −0.0797*** 0.0118 −0.0797*** 0.0119
Kids Away −0.0119 0.0104 −0.0091 0.0105
Kids Home 0.0157 0.0105 0.0129 0.0104
R Inheritance 0.0024 0.0043
Exp Inheritance 0.0034 0.0063
% NW in KG 0.0802* 0.0455
Year=1997 0.0335 0.0264
Year=2000 0.0855*** 0.0216
R2 0.3790 0.4017 0.4055
Observations 16851 16851 16851
MW: Middle Wealth, projected wealth at death $600,000-$1,000,000 for single men, $1,200,000-$2,000,000 for
married men.
HW: High Wealth, projected wealth at death over $1,000,000 for single men, over $2,000,000 for married men.
Sample is men aged 50 to 80, with at least $300,000 in expected wealth at death. All models include all
five imputations and are calculated using the replicate bootstrap weights, and errors are adjusted according to the
formula
√
6/5 ∗ imputation variance + sampling variance.
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Table 1.6: Pooled OLS regression of Labor Force Participation for Married Men
Projected Net Worth (HRS)
(1) (2) (3)
β s.e. β s.e. β s.e.
MW 0.0572** 0.0226 0.0297 0.0224 0.0310 0.0223
MW* Year==1998 −0.0549* 0.0308 −0.0595** 0.0304 −0.0553* 0.0302
MW* Year==2000 −0.0486 0.0322 −0.0491 0.0317 −0.0452 0.0316
Age −0.0508*** 0.0076 −0.0510*** 0.0075 −0.0476*** 0.0076
Age Squared 0.0001* 0.0001 0.0001** 0.0001 0.0001* 0.0001
Education X X
Health Bad X X
Kids X X
Inheritance X
% NW in IRA/Stocks X
Year=1996 −0.0360*** 0.0106 −0.0380*** 0.0104 −0.0371*** 0.0104
Year=1998 −0.0447*** 0.0102 −0.0391*** 0.0101 −0.0367*** 0.0101
Year=2000 −0.0488*** 0.0107 −0.0508*** 0.0106 −0.0473*** 0.0107
R2 0.3790 0.4017 0.4055
Observations 10230 10230 10230
MW: Middle Wealth, projected wealth at death $600,000-$1,000,000 for single men, $1,200,000-$2,000,000 for
married men.
HW: High Wealth, projected wealth at death over $1,000,000 for single men, over $2,000,000 for married men.
Sample is men aged 50 to 80, with at least $300,000 in expected wealth at death.
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Table 1.7: Fixed Effects Regression of Labor Force Participation for Married Men
Projected Net Worth (HRS)
(1) (2) (3)
β s.e. β s.e. β s.e.
MW* Year==1997 −0.0639** 0.0263 −0.0653** 0.0265 −0.0638** 0.0265
MW* Year==1999 −0.0484 0.0306 −0.0497 0.0308 −0.0478 0.0307
Age −0.0321 0.0216 −0.0335 0.0217 −0.0291 0.0218
Age Squared 0.0003** 0.0001 0.0003*** 0.0001 0.0003** 0.0001
Health Bad −0.0050 0.0058 −0.0047 0.0058
Kids Total −0.0262 0.0179 −0.0271 0.0177
R Inheritance −0.0468* 0.0251
Exp Inheritance 0.0003* 0.0002
% NW in Stocks 0.0045 0.0228
Year=1997 −0.0877*** 0.0219 −0.0855*** 0.0221 −0.0833*** 0.0221
Year=2000 −0.1842*** 0.0422 −0.1822*** 0.0423 −0.1780*** 0.0421
R2 0.1353 0.1353 0.1353
Observations 10230 10230 10230
MW: Middle Wealth, projected wealth at death $600,000-$1,000,000 for single men, $1,200,000-$2,000,000 for
married men.
HW: High Wealth, projected wealth at death over $1,000,000 for single men, over $2,000,000 for married men.
Sample is men aged 50 to 80, with at least $300,000 in expected wealth at death.
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β s.e. β s.e.
MW 257.92* 152.44
HW 518.22*** 97.48
MW* Year=1997/8 −282.48 235.09 −123.99* 67.23
MW* Year=2000 −356.43 220.68 −168.80** 76.48
HW* Year=1997 −269.65** 138.01
HW* Year=2000 −422.43*** 112.74
Age −252.19*** 43.33 −213.70*** 61.30
Age Squared 1.30*** 0.34 1.51*** 0.42
High School −2.90 93.04
Some College 62.01 106.49
College 123.87 98.11
Health Bad −169.50*** 30.61 −26.53*** 15.21
Kids Away −26.68 29.20
Kids Home 34.44 30.86
Kids Total −7.77 36.42
R Inheritance 6.74 9.65 −82.86 64.36
Exp Inheritance 24.33 17.86 0.91** 0.39
% NW in KG 214.77* 128.03
% NW in Stocks 11.73 76.88
Fixed Effects X
Year=1997/8 58.20 73.12 −147.35*** 55.35
Year=2000 178.33*** 62.25 −285.13*** 106.42
R2 0.3851 0.1546
Observations 3370 10230
MW: Middle Wealth, projected wealth at death $600,000-$1,000,000 for single men, $1,200,000-
$2,000,000 for married men.
HW: High Wealth, projected wealth at death over $1,000,000 for single men, over $2,000,000 for
married men.
Sample is men aged 50 to 80, with at least $300,000 in expected wealth at death. The
SCF model includes all five imputations and is calculated using the replicate bootstrap weights,
and errors are adjusted according to the formula
√
6/5 ∗ imputation variance + sampling variance.
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β s.e. β s.e.
MW 0.5814*** 0.1934
HW 1.0406*** 0.1509
MW* Year==1997 −0.0041 0.2344 −0.1934** 0.0827
MW* Year==2000/1999 −0.1848 0.2224 −0.0850 0.089
HW* Year==1997 −0.0875 0.2361
HW* Year==2000 −0.1246 0.1925
Age 0.3279*** 0.0766 0.5696*** 0.1071
Age Squared −0.0035*** 0.0006 −0.0043*** 0.0008
High School 0.1744 0.1112
Some College 0.2448** 0.1060
College 0.6617*** 0.1067
Health Bad −0.1410*** 0.0594 0.0179 0.0175
Kids Away 0.0152 0.0147
Kids Home 0.0074 0.0236
Kids Total 0.0483 0.0449
R Inheritance 0.0161 0.0121 −0.0502 0.0692
Exp Inheritance −0.0012 0.0181 0.0006 0.0005
% NW in KG −0.0518 0.0803
% NW in Stocks 0.0362 0.0526
Fixed Effects X
Year=1997 0.0630 0.0720 −0.1585** 0.0712
Year=2000/1999 0.1695** 0.0715 −0.3383** 0.1413
Observations 3370 10230
MW: Middle Wealth, projected wealth at death $600,000-$1,000,000 for single men, $1,200,000-
$2,000,000 for married men.
HW: High Wealth, projected wealth at death over $1,000,000 for single men, over $2,000,000 for
married men.
Sample is men aged 50 to 80, with at least $300,000 in expected wealth at death. The
SCF model includes all five imputations and is calculated using the replicate bootstrap weights,
and errors are adjusted according to the formula
√
6/5 ∗ imputation variance + sampling variance.
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Table 1.10: OLS Regression of Labor Force Participation for Married Men





MW* Year=1997 −0.1390 0.1194
MW* Year=2000 −0.0342 0.0706
HW* Year=1997 −0.0655 0.0531
HW* Year=2000 −0.1013** 0.0484
Age −0.0090 0.0197
Age Squared −0.0002 0.0002
High School 0.0427 0.0418
Some College 0.0292 0.0466
College 0.0716* 0.0394
Health Bad −0.0741*** 0.0345
Kids Away −0.0237** 0.0107
Kids Home 0.0225** 0.0107
R Inheritance 0.0035 0.0052
Exp Inheritance −0.0020 0.0067





MW: Middle Wealth, current wealth $600,000-$1,000,000 for single men, $1,200,000-$2,000,000
for married men.
HW: High Wealth, current wealth over $1,000,000 for single men, over $2,000,000 for married
men.
Sample is men aged 50 to 80, with at least $300,000 in current wealth. The model in-
cludes all five imputations and is calculated using the replicate bootstrap weights, and errors are
adjusted according to the formula
√
6/5 ∗ imputation variance + sampling variance.
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Table 1.11: Fixed Effects Regression of Labor Force Participation for Married Men
Projected Net Worth (HRS) - DiD Test
HRS
β s.e.
MW* Year==1996 −0.0065 0.0251
MW* Year==1998 −0.0612** 0.0313
MW* Year==2000 −0.0542* 0.0337
Age −0.0157 0.0216
Age Squared 0.0001 0.0001
Health Bad −0.0107* 0.0055
Kids Total −0.0209 0.0104
R Inheritance −0.0428* 0.0251
Exp Inheritance 0.0003* 0.0001






MW: Middle Wealth, projected wealth at death $600,000-$1,000,000 for single men, $1,200,000-
$2,000,000 for married men.
HW: High Wealth, projected wealth at death over $1,000,000 for single men, over $2,000,000 for
married men.
Sample is men aged 50 to 80, with at least $300,000 in expected wealth at death.
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Table 1.12: OLS Regression of Labor Force Participation for Married Men
Current Income (CPS)
Panel A - interactions
MW HW
β s.e. β s.e.
Group 0.0819*** 0.0111 0.0937*** 0.0125
Group* Year=1994 −0.0091 0.0156 0.0063 0.0168
Group* Year=1995 −0.0092 0.0156 −0.0073 0.0170
Group* Year=1996 −0.0161 0.0160 0.0037 0.0175
Group* Year=1997 −0.0346** 0.0158 −0.0399** 0.0171
Group* Year=1998 −0.0261* 0.0156 −0.0405** 0.0174
Group* Year=1999 −0.0522** 0.0156 −0.0608*** 0.0169
Group* Year=2000 −0.0405** 0.0155 −0.0540*** 0.0173
Panel B - Controls
β s.e.
Age 0.0082** 0.0038
Age Squared −0.0003*** 0.0000
High School −0.0054 0.0065
Some College −0.0107 0.0067
College −0.0163** 0.0066
Health Bad −0.3704*** 0.0082
Kids Home −0.0037* 0.0016










The model is a regression of labor force participation on group dummies, year dummies, group-year
interactions, and controls. Panel A gives the interaction estimates, broken down for convenience
into two columns, the left for the MW group, and the right for the HW group. Panel B gives the
estimates for the controls. Sample is married men aged 50 to 80. The regression is weighted by
the sample designed weights to account for stratification and sampling error.
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Table 1.13: OLS Regression of Labor Force Participation for Married Men
Projected Net Worth (SCF)
(1) (2)
No Imputations Less than $3m
in projected net worth
β s.e. β s.e.
MW 0.0353 0.0943 0.0440 0.1037
HW 0.1315*** 0.0391 0.1719 0.1170
MW* Year=1997 0.0339 0.1052 0.0232 0.1056
MW* Year=2000 −0.1522 0.1257 −0.1698 0.1264
HW* Year=1997 −0.0950* 0.0526 −0.1890** 0.0866
HW* Year=2000 −0.1326*** 0.0445 −0.1728** 0.0828
Age −0.0509*** 0.0186 −0.0519*** 0.0191
Age Squared 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002
High School 0.0192 0.0399 0.0156 0.0405
Some College 0.0486 0.0378 0.0425 0.0386
College 0.0553 0.0366 0.0428 0.0371
Health Bad −0.0796*** 0.0121 −0.0759*** 0.0131
Kids Away −0.0171* 0.0102 −0.0156 0.0111
Kids Home 0.0191* 0.0109 0.0189 0.012
R Inheritance 0.0058 0.0044 0.0075 0.0048
Exp Inheritance 0.0069 0.0067 0.0055 0.0075
% NW in KG 0.1507*** 0.041 0.1441*** 0.0457
Year=1997 0.0536* 0.0288 0.0540* 0.0296
Year=2000 0.0980*** 0.0245 0.0952*** 0.0242
R2 0.3898 0.4061
Observations 2798 1327
MW: Middle Wealth, projected wealth at death $600,000-$1,000,000 for single men, $1,200,000-
$2,000,000 for married men.
HW: High Wealth, projected wealth at death over $1,000,000 for single men, over $2,000,000 for
married men.
Sample is men aged 50 to 80 with at least $300,000 in current wealth. Both models in-
clude income, equity holdings and net worth, and all are zero. Both models include all five
imputations and are calculated using the replicate bootstrap weights, and errors are adjusted
according to the formula
√
6/5imputation variance + sampling variance.
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Table 1.14: OLS Regression of Labor Force Participation for Married Men
Further Checks, Projected Net Worth (SCF)
(1) (2) (3)
60-70 1000 Hours Placebo
β s.e. β s.e. β s.e.
MW 0.1825* 0.1024 0.0349 0.0514
HW 0.1922*** 0.0645 0.1323*** 0.0365
MW* Year=1997 −0.0551 0.2471 −0.1022 0.0856
MW* Year=2000 −0.2322 0.1716 −0.1175 0.0837
HW* Year=1997 −0.1175 0.1117 −0.1054** 0.0529




Age −0.9873*** 0.2706 −0.0948*** 0.0162 −0.0668*** 0.0212
Age Squared 0.0073*** 0.0021 0.0005*** 0.0001 0.0003 0.0002
High School 0.1219* 0.0622 −0.0254 0.0411 0.0293 0.0422
Some College 0.1874** 0.0761 0.0161 0.0441 0.0743 0.0465
College 0.1602** 0.0674 0.0272 0.0414 0.0671 0.047
Health Bad −0.1060*** 0.0200 −0.0717*** 0.0123 −0.0926*** 0.0136
Kids Away −0.0077 0.0100 0.0006 0.0048 0.0071 0.0059
Kids Home 0.0530 0.0382 0.0077 0.0114 0.0040 0.0138
R Inheritance 0.0118 0.0084 0.0043 0.004 0.0067 0.005
Exp Inheritance −0.0029 0.0162 0.0077 0.0063 0.0032 0.0082
% NW in KG 0.1134 0.0717 0.0599 0.04 0.0530 0.0536
Year=1997 0.0017 0.0501 0.0385 0.0244 0.0133 0.0348
Year=2000 0.1333*** 0.0457 0.0869*** 0.0256 0.0888*** 0.0325
R2 0.167 0.420 0.400
Observations 1192 3370 1197
MW: Middle Wealth, projected wealth at death $600,000-$1,000,000 for single men, $1,200,000-$2,000,000 for
married men.
HW: High Wealth, projected wealth at death over $1,000,000 for single men, over $2,000,000 for married men.
Sample is men aged 50 to 80 with at least $300,000 in current wealth. Both models include income, equity holdings
and net worth, and all are zero. Both models include all five imputations and are calculated using the replicate
bootstrap weights, and errors are adjusted according to the formula
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Chapter 2: Crime and Unemployment Insurance in the Great Reces-
sion
2.1 Overview
Crime fell rapidly and across the board in the United States during the Great
Recession, at a time of deep economic decline, and rising joblessness. This was
a puzzle: crime is expected to rise, not fall, when unemployment rises. I show
that unemployment insurance (UI) benefit extensions can account for part of the
puzzle, explaining why crime did not rise. The idea is straightforward: the higher
propensity to commit crime associated with higher joblessness was mitigated by
the fact that UI to those unemployed was more generous, hence replacing a larger
portion of pre-unemployment income for a longer time. Different UI extension rules
at the state level provide exogenous variation in the length of benefits, which I use
to identify the impact of unemployment benefits can affect crime. I estimate that
in places with an additional $1,000 rise in UI per unemployed person, crime would
have been 1.5% higher were it not for the extensions, on an annual basis. Back of
the envelope calculations suggest that UI extensions can account up to half of the
reason why crime did not rise. Importantly, while my strategy only allows me to
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consider variation in the length of benefits, it is conceivable that UI also prevented
crime from rising through higher benefits for all recipients.
2.2 Introduction
The onset of the Great Recession was accompanied by a broad and substantial
fall in crime in the United States. Property crime fell by 5.4% in 2009 over the
previous year, and by a further 3.1% in 2010. Crimes against persons followed the
same trajectory, driven by an even larger fall in robberies of 8.8% in 2009 and 10.4%
in 2010.1 Crime had steadily declined throughout the 2000s, falling approximately
2% per year, and this further decline occurred against the backdrop of the deepest
recession of the previous 80 years.
This presents two puzzles. Typically, we think that there is a positive rela-
tionship between unemployment and crime, and a conservative consensus estimate
is that a one percentage point increase in unemployment leads to a one percent rise
in crime (Freeman 1995). As such, it is a puzzle that crime fell, but also that it
did not rise. In this paper, I test whether unemployment insurance (UI) benefits
generosity can partially account for the second puzzle. The institutional features
of unemployment insurance, together with special provisions in the American Re-
covery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 or ARRA (commonly known as the Obama
stimulus), greatly expanded the length of unemployment benefits. ARRA also raised
1The FBI, through its Unified Crime Reporting System, classifies major crimes in two cat-
egories, violent and property. Property crime consists of burglary, larceny-theft and auto-theft,
while violent crime consists of murder, forcible rape, and robbery. The distinction between theft
and robbery involves the physical presence of the victim.
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the level of benefits for all recipients by $25. If work and crime are substitutes, for
at least some individuals, then, for a given level of joblessness, more generous and
longer benefits should be associated with a lower probability of committing crimes,
by replacing a larger portion of pre-unemployment income, and for a longer time.
It follows then that for rising unemployment, UI generosity should mitigate the
expected rise in the probability to commit a crime.
I identify a statistically significant causal effect of the rise in UI benefits per
unemployed individual on property crime. I use county level crime data from the
UCR program of the FBI, the UI extension database from the Department of Labor,
labor market data from the BLS, and demographic data from the Census, and focus
my analysis on 2009, a year where there is enough variation to give me statistical
power. I find that in places with an additional $1,000 annual rise in UI per un-
employed person (over a pre-crisis mean of around $3,000), crime would have been
1.5% higher were it not for the extensions.2 Back of the envelope calculations sug-
gest that UI extensions can account for up to half of the counterfactual rise in crime
that previous literature suggested should have taken place, implying UI can have
an important role in mitigating the effect of unemployment on crime. Importantly,
while my identification strategy only allows me examine the impact of the length of
UI benefits on crime, higher UI benefit levels may also have affected crime, as would
be expected, through higher benefits for all recipients.
A regression of unemployment benefits per unemployed person on the crime
rate is likely to suffer from omitted variable bias, to the extent that factors related
2In 2008, the crime rate in the United States was 3,214.6 per 100,000 people.
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to both crime and unemployment benefits or labor market conditions cannot be ac-
counted for. Simultaneity bias is also likely to exist, since high unemployment areas
typically have higher crime, together with non-trivial measurement error. As such,
it is necessary to identify an instrument that is highly correlated with unemployment
benefits, and uncorrelated with the error term.
My identification strategy exploits the fact that different states use different
rules to extend unemployment benefits during high unemployment times, and this
institutional variation is sufficient to retrieve a causal estimate of unemployment
benefits on crime. I use two different instruments, each of which is valid under the
assumption that the policies are exogenous ("as-good-as randomly assigned") to the
crime and labor market conditions of the states.
The main instrument for UI per recipient is the so-called TUR rule, which trig-
gers the provision of Extended Benefits (EB) for an additional 13 to 20 weeks, over
and above the standard 26 weeks available in all states, once state-level unemploy-
ment is over 6.5 percent and over 10 percent higher than the either of the previous
two years (for details about the extension rule see Section 2.4). Twelve states have
this rule, which was instituted in the 1970s, and so is plausibly uncorrelated with
local crime and labor market conditions, or any other variable potentially affecting
crime which cannot be accounted for. This instrument hence addresses omitted
variable bias, while also correcting for measurement error.
In order to increase precision, I use a measure of total weeks of extensions from
EB and the Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC) program as a separate
instrument. A minimal additional assumption is necessary to ensure the validity of
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the exclusion restriction for the continuous instrument (MEW). Namely, I need to
assume that a county is not too large compared to the rest of the state, so that its
unemployment rate is not driving the extensions. This is due to the complex non-
linear nature of the overall extension program; this assumption is not needed for the
TUR instrument because it is (plausibly) unconditionally as-if-randomly assigned.
The MEW instruments is assumed to be as-if-randomly assigned only conditional
on state unemployment.
My paper is part of a growing literature that uses instrumental variables tech-
niques to study crime (see Mustard 2010), and is naturally placed at the intersection
of two related subfields: on the one hand, papers looking at how local labor markets
affect crime, and, on the other, how transfer programs affect crime. The former,
in particular, has recently made strides in estimating much larger effects of unem-
ployment or wages on crime using IV, compared to the previous literature had with
OLS. This is less so for transfer payments, primarily due to the fact that, in the
United States, as well as other developed countries, there is little spatial variation
in transfer payments due to institutional differences across jurisdictions.3 In addi-
tion, my paper combines a policy variation (the UI extensions) which is activated by
a natural experiment (a large negative aggregate shock to employment), and thus
provides an identification strategy which has been suggested as being a particularly
attractive in the context of crime, as it sidesteps the problem of covariate identi-
fication, which has been blamed for the conflicting conclusions taken by different
3Exceptions are Foley (2011) for welfare payments in the United States and Machin & Marie
(2006) for UI in the United Kingdom.
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researchers (Durlauf et al. 2010). Finally, there now exists an extensive literature
on the effects and incentives of the expansion of unemployment insurance in the
Great Recession on job search (Rothstein 2011), on poverty (Bitler & Hoynes 2013),
and on participation in other programs (Mueller et al. 2013). I contribute to this
literature by examining another, unintended effect, of the UI expansion.
My paper underlines a significant positive externality of unemployment insur-
ance in general. The benefits of UI had been traditionally viewed in terms of smooth-
ing consumption (Gruber 1997), alleviating liquidity constraints (Chetty 2008), or
improving job quality (Caliendo et al. 2009), while creating small job search disin-
centives (Farber & Valletta 2013). I show here that an unintended benefit of UI is
to moderate the effect of unemployment on crime. This has important consequences
in terms of policy design, especially at a time when some states have reduced the
length of standard UI below 26 weeks, the EUC program has not been renewed,
and EB triggers are deactivated since unemployment is falling, even though it still
high in many states. In addition, as of early 2014, job finding rates are 30% lower
than before the crisis.4 The social cost of crime in the United States is very high.
In terms of direct monetary costs, expenditure on corrections, police protection and
legal services were estimated by the Department of Justice to be up to $261 billion
for 2010 (Kyckelhahn & Martin 2013). Furthermore, crime can have a devastating
long term impact on minorities, especially children, either because their parents are




case they are at a significantly higher risk of not finishing high school or recidivat-
ing as adults (Aizer & Doyle 2013). Total unemployment insurance expenditure for
2010 was approximately $140 billion, suggesting that even moderate impacts of UI
on crime can have substantial fiscal benefits, all the while improving outcomes for
poor families.
The following discussion is scheduled as follows. Section 2.3 describes the
previous literature. Section 2.4 describes the UI extension program and the data.
Section 2.5 discusses the empirical strategy, and Section 2.6 presents the results.
Section 2.7 provides an interpretation of the results, and Section 2.8 concludes.
2.3 Previous Literature
The economic analysis of crime goes back to Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973),
who argue that the decision to commit a crime involves a cost-benefit analysis, which
is consistent with the rising incomes and rising crime in the 1960s. More recent
literature has emphasized that a) national or state level data are not appropriate
for the analysis of crime, an inherently local phenomenon and b) that crimes are
committed by the employed as well, so a binary choice model between crime and
work will not fit the data (Freeman 1995).
The particular complication of studying crime and economic incentives is that
standard problems of unconfoundedness can bias results in indeterminate directions
- that is, even the direction of the bias is typically unknown. Consider reverse
causality: on the one hand, crime can negatively affect employment at the individual
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level, with lower employability for past offenders (Freeman 1995). By contrast, at the
local aggregate level, reverse causality can have an ambiguous effect (Mustard 2010):
high crime can lead to wealthy residents leaving the jurisdiction (Cullen & Levitt
1999), but can also lead employers to offer higher wages (Roback 1982). Omitted
variable bias is also especially pronounced in the crime context, as we know very
little about what causes crime (Durlauf et al. 2010), and if the omitted variables
are correlated with the variable of interest, results will be biased. For instance,
Raphael & Winter-Ebmer (2001) show that consumption of criminogenic substances,
such as drugs and alcohol, is pro-cyclical (and so correlated with unemployment),
so omission of a relevant variable in a regression of crime on unemployment will
result in downwardly biased estimates. Some observers (e.g. Horowitz 2004) suggest
that natural experiments are the only way of working around this issue, and it is
this strategy that I implicitly employ in this paper. Finally, measurement error
is a pronounced concern with crime data (see Appendix A for details). Though
classical measurement error in the dependent variable does not bias estimates in
linear models, crime regressions invariably use log transformation, in which case
errors will lead to biased estimates.
Concerning the labor market, the literature has found larger effects of unem-
ployment on crime with IV than OLS (Mustard 2010), suggesting that the bias is
mostly downwards. In the US, Lin (2008) uses real exchange rate changes to in-
strument for changes in the the state level manufacturing sector GDP, and finds
an elasticity of property crimes with respect to unemployment of around 4 to 6.
Raphael & Winter-Ebmer (2001) use defense contracts and oil shocks at the state
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level and find similar estimates. Gould et al. (2002) argue that the wages of low
skilled men are a better measure of labor market conditions, given the cyclicality of
unemployment, but still show elasticities of property crime with respect to unem-
ployment of around 2.5 Fougere et al. (2009) find significant effects for youth crime
in France. Notably, all these papers explicitly consider groups relatively more likely
to engage in crime.
Work on the effects of social programs on crime has been comparatively slim-
mer, despite the theoretical link: if we expect poorer labor markets to lead to higher
crimes because individuals substitute between crime and legal employment, then we
should also expect social programs to mediate that link. A substantial challenge
is the lack of spatial variation in welfare programs. Indeed, virtually all relevant
work in the United States has exploited variation caused by the 1996 welfare reform
(PRWORA), which allowed for state-level initiatives through waivers, and hence
created cross-state variation.6 This leads to further identification problems, if the
adoption of state-level programs is in any way correlated with pre-existing crime
trends. Monte & Lewis (2011) overcome this issue by using individual level panel
data and document a rise in female criminality that coincided with PRWORA. They
estimate a hazard rate model, and show that higher unemployment and non-receipt
of welfare raise the hazard of criminal behaviour.7 Beck et al. (1980) provide evi-
dence from a social experimental in 1970s, which gave welfare payments to former
5See also Grogger (1998) for an early examination of youth and wages in the US, and Machin
& Meghir (2004) for the UK.
6This obstacle has also been reported in the UK context by Machin & Meghir (2004).
7Broadly similar results are reported elsewhere in the literature, see Defronzo (1996), Defronzo
(1997), Allen & Stone (1999), Hannon & Defronzo (1998b), Hannon & Defronzo (1998a).
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convicts, and reduced crime.8
Foley (2011) considers instead high-frequency temporal variation. He looks at
monthly welfare payment cycles in 12 large US cities across which there is variation
at the time of the month when welfare payments (TANF, Food Stamps/SNAP, SSI)
are disbursed. He considers whether smoother payment cycles lead to smoother
crime cycles, compared to staggered payment cycles (i.e. once or twice a month),
and indeed finds strong evidence that financially motivated crimes, but not other
crimes, rise with the number of days since the last payment. Crime is higher after
the first ten days of the month in cities where payments take place early in the
month, compared to cities with smoother payment cycles. This is evidence that
crime supplements welfare income, consistent with the standard model.
Little is known about the effects of unemployment insurance on crime, also
due to the lack of substantial variation. Machin & Marie (2006) study a policy
which simplified the British unemployment insurance system and introduced the
Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA), a simpler and much more stringent regime, which
reduced duration and mandated monitoring to ensure search effort. Their results
are consistent with the Beckerian model, showing that areas with more exposure to
the new policy exhibited a relative rise in crime. Note that JSA is much less generous
than the UI system, with benefits capped at £71 per week, while welfare payments
are typically more generous in the UK, so comparisons are not straightforward.9
8Technically the program envisioned unemployment benefits, but the transfers were given to
individuals with no labor force attachment, and were taken away once the individuals found, so
the program was identical to welfare with 100% benefit withdrawal rate.
9In the US, average weekly benefit amount was approximately $300 in 2009, and the lowest in
the country was $196 (for Mississippi).
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Fougere et al. (2009) also show suggestive evidence of a negative relationship between
UI and crime for France, but they do not have access to instruments for UI and so
their estimates are quite low (compared the large IV estimates of the effects of
unemployment on crime that they report).
Finally, in the early literature, crime and work were considered as mutually
exclusive choices, and ignored the possibility of crime as illegal work. Fagan &
Freeman (1999) argue that one should instead consider a continuum of possible
options. It is thus more intuitive to think of the decision between legal and illegal
activities as solutions to a time-use problem. One could think then of the early
literature as focusing on the subset of choices leading to corner solutions, ignoring
the possibility of interior ones. When referring to crime and work as substitutes,
or as crime income complementing work income, it is this framework that I have in
mind.
2.4 The UI system and Data
Unemployment insurance (UI) in the United States is composed of three tiers.
The first tier is the Unemployment Compensation (UC) program, the "normal"
UI program, which has traditionally provided unemployment benefits to eligible
individuals for up to 26 weeks.10 Such benefits are financed through state payroll
taxes, and vary in generosity (the replacement rate) across states, in a very stable
manner.
10Several states now have fewer than 26 weeks of coverage, but these changes took effect in 2011
or later.
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In times of high unemployment, two further tiers may become operational.
The first is the Extended Benefits (EB) program, a permanent program triggered
if state-level unemployment passes a specific threshold, which varies across states.
EB provides an additional 13 or 20 of benefits to individuals who exhaust normal
UI, and financing is typically divided between state and federal governments.
EB can be activated by three possible "ON" triggers. The first is common to
all states, and requires that the insured unemployment rate (IUR) be on average
at least 5% for 13 consecutive weeks and be 120% or more of the average IUR over
the same period of the preceding two years. IUR is the unemployment rate of UI
eligible individuals, that is, the fraction of regular UI recipients as a percentage of
the labor force covered by UI.
Most states have a second trigger, activated if IUR is over 6% on average over
the preceding 13 weeks, irrespective of old IUR. Finally, a third trigger, operating
in 12 states, involves the 3-month TUR (total unemployment rate, the standard
metric given by the ratio of the unemployed over the labor force) averaging at least
6.5% and being at least 110% of the 3-month TUR of the same period for either
of the two previous years. If TUR is above 8%, extensions can go up to 20 weeks.
Crucially, the 3-month TUR rule is the easiest to activate and the 6% IUR the
toughest, providing the inter-state variation necessary for identification.
Finally, Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC) legislation can be
passed by Congress during times of exceptionally high unemployment and extend
benefits further, with the federal government typically being responsible for the
costs. Congress initially passed EUC08 in July 2008 (before any states had activated
79
EB), and provided an extension of 13 weeks for all states. It was reinforced in
November and extended through ARRA to provide 20 weeks for all states, and an
additional 12 weeks to states with very high unemployment (see Appendix B.3.1 for
details). ARRA also uniformly raised all UI checks by 25$ weekly.
2.4.1 Data
Data on UI extensions on a weekly basis come from the Department of Labor.11
Crime data appear in annual format, so the most natural way to construct my
extension measure for the continuous instrument is to calculate the average number
of weeks of extensions for each state. For instance, if a state has no extensions for
the first half of the year, and 30 weeks for the other half, it will be recorded as
having an average of 15 weeks for the year.
Data on crime come from the centralized Unified Crime Reporting (UCR)
database from the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The FBI collects reports from
local law enforcement agencies on a voluntary basis from cities with a population of
10,000 or more, and from counties with a population of 25,000 or more. The raw
data are then imputed into a county level aggregate, by the National Archive of
Criminal Justice Data (NACJD) at the University of Michigan, and that is the data
source I will be using. A detailed discussion of various issues concerning the crime
data can be found in the appendix.
County unemployment data come from LAUS and county employment and
wages data from QCEW, both from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Data on per-
11http://workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/unemploy/claims_arch.asp.
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sonal characteristics come from intercensal estimates for demographic variables, pro-
vided by the Census, and cover detailed information of the age, gender, and race
distributions. Finally, annual data on UI spending at the county level comes from
the Bureau of Economic Analysis regional program.
2.4.2 Sample
As I more fully explain in the next section, too few states had UI extensions
in 2008 and for too little time, while exactly the opposite is true for 2010. As such,
I focus my analysis on 2009, the year when ARRA was enacted and the UI system
expanded substantially.
My final sample includes counties with population over 50,000 in 2008, and
with full data from 2005 to 2010. I drop all counties from Illinois. Out of 102 coun-
ties, only 6 had non-zero crime data in 2005-2007 (including 5 of the 7 largest), and
another 43 in 2008. The ICPSR codebooks do mention Illinois as having particu-
larly problematic crime data. Including the 6 correct counties (which includes Cook
County, the second largest county in the United States) in my estimation does not
affect my results at all, but I nevertheless drop them for consistency. I also drop
New York City, as ICPSR collects crime at the Police Department level, which cov-
ers all 5 boroughs (each a separate county), and then apportions crime data to each
borough by population. This seems unlikely to be valid, and although the NYPD
reports separate counts for each precinct on its website, I prefer to be consistent.
Here as well though, my results are not changed if I include New York City. Finally,
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Virginia has 95 counties and independent cities. On multiple occasions, such cities
are completely contained within the surrounding county, and BEA releases UI data
for the whole region. I thus have to drop those counties from my analysis. I also
drop the whole state of Virginia as a check, and the results are unchanged, so I
decide to keep the available counties in my sample.
Table 2.1 gives summary statistics for my final sample of 907 counties.
2.5 Crime in the Great Recession
Graphical evidence of crime in the Great Recession can help build intuition.
We are interested in showing that UI extensions prevented a rise, but since crime fell
almost everywhere, this is equivalent to showing that crime fell more in places that
had higher extensions conditional on unemployment. As I show below, it turns out
that places affected by the binary instrument had unemployment that was virtually
identical, on average, with the national unemployment level, and so conditioning
on unemployment is not necessary for the graphical exercise. Though I will not be
estimating a differences-in-differences model, which would require common crime
trends between high and low unemployment counties and states before 2009, visual
evidence will help strengthen the econometric results to follow.
I break down my sample of 907 counties into two bins, according to mean
extension weeks in 2009. If intuition is correct, we expect to see sharper falls in
crime in 2009 for counties in high extension states, compared to counties in low
extension states.
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Figure 2.4 plots the average crime trends for the two groups (weighted by
county population), setting 2005 crime rate equal to 1 for ease of interpretation. The
intuition seems indeed valid: after a similar downward trend before the recession,
counties in high extension states exhibited a much larger fall in 2009, with the trends
converging again in 2010. This image is even starker if we consider only the larger
counties, and this is shown in figure 2.5, where only the counties with population
of at least 500,000 are shown. Figure 2.6 shows the same story, only in this case I
restrict the sample to cover only those counties whose population is less than 10%
of the state population, in order to make sure that a county is not too large to affect
the state extension rate.
2.5.1 Empirical framework
The figures present a story of crime declining substantially more in 2009 in
counties at higher-than-median-extension states, suggesting that 2009 saw a shock
that differentially affected those counties. In light of the graphical evidence, and the
discussion in the previous section, it becomes apparent that the variation required to
identify the effects of UI on crime must come as a state-level shock. The differential
rise in UI extensions, as a result of a spike in unemployment, indeed provides such
variation.
My empirical framework is given by the following model:
∆crimei,2009 = γ∆UIi,2009 + ζ
′∆Xi,2009 +∆ϵi,2009, (2.1)
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where X is a matrix of local demographic characteristics, to be defined below.
This is a standard first differences model, which exploits the panel nature of the
data.12 The crime variable is in logs, so that its first difference has a percentage
change interpretation.
First differencing accounts for unobserved heterogeneity, which is presumably
substantial. In addition, extensions provide exogenous variation for 2009 only. In
2008, only 4 states had EB activated at one point or another (Alaska, North Car-
olina, Oregon, Rhode Island - all of them through the optional TUR trigger ad-
dressed below) and for not enough time to generate substantial difference in UI. A
few more activated the 2nd tier of EUC in late November. In contrast, in 2010,
while there is still substantial variation in mean extension weeks, though lower than
in 200913, there is too little variation year-on-year, since states with high exten-
sions in 2009 had high extensions in 2010. Since I have to account for unobserved
heterogeneity, 2010 does not provide enough variation.14
The model in (2.1) is valid only if unobserved heterogeneity is time invariant,
so that first differencing removes any correlation between error and regressors. The
short time-span I am considering makes this a reasonable assumption for area effects
(social interactions), which are very important for crime (Freeman 1995). Glaeser
et al. (1995) show that only 30% of the substantial geographic variation in crime
is driven by demographics. However, time-varying heterogeneity, especially during
12Note that a fixed-effects (within) model with a year dummy is statistically equivalent to first
differences when T=2.
13The coefficient of variation for mean extension weeks is 0.22 in 2009 and 0.16 in 2010, falling
to 0.12 once I drop the three small states (NE, ND, SD) which did not activate tier 3 of EUC in
2010.
14Put another way, the first stage is too weak for 2008 and 2010.
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this time-frame, is sure to be present. For instance, in areas with relatively low
wages (and so low UI), consumption of durables could have fallen so much so as
to reduce profitable crime opportunities. Criminals could have left crisis ridden
areas in low unemployment states in search for better opportunities. In contrast,
the proliferation of smart phones made profitable petty crime easier, and coincided
chronologically with the recession. It is possible that the recession itself altered
people’s attitudes towards crime. This is actually one of the arguments put forward
about why crime fell during the Great Depression (Wilson 2011), and is addressed
below. Moreover, as already mentioned, omitted variable bias is as much of an
issue as simultaneity. In addition, the use of a log transformation for the dependent
variable means that if the dependent variable is measured with substantial error,
this can feed into the right hand side error term and give inconsistent estimates (see
the appendix for details). Finally, standard measurement error of UI is very likely,
attenuating estimates. In any case, it is likely that OLS estimation of (2.1) will be
biased, with an unknown direction of the bias.
2.5.2 Instruments
To remedy this, I instrument for the change in UI using extensions as the state
level. I will use two different but related instruments. The first, which I call TUR
instrument, is a binary variable set to 1 for states with a permanent TUR rule in law,
and 0 otherwise. As mentioned earlier, the TUR rule is the easiest to trigger, with
the mandatory rule being the hardest. Indeed, out of the 15 states with active EB
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programs in early March 2009, 6 had used the TUR trigger, 9 the IUR trigger and
none the mandatory trigger15, although only 12 states have the TUR option in law,
and these 12 states did not have higher than average unemployment in 2009. The
TUR instrument is an excellent exogenous source of institutional variation (as those
rules were passed into law in the 1970s), but it can only give us enough variation for
the first quarter of 2009. Almost all states have a provision that activates the TUR
option if federal financing reaches 100%, which is exactly what ARRA achieved,
effective end of March. This quarter generated substantial variation (on average, UI
per recipient rose by around $1,000 a year more in TUR states compared to other
states), but one might worry that it does not give high enough precision. Table 2.2
presents the reduced form regression, that is, the regression of the change in crime
on the TUR instruments, and shows that crime fell by almost 2 percentage points
more in the TUR states compared to the rest, giving support to the underlying
hypothesis of this paper, assuming the instrument is valid.
Ideally, one would implement a regression discontinuity design, comparing
counties in states just below and above the cutoff. This is not possible here as I
have neither the statistical power nor the high frequency UI variation to do this, so
an alternative to increase efficiency and hence the strength of my instrument is to
condition on the change in state unemployment. This is valid assuming the change
in state unemployment is uncorrelated with the error term. It is unclear whether
this is true. It should ostensibly be the case for counties small enough compared
to the state, or with counties whose unemployment (or change in unemployment) is
15http://www.urban.org/publications/411851.html.
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substantially smaller than the state total. In any case, this does not affect the va-
lidity of the instrument, which is independent of state level labor market conditions
(no correlation of TUR and state unemployment).16 Conditioning on the change in
state unemployment does not affect the first stage estimates at all and markedly
improves precision. Restricting the sample to counties with less than 10% of the
state population, or those whose unemployment change is half a point smaller (or
less than 80% of) the change in state unemployment also gives the same estimates
(but with lower precision). The first stage results are given in the top panel of Table
2.4.
The binary instrument is inefficient because it ignores the other parts of the
emergency UI framework. EUC resulted in further increases in extensions, in a
non-linear fashion, whereby states were granted further extensions if unemployment
passed certain cut-offs (see the appendix for details). So the combination of TUR,
IUR, EUC and the mandatory rule resulted in a high degree of variation in the mean
weeks of extensions states received in 2009, and so mean extension weeks (MEW)
for the state (or its change over the previous year) is my second instrument. The
benefit of using this continuous instrument is a gain in efficiency and instrument
strength, due to the much higher level of variation.
However, conditioning on the change in state unemployment now becomes
essential: MEW is the result of a highly complex system of trigger rules, and is thus
16To see why this is the case, the covariance of the model in (2.1) with the instrument Zi is
Cov(∆Yi, Zi) =Cov(γ∆UIi + ζ
′∆Xi +∆ϵi, Zi) = γCov(∆UIi, Zi) + ζCov(∆Xi, Zi) + Cov(ϵi, Zi)





highly correlated with state unemployment, and ignoring this latter will invalidate
estimation.17 This was not an issue with the TUR instrument because TUR states
had unemployment equal to the national mean. Adding state unemployment on the
covariate list removes it from the error term, but then the previous issue rises again
of whether it is endogenous or not. Rothstein (2011) employs a similar approach to
estimate the employment effects of UI extensions. He faces a very similar problem,
as he wants to remove the labor demand component from his extensions measures,
and employs cubic polynomials for the state unemployment rate. I also experiment
with a cubic polynomial, as well as 5-piece splines, and the results are unchanged.
He uses individual-level data from the CPS, and so endogeneity is less of a concern
for his approach. In any case, the coefficient estimate of the effect of UI on crime is
almost identical to the binary instrument without conditioning, with further gains
in efficiency and instrument strength, thus alleviating such concerns.
2.5.3 IV assumptions
Following the standard program evaluation notation (e.g. Angrist & Pischke
2010), let Y1i denote the value of Yi if county i receives treatment, and Y0i if it does
not. Furthermore, let D1i denote the value of treatment Di if the instrument Zi = 1
17With the vector of X’s fully exogenous, the estimate will have probability limit γ +
ζ Cov(∆Xi,Zi)Cov(∆UIi,Zi) .
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and D0i if Zi = 0. These can be written as
Di = D0i + (D1i −D0i)Zi
Yi = Y0i + (Y1i − Y0i)Di, (2.3)
where Y and D correspond to ∆crime and ∆UI respectively. For Zi to be a
valid instrument, we need that i) Y0i, Y1i, D0i, D1i ⊥ Zi, ii) E(D1i − D0i)̸= 0, and
iii) D1i ≥ D0i, ∀i.
The first condition combines the independence and exclusion restrictions. The
independence restriction, alternatively stated as saying that the instrument is un-
correlated with ∆ϵi, says that the instrument is as good as randomly assigned,
independent of potential outcomes and potential treatments assignments. That is,
the assignment of Zi is unrelated to the change in crime that would have occurred
were it not for the instrument. Similarly, the assignment of Zi is unrelated to the
change in UI that would have occurred were it not for the instrument. The exclusion
restriction says that the only way the Zi induces a change in crime is through its
effect on the change in UI.
The exclusion restriction is trivially satisfied. It could only be violated if the
implementation of extensions by itself induced a change in crime. While this is
untestable, it seems implausible to have been the case. The independence assump-
tion is satisfied as long as a county is not too large compared to the state. If a county
is large enough so that its unemployment level can affect the state unemployment
level, then the instrument might not be independent of potential outcomes. In my
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regressions, I control for this issue by restricting the sample in some models to coun-
ties that contain less than 10% of the state population. Note that in the case of
the binary instrument, as long as the non-TUR states are reasonable comparison
groups, having a dominant county is only an issue if it is too different from the rest of
the state. For example, take the extreme where shocks are perfectly equi-correlated
within states (or simply where there is only an aggregate shock). In this case, we
are simply comparing averages across TUR and non-TUR states.
The independence assumption is slightly more subtle in this application than
in a standard IV setting. While the instrument is plausibly as-good-as randomly as-
signed, its activation depends on state unemployment. If, for whatever reason, only
the TUR states had high unemployment, then the instrument would be correlated
with state unemployment, in which case validity of the instrument would depend on
whether state unemployment is correlated with the error term. Luckily, there seems
to be no correlation, as can be seen from the reduced form regression in Table 2.2.18
In addition,
The second condition states that a first stage exists. That is, Zi is correlated
with ∆UIi. This assumption is testable and will be shown in the results section.
Finally, the last condition is the monotonicity restriction, which requires that as-
signment of the instrument monotonically affects treatment. In this context, it says
that ∆UIi be higher with the extensions than without. It is also non-testable (as
we do not observe counterfactual outcomes), but is also trivially satisfied, given
18The t-test for equality of means of state unemployment for TUR and non-TUR states has a
p-value of over 90%.
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the institutional setting previously described, and the fact that no state made the
conditions for UI more stringent in 2009.
The monotonicity assumption is only required if outcomes are allowed to be
heterogeneous, and is a requirement for the LATE theorem of Imbens & Angrist
(1994). LATE identifies the effects of the treatment from the population of those
who are induced by the instrument to take the treatment (the "compliers"), who in
this case are the unemployed receiving UI. There has been considerable interest in
IV under heterogeneity lately (see Heckman & Vytlacil (2007)) and the conditions
under which IV can identify an interesting treatment effect. Heckman & Vytlacil
(2006) show that if there is "selection on gain", that is, if the treatment is chosen by
those who would disproportionately benefit from it, then LATE does not identify a
meaningful effect, even under monotonicity. Assuming assignment is random there
is no selection to be concerned with, except for potential differences in take-up rates
across counties.
My strategy estimates what Angrist & Imbens (1995) call the average causal
response, and is the variant for the general case of a multivalued treatment. For the
TUR instrument, the estimate has a transparent decomposition as a standard Wald
estimator. Obviously, the treatment is hardly discrete, but it is straightforward to
discretize it, say into bins of $1,000 or $500. The IV estimate is thus the weighted
average of causal responses at each unit of the treatment for counties induced by
the instrument to increase UI by at least one unit compared to the previous year.
The case where the instrument is multivalued as well is much more complicated




To begin with, Table 2.3 reports several models based on (2.1), without in-
strumenting. It is interesting to consider first the correlations in the data. Across
all models, we see that the coefficient of ∆UI is negative but small and varies in
significance. Precision is improved as more covariates are added, but the p-value is
never below 15%. Note that ∆UI is in $1000’s, so a coefficient of -0.003 indicates
that a $1,000 dollar annual rise in UI is associated with a 0.3% lower crime rate.
The coefficient of unemployment is negative and highly significant throughout, be
it a the state or the local level (though adding county level makes state insignif-
icant). This is likely due to the substantial rise in enrollment and outlays of the
Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program (SNAP) during the Great Recession.
Ganong & Liebman (2013) show that the 5 million rise in participation (18% rise)
and almost 50% rise in outlays (from $34.6 billion to $50.4 billion) in 2009 over
the previous year is almost entirely due to the rise in unemployment (together with
a uniform rise in expenditure due to ARRA). Overall, these structural regression
results are not informative, and are only meant to underline correlations. The fact
that the coefficient of ∆UI has at least a negative sign is encouraging, but no con-
clusions should be drawn from it. Note that all variables mentioned here are in first
difference form unless otherwise stated.
Next I turn to the IV results, first presenting the models using the TUR
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instrument in Table 2.4. Even with no covariates and a binary instrument that has
a value of 1 for only 20% of the sample, the coefficient is much higher in absolute
value, and significant at the 10% level. Moreover, the first stage is quite strong, with
an F-test of 12.39. This is below the threshold of 16.38 defined by Stock & Yogo
(2005) as indicative of at most 10% bias, but above 8.96 indicating 15% bias.19 The
coefficient of ∆UI is -0.015, meaning that a rise in $1,000 in UI per unemployed
person leads to a 1.5 percentage points fall in property crime.
Adding covariates changes nothing in the interpretation of the results, and
barely affects the coefficient, but significantly improves precision, as it adds more
points of support. Adding state unemployment raises the significance of the UI
estimate (p-value is now almost 2.2%), and the strength of the instrument, but leaves
the coefficient unaffected, due to the unconditionally as-if-random nature of the
instrument (as shown in 2.2). Adding demographic covariates and state wage alters
slightly the coefficient, due to the inevitable small sample bias in the reduced form,
which gives rise to weak correlations between the instrument and covariates. This
goes away if I add state unemployment, and the first-stage F-stat is now comfortably
higher than the highest Stock-Yogo value. Overall, the robustness of the estimate
is pronounced, a result expected from the highly significant difference in means in
the dependent variable for counties with and without TUR (Table 2.2).
Turning now to the continuous MEW instrument, recall that we have to con-
dition on state unemployment. MEW is correlated with it, in a highly non-linear
19Note that errors are clustered at the state level, as I am considering the effects of state-level
policies. With errors clustered at the county level or not at all, the F test is above 100.
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fashion, and ignoring this correlation will yield inconsistent estimates, as the first-
stage fitted values will pick up the correlations of state unemployment with the
instrument, UI, and crime (see footnote 17 for the analytical expression). This is-
sue is illustrated in column one of Table 2.5, where no covariates are included, and
the estimate is completely different than before. Once I add state unemployment
though, the coefficient is very close to the binary instrument case, with higher F-tests
for the instrument. Adding demographics variables and state wage, or allowing for
time-varying coefficients for state unemployment increases the significance of the in-
strument and leaves the coefficient unchanged. Notice that adding labor market and
income covariates other than unemployment (log wage, log retail wage, mean or me-
dian household income, ratio of mean to median household income) does not affect
the estimate (only slightly reduces precision, as all these variables are insignificant),
which highlights the fact that the correlation of MEW and state unemployment is
only due to the trigger rules. If state unemployment is correlated with the error
term, then so should be other labor market and income variables.
2.7 Interpretation
In the previous section I showed that due to the expansion of UI during the
Great Recession, an additional dollar rise in UI led to a larger fall in crime, with
the coefficient being around -0.012 to -0.015 for UI. This means that an additional
$1,000 rise in UI led to approximately 1.5% fewer crimes committed, all other things
remaining equal. As the crime rate in 2008 was approximately 3,215 per 100,000
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people, this translates into a reduction of around 50 crimes per 100,000 in areas
treated. As I am agnostic on why crime fell (but offer some possibilities in the next
section) and focus on why it did not rise, the interpretation of the result is that
in places with more generous extensions the UI system played a more important
role in mitigating the higher probability to commit crimes that result from higher
unemployment. As crime fell everywhere, the mitigating effect of UI in this context
imply a fall in crime.
To quantify the overall effect the extensions had on crime, the variation ex-
ploited has to be considered. ∆UI was around $3,500 on average in my sample,
but I have to take into account the fact that there was a substantial uniform in-
crease in benefits from two different sources. First, ARRA instituted a $25 weekly
uniform rise in benefits per recipient. Second, the EUC program had some uniform
extensions with no unemployment requirements, which grew from 2008 onwards (see
Appendix B.3.1), resulting in a minimum rise of 13 weeks of extensions for every
state compared to the previous year.20 Note that this issue is a problem because
our interest is in the amount individuals received, not overall transfers to each local-
ity, as the fundamental economic problem is at the individual level. Unfortunately
it is impossible to correct for these issues, together with the certainly non-trivial
measurement error in UI, without very strong assumptions. But it is possible to
conservatively bound this effect, by noting that since more than 75% of the labor
force in 2009 had spells lasting more than 5 weeks, 60% longer than 10 weeks, and
20To see why this has to be accounted for, assume there are two counties, with two types of
unemployed each. Type A receive 5 dollars more in both counties, and type B receive 5 dollars
more in county 1 and 10 dollars more in county 2, due to policy differences. Then there is variation
for only 5 dollars, but just taking the mean would show 10.
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about a third for 27 weeks or more21, we can assume that there is a significant part
of the unemployed in every locality that receive what was essentially a large lump
sum. The 1st percentile of ∆UI in 2009 was $853 and the 5th $1,760, so assuming
a lower bound on the size of the lump sum of $1,500 leaves us with at most $2,000
of variation, which can explain at most about 45 to 55% of the documented fall
in crime. Raising the maximum value of the lump-sum to $2,500 (25th percentile)
restricts the magnitude that can be explained to 27%.
A lower bound on the magnitude of the change in crime that UI can explain
can also be given by the R2 of the first-stage for the binary instrument, which is
0.11, meaning that TUR alone can explain 11% of ∆UI, or around $380. This gives
a lower bound on the explanatory power of UI of 8.2%. While these calculations
are necessarily imprecise, it is important to consider the variation exploited here.
In the simplest case, for the TUR instrument, variation comes only in terms of
extensions, and thus the long-term unemployed, for the first quarter. With the
MEW instrument, variation in extensions is much broader so the first-stage R2 is
0.34, and assuming the independence assumption holds then UI extensions explain
25% of the fall in crime. A similar figure is obtained from exploiting the fact that
the average rise in MEW is 3 weeks higher in TUR states, which, multiplied by
the average weekly benefit of $325 in those states (slightly higher than for non-TUR
states), gives a $975 relative rise (more than three quarters of the observed difference
between the two types of states is accounted for).22
21http://www.bls.gov/cps/tables.htm
22This last exercise can exploit part of the flat $25 payment. While the $975 figure assumes the
average unemployed person enjoyed those extra 3 weeks of UI, average benefits were more than
$3,000 higher per person for the TUR states, so it certainly seems plausible.
96
Finally, unemployment extensions could have only affected unemployed indi-
viduals, while a large fraction of crimes are committed by the employed. It has been
suggested that focusing on the unemployed might give one an incomplete view of
how labor market conditions affect crime (Machin & Meghir 2004). While this is cer-
tainly true in general, it is not the case for the period studied, as the unemployment
ranks almost doubled in 2009.
2.7.1 Other factors
It is important to consider other factors that might have helped in preventing
the crime rise and also to the reduction in crime, and how those could have con-
founded my estimates. The crucial issue here is the counterfactual: what would the
crime trajectory have been without UI, conditional on local employment conditions.
While I have shown that places that received higher benefits fared better, I cannot
give a clear answer to this question, because benefits went up essentially everywhere
by a significant amount. The nature of my strategy is necessarily local, thus while
it can still give an important insight, namely that UI benefits mitigate the effect of
unemployment on crime, it is difficult to deduce the counterfactual.
As mentioned before, there were almost surely other factors at play, most im-
portantly the rise in SNAP enrollment and compensation (20$ or more uniform rise
in benefits23), so that previous enrollees received more. SNAP is especially relevant
to crime as it is targeted groups at high risk of committing crimes, such as single
23The precise number depends on family size, see http://www.cbpp.org/cms/?fa=view&id=
3899.
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mother-headed households with juveniles. Indeed, juvenile crimes (as measured by
arrests) fell markedly throughout, and mostly in the areas with high unemployment,
which saw most of the aggregate crime reduction. Similarly, high unemployment ar-
eas had about 10-15% more households headed by single mothers.24 Unfortunately,
while there is some cross-state variation in SNAP rules, it is not sufficient to provide
identifying variation, especially since the rise in participation was almost exclusively
due to the rise in unemployment (Ganong & Liebman 2013). SNAP and UI also
compensated in terms of social protection for the sharp fall in scope, compared to
previous recessions, of the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) pro-
gram, which used to be the backbone of the welfare system until 1996 (Bitler &
Hoynes 2013). Even TANF, however, though not as comprehensive as it was in the
past, provided very targeted support, in the form of 250,000 subsidized jobs, roughly
equally split between needy adults and youth. Data is not available so one can only
conjecture, but it is likely that this could have potentially played led to a reduction
in crime.
We can thus assume that, ceteris paribus, crime would have risen were it not
for the these programs. If we further assume that the counterfactual increase crime
would have been 3%, a conservative estimate given that the literature gives a lower
bound of 2 for the elasticity of property crime to unemployment, then UI explains
up to half of why crime did not rise.25
24Source: UCR and the Decennial Census, author’s calculations.
25On the contrary, one could argue that crime was on a downward trajectory, so would have
fallen anyway. While the first part of this statement is true, I note that the the falling trend had
moderated substantially by 2008 (from over 2% in the previous four years to only half of that), the
first year of the crisis, even before the large rise in unemployment. So it does not seem unlikely
that whatever factors were leading to this secular fall had dissipated.
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It is also interesting to consider crime in the Great Depression, as crime fell
during that time, and various theories have been suggested pertain to cultural fac-
tors, such as closeness with families and supervision for young children (Wilson
2011). This would suggest that factors specific to unusually deep downturns turn
people away from crime, and cast doubt on the present estimates. There are a num-
ber of problem with this interpretation however. First, the Depression came with
the abolition of Prohibition, an era typically considered to be rife with crime. To
my knowledge, there is no work done on the impact on crime of the 21st amend-
ment, which officially ended Prohibition in late 1933 (though wine and beer sales
had become legal earlier in the year), but it is uncontroversial to argue that crime
should have fallen as a result.26 Second, the New Deal implemented a very large
expansion of social assistance, primarily through work relief programs, and recent
work by Fishback & Kantor (2010) argues that those programs did indeed reduce
crime. Even though federal transfers did crowd out private transfers (Gruber &
Hungerman 2007), federal assistance resulted in an increase of spending by almost
13 times, and the authors estimate that such assistance had an elasticity of around
0.15. In addition, a significant part of the work relief programs, the Civilian Con-
servation Corps (CCC), directly removed 3 million men aged 18-25 from 1933 to
1942 from their localities and employed them in rural areas, thereby directly re-
moving a significant part of the most crime-prone demographic from the cities.27
26The rise in crime, especially organized crime, during Prohibition was the principal reason for
repealing it.
27Fishback & Kantor (2010) mention that they do not have detailed data for the CCC but
report some results using state-level information and obtain similar results. The bias is sure to
understate the effect of the program.
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Compared to the last major recession, that of the early 1980’s, crime rose signifi-
cantly initially and then fell just as significantly. UI also expanded substantially at
the time. Data for this period do exist but in significantly different form than after
1994, and so I will not attempt and make comparisons. TUR rules had been passed
relatively recently compared to that period so perhaps the instruments would not
be valid. Also note that crime rates were almost 60% higher than during the Great
Recession, implying that comparisons might be futile. Again, my strategy does not
allow for global generalizations: it only allows me to deduce that UI extensions were
responsible for a non-trivial portion of the fall in crime in 2009.
2.7.2 Limits to the identification Strategy
It is important to be more specific about the intuition the results give us, and
about the limits of IV.
I showed previously that counties in TUR states exhibited a fall in crime
of almost 2% relative to counties in non-TUR states, even though unemployment
was roughly the same. So it is straightforward to start with the thought experiment
where I assume that there was no rise in unemployment and TUR states gave benefits
to the already unemployed for a longer time than the non-TUR states. Even in good
labor market years, the fraction of the unemployed who would qualify for extensions
is not trivial. In 2005, about 20% of the unemployed nationwide had durations
lasting for more than 27 weeks.
The binary instrument employed here provides an excellent framework of
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thinking about the mechanism at play, because it is essentially randomly assigned,
and can be thought of, without loss of generality, as a randomized experiment. So
the analysis can be boiled down to the simplest possible case, where we have two
identical states, and one is "shocked" with lengthier UI benefits, and shows a fall
in property crime. The affected population, the long-term unemployed, would thus
respond to receipt of UI. In the no-extension state, some long-term unemployed en-
gage in property crime when their benefits run out. In the TUR state, the long-term
unemployed receive benefits for longer, and we can think of them committing fewer
crimes either because they find jobs during their extensions and so do not have to
commit crimes to supplement their income, or because they can live-off their bene-
fits for longer before resorting to crime. This is consistent with the view of crime as
supplementing other income in the study of Foley (2011) for welfare payments, espe-
cially since the long-term unemployed are probably more common with the welfare
population he studies in low unemployment years, than during crises.
Second, the $25 extra payment raised benefit levels for all, even those below the
extension limit. An extra $100 dollars per month is not a trivial increase when put
into perspective. For instance, average SNAP payments were $146 for one person
per month in 2011 (Ganong & Liebman 2013), which includes a $20-25 monthly rise
in benefits through ARRA. TANF payments in 2010 were an average of $392 per
family. In terms of generosity, this increase raised average UI payments by up to
14% compared to the previous year. As such, fewer crimes would be committed as
a result of this increase, by any unemployed person, through the receipt of benefits.
The present empirical framework does not allow me to capture the full extent of this
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effect, as the instrument induces variation only in the length, not the level of the
treatment, but it is likely that if UI does indeed mitigate the effect of unemployment
on crime, then this effect would have been substantial. I can only partially capture
it through the difference in extension weeks, multiplied by the average payment, and
hence only for those with very long spells.
Now consider the case where unemployment also rises in a similar manner in
both states. Both the extensions and the benefit increase would then affect the newly
unemployed in the same way, compared to a regime with lower benefits and shorter
benefit durations. Absent any dynamic feedback effects for the newly unemployed
who committed crimes while employed, the expected effect of UI here would have
been to prevent crime from rising. That is, for the population who did not commit
crimes while employed, higher and longer UI payments would have prevented them
from engaging in crime, for either short spells (the extra payment) and longer spells
(the extensions and the extra payment).
My strategy can thus capture, in a transparent and straightforward fashion,
the effect of TUR on average extension length, and average annual level of benefits.
On average, TUR states had 3 more weeks of extensions compared to 2008 that
non-TUR states. At an average level of around $325 dollars weekly, this amounts
to almost $1,000 dollars more over 2008, compared to non-TUR states. It can
capture a small part of the higher weekly payments, which are expected to have
been substantial.
Can we think of UI as potentially affecting the decision to commit crimes if
employed? While it is outside the scope of this paper to answer such a question,
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conceptually, if the decision to commit crimes is a dynamic one, and the future loss
of income due to an arrest is non-trivial and is factored in the individual decision
making, then higher UI can indeed serve so as to reduce the crimes of the employed,
by raising income in the unemployed state.28 29
2.7.3 Robustness checks
I conduct two sets of robustness checks. First, for the MEW instrument to
be valid, the county should not be too large relative to the state. If it is, then the
instrument is not as good as randomly assigned, as its value depends on county
level conditions, which may not be fully accounted for by conditioning on county
unemployment (which would make the instrument as-good-as-randomly-assigned
conditional on county unemployment). One way to check this is to restrict the
sample only to relatively small counties. Columns 1 to 3 of Table 2.6 show the
results this test, restricting the sample to counties who account for less than 10%,
5%, and 1% of their total state population, respectively. There is little change in
the coefficient of ∆UI (the different is not-statistically significant) as the sample
is restricted. The strength of the instrument significantly drops in the 1% sample,
which is quite small, but it still larger than the 25% maximal bias threshold of Stock
and Yogo. Overall, the results do not seem to be driven by the very large counties.
28The opposite case is also theoretically possible: For employees individuals, higher UI implies
higher incomes if they lose their jobs, so they might be more willing to take risks and commit
crimes. However, unemployment insurance is typically "no-fault", given only to individuals losing
their jobs through no fault of their own, which certainly would not be the case if they are dismissed
after commission of a crime.
29Engelhardt & Rupert (2008) posit that in their equilibrium search model, higher UI leads to
lower crimes for the employed if average jail sentence is longer than average job duration.
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Second, I conduct a falsification test. The identifying assumption is that coun-
ties in states with the TUR rule would not have had different crime trajectories than
those in states without the TUR rule in the absence of the large changes in UI spend-
ing. An indirect way of checking the validity of this assumption is to consider the
reduced form relationship for the years before the crisis (when activation was very
rare), and test the relationship between crime and the TUR rule. Columns 4 and 5
of Table 2.6 show the results of these checks for the change and levels of log property
crime, respectively, for the period from 1994 to 2007 (1995 for the change in crime
regression). There is no evidence of a robust relationship between crime and the
TUR rule before 2008, conditional on covariates.30
2.8 Conclusion
In this paper, I test whether unemployment insurance extensions can partially
account for the significant drop in crime during the peak of the Great Recession in
2009. I use two different but related instrumental variables from state-level policies
in order to instrument for the potentially endogenous UI benefits per unemployed
person. The instruments are each valid under different assumptions, and are thus
complementary.
My IV estimate of change in UI to change in crime is around -0.015. As this
paper is agnostic about why crime fell and the focus is on UI as a mechanism through
30Another common test in the literature is to run the main regression on the pre-treatment
sample for relevant subsamples of the pre-period (in this case, a regression for every year). The
results of this test (not shown) are very similar, with the mean of the coefficient centered around
zero, with large standard deviation in both cases.
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which a rise was prevented, this estimate means that in places with an additional
$1,000 rise in UI per unemployed person, crime would have been 1.5% higher were it
not for the extensions. Back of the envelope calculations suggest that the extensions
account for up to half of the expected counterfactual rise in crime.
These findings add to the debate and our knowledge about crime and public
policy in two ways. First, they underline the crime-preventing capabilities of transfer
programs. This has been shown in other studies for welfare in the US, and for UI
in Europe, but this is the first paper document a causal effect of UI on crime in the
US, and it is thus a contribution to the economic of crime literature. Second, they
highlight a potentially important additional benefit of unemployment insurance, and
provide an additional issue to be considered in the discussion of UI extensions, a
highly topical issue in the US.
105
Figure 2.1: Crime, countries over 50,000, High versus Low Unemployment
Figure 2.2: Crime, countries over 500,000, High versus Low Unemployment
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Figure 2.3: Crime, small counties over 50,000, High versus Low Unemployment
Figure 2.4: Crime, countries over 50,000, High versus Low Mean Extension Weeks
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Figure 2.5: Crime, countries over 500,000, High versus Low Mean Extension Weeks
Figure 2.6: Crime, small counties over 50,000, High versus Low Mean Extension Weeks
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics - Selected Sample of 907 counties in 2009
µ σ min max
Property Crime Rate (per 100,000) 2,995 1257 140 10,315
% Change over 2008 -4.68 12.65 -99.54 134.78
UI per unemployed person ($) 8,998 3,253 2,325 32,059
Change over 2008 3,349 1,462 -1,327 23,557
Population (1,000s) 252 449 50 9,787
Unemployment Rate 9.2 2.6 3.6 27.9
Unemployment Rate (State) 9.1 1.8 4.3 13.3
Income per capita ($) 35,282 7,861 17,217 79,902
State avg. wage ($, weekly) 833 117 641 1490
Population Shares
Under age 10 13.0 2.0 5.1 21.4
Age 10-14 6.7 0.9 2.6 9.9
Age 15-19 7.3 1.0 2.8 13.3
Age 20-24 7.0 2.8 2.8 26.3
Age 25-44 25.7 2.7 15.7 43.1
Age 45-64 26.8 2.8 14.5 35.5
Over 65 13.5 3.6 5.2 42.1
Male 49.3 1.2 46.4 60.9
Non White 25.4 18.5 2.3 97.0
Summary statistics for my final sample. The sample consists of counties
with population over 50,000 in 2009. Details about the construction of
the sample can be found in the Data Appendix.
Table 2.2: Reduced Form Relationship - Change in Log Property Crime
TUR ∆ MEW
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Instrument -0.01835* -0.01778** -0.0187** -0.0025*** -0.0027***
(0.0111) (0.0089) (0.0089) (0.0009) (0.0009)
∆ State Unemployment X X X X
Controls X X
Observations 907 907 907 907 907
Each column is a separate regression of the change in log property crime rate (the dependent
variable) on the instrument and covariates, at the annual level. Standard errors clustered
at the state level, and regressions weighted by total county population.
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Table 2.3: OLS - Change in Log Property Crime
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
∆UI -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
∆ State -0.0171** -0.0140**
Unemployment (0.006) (0.006)
State -0.0143* -0.014 -0.015*
Unemployment (0.0081) (0.008) (0.008)
Lag State 0.0114 0.013 0.013
Unemployment (0.0128) (0.013) (0.014)
Income X X
Demographics X X X
Observations 907 907 907 907 907 907 907
R2 0.000 0.024 0.024 0.035 0.051 0.051
Each column is a separate regression of the change in log property crime rate (the dependent
variable) on the change in unemployment benefits per unemployed person, at the annual
level. Standard errors clustered at the state level, and regressions weighted by total county
population.
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Table 2.4: 2SLS with TUR instrument - Change in Log Property Crime
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
First Stage - ∆UI
TUR 1.221*** 1.231*** 1.307*** 1.158*** 1.282*** 1.258***
(0.347) (0.315) (0.318) (0.306) (0.283) (0.272)
∆ State -0.296
Unemployment (0.222)
State -0.563* -0.477* -.431
Unemployment (0.298) (0.264) (0.260)
Lag State 0.838* 0.693* 0.629*
Unemployment (0.419) (0.393) (0.370)
Income X X
Controls X X X
Second Stage
∆UI -0.015 -0.014** -0.015** -0.015 -0.015** -0.014**
(0.001) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007)
∆ State -0.021***
Unemployment (0.007)
State -0.020*** -0.018** -0.018**
Unemployment (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Lag State 0.020* 0.020* 0.018
Unemployment (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
Income X X
Controls X X X
Observations 907 907 907 907 907 907
1st Stage R2 0.114 0.146 0.170 0.199 0.218 0.264
1st Stage F-stat 12.392 15.281 16.863 14.276 20.553 21.418
Each column is a separate IV regression of the change in log property crime rate (the
dependent variable) on the change in unemployment benefits per unemployed person, at
the annual level. The instrument is a binary {0,1} variable, set to 1 for states with the TUR
rule. Standard errors clustered at the state level, and regressions weighted by total county
population. The 1st Stage F-statistic is the Kleinbergen-Paap statistic, which accounts for
clustered errors.
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Table 2.5: 2SLS with MEW instrument - Change in Log Property Crime
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
First Stage - ∆UI
∆MEW 0.071*** 0.145*** 0.174*** 0.065*** 0.173*** 0.168***
(0.023) (0.029) (0.032) (0.024) (0.030) (0.034)
∆ State -0.940*** -0.8818***
Unemployment (0.235)
State -0.713*** -0.726*** -0.701***
Unemployment (0.233) (0.230) (0.238)
Lag State 0.346 0.404 0.374
Unemployment (0.357) (0.366) (0.347)
Income X X
Controls X X X
Second Stage
∆UI -0.035** -0.013* -0.013* -0.043** -0.013* -0.014**





Lag State 0.018* 0.018
Unemployment (0.011) (0.012)
Income X X
Controls X X X
Observations 907 907 907 907 907 907
1st Stage R2 0.107 0.316 0.350 0.186 0.366 0.391
1st Stage F-stat 10.046 25.505 30.220 7.352 32.634 24.421
Standard errors clustered at the state level. Regressions weighted by total county population.
1st Stage F-stat is the Kleinbergen-Paap statistic, which accounts for clustered errors.
Each column is a separate IV regression of the change in log property crime rate (the
dependent variable) on the change in unemployment benefits per unemployed person, at
the annual level. The instrument is the change in the mean number of weeks of extensions.
Standard errors clustered at the state level, and regressions weighted by total county
population. The 1st Stage F-statistic is the Kleinbergen-Paap statistic, which accounts for
clustered errors.
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Table 2.6: Robustness Checks - Log Property Crime
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
IV - MEW instrument
∆
∆ UI -0.0174** -0.0208*** -0.0157**
(0.0068) (0.0080) (0.0093)
∆ State -0.0215*** -0.0211** -0.0268
Unemployment (0.0066) (0.0088) (0.0166)
Income X X X
Controls X X X
Observations 825 709 229
1st Stage R2 0.371 0.336 0.284













Standard errors clustered at the state level. Regressions weighted by total county population.
1st Stage F-stat is the Kleinbergen-Paap statistic, which accounts for clustered errors.
In the top panel, each column is a separate IV regression of the change in log property crime
rate (the dependent variable) on the change in unemployment benefits per unemployed
person, at the annual level. The instrument is the change in the mean number of weeks
of extensions. Standard errors clustered at the state level, and regressions weighted by
total county population. The 1st Stage F-statistic is the Kleinbergen-Paap statistic, which
accounts for clustered errors. In the bottom panel, each column is an OLS regression of
the dependent variable (change or level of log property crime) on the TUR instrument.
Standard errors clustered at the state level, and regressions weighted by total county
population.
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Chapter 3: The Role of Taxes and Trade Costs in the Greek Recovery
3.1 Overview
Despite an unprecedented reduction in labor costs, Greece has failed to en-
gineer an export-led growth during the recent crisis. Exports did not rise, falling
slightly in 2012, all the while other crisis hit countries in the euro periphery achieved
large export gains with much more modest wage reductions. I study the role of taxes
and trade costs in explaining the failure of Greece to boost its export sector. While
the wage cuts were taking place, energy tax hikes sharply raised the cost of energy
for industrial production. VAT, which disproportionately affects tradables, also rose,
while there was no reduction in the substantial trade costs burdening Greek exports.
After a detailed discussion of the theoretical and empirical literature on the effect
of these factors on exports, I conduct a set of quantitative exercises in the context
of a small-scale New Keynesian small open economy model, to gauge their relative
importance in explaining poor export performance. I find that trade costs are cru-
cial in explaining why exports did not rise; a 20% reduction in trade costs (to the
level of Portugal) would mean 8% more exports within 10 quarters. Similarly, VAT
and energy costs can partially explain why exports fell.
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3.2 Introduction
The euro crisis started in 2010, shortly following the global financial crisis, and
was predominantly characterized by severe adjustments on the part of the peripheral
countries (Portugal, Ireland, Greece, Spain, and secondarily Italy), who attempted
to reduce current account and budget deficits. Figure 3.1 plots the current account
as a percentage of GDP for the PIIGS countries and Germany, and illustrates the
imbalances that were generated with the introduction of the euro in the late 1990s,
as well as the adjustment after 2010.
Figure 3.1: Current Account in the EU Periphery
These current account adjustments are substantial, and even more remarkable
when taking into account that all these countries are members of a currency union,
where intra-union trade accounts for more than 80% of total trade. This meant that
the current account adjustment could not take place through a currency devaluation,
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and so the reduction in the current account deficit (including a whopping 15% of
2008 GDP from 2008 to 2014 for Greece) was achieved through a combination of
falling imports and rising exports. To achieve this, these countries engaged in a
so-called "internal" devaluation process, where wage reductions in the periphery
compared to the core would correct the competitiveness problem of these countries,
compared to the core, a result of easy credit and a consumption boom after the
introduction of the euro in 1999.1 Figure 3.2 shows the path of the nominal unit
labor costs for the PIIGS versus Germany since the year 2000.
Figure 3.2: Nominal Labor Costs in the EU Periphery
Starting in 2010, and with the exception of Italy, a large part of the cost
gap with Germany was significantly reduced. Greece is again the country with the
sharpest adjustment, showing a reduction of 12% from 2010 to 2014, a much larger
fall than the other countries (though Ireland has been reducing labor costs since
1Greece entered the euro in 2001. Physical currency was introduced in 2002.
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2007, as it was affected at a much earlier stage of the crisis than the rest of the
PIIGS).
Combining then the substantial current account consolidation and the im-
provement in competitiveness would suggest that exports must have increased. This
is indeed the case for Portugal, Spain, and Ireland, but not the case for Greece. In
Figure 3.3, I update a graph from Arkolakis et al. (2014) to include 2014 data. The
figure shows the cumulative contribution of exports and imports in the trade balance
consolidation from 2007 to 2014, as a percentage of 2007 GDP. Falling imports have
a positive contribution to the trade balance, and are recorded as positive. Ireland
has had a remarkable export performance (allowing it in fact to also raise imports
substantially), while Spain and Portugal both reduce imports and raise exports.
Greece, on the other hand, has achieved its large adjustment exclusively through a
steep fall in imports, accompanied by a very small fall in exports.
Figure 3.3: Contribution to the Trade Balance Consolidation
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This picture poses a puzzle. In a classical model with fully flexible wages
and prices, falling labor costs would imply higher exports. More realistic models,
which allow for price rigidities and an imperfect passthrough of lower domestic
export prices to lower foreign import prices (see Burstein & Gopinath (2014) for a
recent survey), suggest that passthrough is imperfect and varies substantially across
countries, but this fact would still not be able to explain why Ireland or Portugal
have managed to grow their own exports. This suggests that there is something
unique to Greece.
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, to extend a recent literature
that has considered possible reasons behind this adjustment failure, by providing a
holistic analysis of the issue. Other studies have looked at energy (Mitsopoulos 2014)
or price rigidities (Arkolakis et al. 2014) separately. I complement these studies by
including a more extensive analysis of the role of taxes and logistics, which have
been relatively unaddressed. Second, to provide a unified treatment of all these
issues, by conducting a set of quantitative exercises in the context of a standard
small-open economy model with a currency union, allowing for VAT imperfections,
energy taxes, and logistics costs. This approach can provide an illustrative common
analysis of these issues and potentially inform policy on the importance of each
factor.
Taxes and distribution costs could in theory account for a significant fraction
of the failure of export-led growth to pick-up in Greece. After the 2010 bail-out
by the so-called "troika" comprised by the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
the European Commission (EC), and the European Central Bank (ECB), strict
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conditionality rules were imposed on Greece, which aimed at reducing a massive
fiscal deficit, over 15% of GDP in 2009. In order to fulfill its fiscal goals, the
Greek governments took a series of deficit fighting measures, with substantial tax
hikes across the board, including, inter alia, a hike on VAT and the taxation of
energy. Consequently, prices rose in Greece for the first few years of the adjustment,
despite a sharp reduction in labor costs. In addition, an inefficient distribution
sector prevented these gains in competitiveness from manifesting in a rise in exports.
I focus on these two taxes and study their impact in the recovery.
The excise taxes on energy (electricity, oil, natural gas) rose substantially for
both consumer and industrial use. At the same time, the state-controlled Public
Electricity Corporation, which holds a virtual monopoly on the Greek electricity
market, substantially raised the cost of electricity, as an indirect means of collecting
taxes. All in all, this resulted in a rise of up to 60% in the cost of energy for industrial
use in Greece since 2009 (Mitsopoulos 2014).
In turn, VAT also rose substantially and in a fragmented fashion since, as
is typical for VAT, there are various exemptions and special rates. On the whole
though, the VAT hike contributed significantly to the overall rise in the price level
in the earlier years of the adjustment, up to a third according to Arkolakis et al.
(2014). At the same time, as pointed out first by Feldstein & Krugman (1990), the
VAT has a pernicious trade-adjustment property, namely the fact that it is higher
on tradable than non-tradable goods. In a textbook model (Vegh 2013), a negative
demand shock will reduce demand for both tradables and non-tradables goods, but
since the latter can only be produced domestically, there will be a corresponding
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labor shift to the tradable sector. However, if taxes on tradables are higher, this
shift will not take place.
Finally, an inefficient logistics sector can be a significant barrier to trade.
The land distribution sector is especially problematic, characterized a fragmented
trucking industry, which is primarily based on a single truck ownership system. This
in turn means that truck companies are too small to enjoy economies of scale and
reduce trade costs. This is magnified by the virtual absence of a commercial rail
system, implying that the substantial infrastructure improvements in the Port of
Piraeus, the largest port in Greece, cannot be exploited by domestic exporters.
I find that trade costs have a very significant negative effect on exports; low-
ering trade costs by 20%, to the level of Portugal, within ten quarters, would have
8% higher exports, and 2.5% higher output. VAT and energy taxes are much less
important in the steady state; VAT has a moderate effect on exports and a small
effect on output, and opposite for energy taxes. However, together they can account
for part of the decline in exports (as opposed to the lack of growth), since in the
absence of these two tax hikes, exports would have been 3% higher within 5 quarters.
3.3 Background
3.3.1 Internal Devaluation
The basic idea of an internal devaluation that could boost competitiveness
in the presence of fixed exchange rates goes back to Keynes, who was writing for
the Gold Standard period, and argued that an export subsidy and an import tariff
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could mimic the effect of a currency devaluation, by reducing the relative price
of home tradables (de Mooij & Keen 2012). As such predatory tax policies are
illegal in the EU, the more recent discussion of the same concept evolved along the
lines of the so-called "fiscal devaluation", where a reduction of employers’ social
insurance contributions (SCR) and a rise in VAT would bring about a revenue-
neutral improvement in competitiveness. The mechanics of such a fiscal devaluation
would be as follows. Starting from an initial low employment, high sticky nominal
wage position, a reduction in SCR would raise labor demand and thus employment,
as the labor cost would fall even with fixed nominal wages. The rise in VAT would
serve a double purpose. First, it would raise the price of domestic consumption
(but not exports), and so make domestic tradables more attractive only to foreign
consumers. Second, it would ensure the reform is revenue neutral (International
Monetary Fund 2011). Note that flexible wages would negate this effect, as workers
would demand higher wages, while a flexible exchange rate would appreciate after
the increased demand for home goods. This is of course redundant, as with flexible
nominal wages and prices the adjustment would take place through the market and
there would be no need for a fiscal devaluation.
Farhi et al. (2014) provide theoretical support for this idea, by providing con-
ditions under which a combination of taxes and subsidies could mimic the real effects
of a nominal devaluation under fixed exchange rates, in the context of a standard
New Keynesian small open economy model with sticky prices. They also show the
equivalence of this new approach of fiscal devaluation with the older Keynesian idea
of tariff-cum-subsidy. Interestingly, they show that, in the context of a currency
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union, fiscal devaluations can be unilaterally engineered and be effective without
accommodating monetary policies, as long as the size of the country is sufficiently
small relative to the union. This simple tax policy is only really equivalent to a nom-
inal devaluation under certain conditions, some restrictive (namely that the policy
is unanticipated). Otherwise, under sticky prices, the VAT rise will raise the real
exchange rate, the exact opposite of a nominal devaluation, and the combination
of a consumption subsidy with a change in the income tax is needed to offset this
effect, making the policy quite complicated. Furthermore, while a nominal depre-
ciation would affect the export prices of all goods in an identical way, the effects
of fiscal devaluation will be more pronounced for labor-intensive goods, and since
non-tradables tend to be more labor intensive, the required reallocation will be hard
to achieve International Monetary Fund (2011).
In any case, fiscal devaluation envisioned as such was never really implemented
during the crisis, although it was tried to some extent in Denmark and Sweden in
the late 1980s and early 1990s, but also in Germany in 2006, within the context of a
currency union. If anything, the crisis countries in the eurozone periphery would be
better placed to run successful fiscal devaluations of the Farhi et al. (2014) type, as
they are quite small relative to the union, and so they would not require monetary
accommodation. An explicit fiscal devaluation approach was part of the bail-out
deal for Portugal but was eventually scrapped. France announced such a plan in
2012 but never implemented it.
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3.3.2 VAT and trade
There is an old argument about the competitiveness gains of VAT. The argu-
ment rested on the mechanics of VAT as a "destination-based" taxed. It is imposed
on goods consumed domestically, but not on those exposed, and so it can act as a
tariff-cum-subsidy on its own. However, as Feldstein & Krugman (1990) showed, for
the case of a uniform VAT, this argument misses the fact that domestic exporters
will equalize the prices they demand both home and abroad. In a small open econ-
omy that is a price-taker in international markets, this means that the home price
of exportable goods is simply equal to the international price plus the tax. The do-
mestic importers will behave similarly, and thus the domestic price of imports will
also equal to the international one plus the tax. Finally, the imposition of the VAT
will raise the price of non-tradables in the same way, and so all absolute prices rise
by the same rate, leaving relative prices unchanged. This makes VAT trade-neutral.
Even when trade costs are taken into account, imposition of VAT does not affect the
pre-tax equilibrium. The crucial element of VAT that makes it trade-neutral is also
what has given rise to the competitiveness misconception, namely that it is rebated
on exports but imposed on imports. However, all the export rebate does it to let
the export enter the foreign market untaxed from home, so that it is only affected
by foreign taxes. Similarly, the tax on imports merely ensures that the imported
goods are subject to the same domestic tax policies as home goods.
This argument makes clear the fact that, in principle at least, the proposed
fiscal devaluation approach needs a rise in VAT only for the policy to be budget-
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neutral, as VAT in theory has no effect on trade. The trade-improvement part of
fiscal devaluation strategies relies on the fact that VAT may substitute for other
taxes that are not trade neutral, in this case the payroll tax, though this analogy
is more common with regards to the income tax. Both income and payroll taxes
are inherently trade reducing in the short-run, as they discourage savings, which,
through the national account identities, mechanically result in a higher trade deficit.
Such arguments are especially common in the United States, which does not have
a VAT, but instead a sales tax, typically imposed at rates much lower than VAT
in other OECD countries. Revenue-neutral tax reforms, where VAT replaces the
income tax, are frequently proposed in the US. Feldstein & Krugman (1990) rec-
ognized this possibility for the case of an income tax, while Calmfors (1998) first
made the argument about using the VAT and the payroll tax to engineer a fiscal
devaluation in the EMU.2
It should be clear that VAT is trade-neutral in the sense that it does not distort
relative prices of imports and exports, and hence it is not a beggar-thy-neighbor,
expenditure-switching policy. However, there will in general be intertemporal ef-
fects from the imposition of VAT, just like with any other policy. For example,
according to standard theory, an anticipated rise in VAT is expected to result in
higher current consumption (and consequently higher current account deficits) now,
as consumers front-load consumption, by engaging in intertemporal arbitrage. Sim-
ilarly, a (temporary) unanticipated rise in VAT will bring about a reduction in total
2In the long-run, the present discounted value of the trade balance has to equal zero for every
country, and so any trade-improving has to reverse.
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consumption, and hence an improvement in the trade balance, along with a real
exchange rate depreciation, which will be reversed when the VAT falls again. When
taking the presence of non-tradables more explicitly into account, a uniform rise
in the VAT reduces consumption for both tradables and non-tradables. If tradable
goods prices are internationally set, relative prices of non-tradables will fall, shifting
production to tradables (Vegh 2013). This intertemporal distortion generates an
expenditure-changing effect.
There is in fact a lot of evidence that anticipated VAT changes do generate this
theoretical effect. The main policy change studied is the VAT hike in Japan in 1997,
where Cashin & Unayama (2011) find that an anticipated rise in VAT from 3% to 5%
led to an significant increase in total expenditure consumption in the three months
preceding the change (0.61, 3.24, and 8.85% relative to the counterfactual). The
observe that over three quarters of this change is due to durables. As reported in
de Mooij & Keen (2012), there is also similar evidence of responding to VAT changes
for Germany and the UK, and the upshot is that this intertemporal effect may be
substantial, but short-lived, and primarily affecting durables. To my knowledge,
there has been no study explicitly looking at this intertemporal effects of VAT on
the trade balance, but the connection is clear, especially if the response is mostly
due to durables, as countries like Greece have little domestic production of durables.
The clear theoretical prediction about the trade-neutral nature of the VAT
notwithstanding, reality is more complicated. Two main assumptions needed to
hold for VAT to indeed be neutral.3 First, the tax needs to be uniform, imposed
3In addition, if VAT is imposed on an origin-basis, flexible exchange rates are needed to ensure
125
at the same rate on all goods. Second, the rebate system needs to be properly
functioning. I consider these issues in turn.
As Feldstein & Krugman (1990) made clear in their exposition, the trade-
neutrality of the VAT is only true in what they call the idealized version of the
tax, where it is imposed uniformly on all goods. If that was not the case, then the
result would not hold. They made the specific distinction between tradables and
non-tradables goods, as it is well known that non-tradables are typically taxed at
a lower rate. Part of the reason why this is the case is administrative complexity
in taxing certain non-traded activities, such as household production and, more im-
portantly, the informal sector. This is especially crucial for Greece, which has the
one of the largest informal sectors relative to GDP among OECD countries (Schnei-
der & Buehn 2012). Indeed, to the extent that informal activity is predominantly
non-traded, there exists a natural tax-advantage to non-tradable production. Fur-
thermore, modern welfare states typically tax-discriminate in favor of certain goods
and services, such as healthcare and education, for equity and fairness reasons.
Such goods and services are also typically non-tradable, magnifying the relative tax
distortion between the two types of production.
The effect of the unequal tax treatment of tradables and non-tradables is
straightforward. Non-tradables become relatively cheaper, so consumption, and
hence production, shifts to that sector. This is especially problematic for Greece
in the current juncture as the recovery strategy hinged on exactly the opposite
neutrality. The policy-relevant case is that of destination-basis taxation, so I will not dwell on this
special case.
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goal, an export-led growth through a resource shift towards the tradable sector.
The precise impact of this wedge is very hard to estimate, not least because of
the large practical difficulties in precisely delineating tradables and non-tradables
from the data. Nevertheless, relative elasticities with regards to the different types
of goods are likely to matter regarding the effect of a VAT hike on trade. If, for
instance, tradables consists of more inelastic commodities than non-tradables, the
VAT hike may have no effect on trade at all, as consumers do not change their
spending patterns. This is a very complicated question to answer, and an interesting
topic for future research4, intuition would suggest that for a country like Greece,
with domestic production of most staple goods, non-tradables are less elastic than
tradables, which, with the exception of energy, tend to be elastic goods, such as
durables (citation needed). Furthermore, according to Feldstein & Krugman (1990),
and standard models in general (Vegh 2013), the higher demand for non-tradables
following the hike will be followed by a rise in both price and production of non-
tradables (by a shift in production), as this demand shift cannot be accommodated
by imports.
The need for a properly functioning of the rebate system in order to ensure
the trade neutrality of VAT is clear. In the extreme case with no so-called border
adjustments (no rebate on exports, no VAT on imports), the system becomes origin-
based, and the neutrality is preserved, with the additional requirement of price
and/or exchange rate flexibility. In the more empirically interesting case of no or
partial rebate on exports and a full tax on imports, VAT becomes a protectionist
4There is no, to my knowledge, any empirical study examining this dimension.
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policy. Recall that with a full rebate the domestic exporter is indifferent between
the international price when exporting, and the tax inclusive price domestically, the
domestic price must be equal to the international price plus the tax. By contrast,
in a system with no rebate, the producer will pay the tax no matter where the good
is sold, and so the domestic consumer price will equal the world price. This has
the effect of reducing the relative price of exportables over imports domestically.
As such, non-rebate of the VAT amounts essentially to an export tax, and, at least
in the short run, lower profits for exporters are likely to lead to a fall in trade.
Feldstein & Krugman (1990) pointed out that this much lamented feature of VAT
by non-economist is precisely what makes VAT trade-neutral. In the more realistic
case of a partial rebate, the domestic price of exportables will be somewhat higher
than the world price, but still lower than in the case of a full rebate.
There is are further nuances regarding the property functioning of the VAT
system that is specific to Greece. As is well-known, Greece has chronic tax-collecting
problems, relating both to the size of the informal sector (particularly self-employment),
as well as a culturally lax attitude towards tax collection. It was commonplace in
the years before the crisis for retail firms and the self-employed to either not give
receipts of service, or to charge a higher price to customers asking for a receipt. As
VAT is collected on sales, this was a particularly effective strategy to avoid pay-
ing VAT, and one of the first initiatives of the Greek government after the troika
programs started was the incentivize consumers to take receipts. However, as the
export sector provides a de-factor formal sector and firms that trade internationally
are typically larger and more cash-rich, the government routinely delayed, often for
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a long time (citation needed) rebating VAT paid on intermediate inputs. As the
domestic and intra-EU VAT rebating system is fully automated, the companies af-
fected were those who imported intermediate inputs from outside of the EU and
also exported their goods outside of the EU (citation needed, numbers too).
A similar VAT irregularity that was particularly unpopular for several years
(but was recently stopped) was the demand by the government for businesses to
pay a part of the VAT proceeds they were expecting to receive throughout some
future period of time before actually collecting the tax. The rules surrounding this
practice were highly erratic, but most damaging to businesses was the fact that
the pre-payment was based on past sales, a requirement imposing very tight cash
constraints on businesses who saw their sales falling by record levels for several years
in a row. It is less obvious how this practice affected trade specifically.
A final theoretical issue of note is the difference between a sales tax (a tax
on retail sales only) and a VAT. With a properly functioning VAT rebate system, a
sales tax with a destination-based VAT are ex-ante identical. Two main differences
may emerge. First, if exporters are not properly rebated, then VAT may have the
unintended effects described above. A sales tax is by construction imposed only
on retail consumers and does not need border adjustments. Second, VAT is more
"evasion-proof" with regards to exports than sales taxes. Along the value-chain,
the VAT may be rebated to buyers and sent to the tax authority by sellers several
times. As such, several independent parties will need to engage in evasion for tax
revenue to be completely lost to the state. By contrast, a sales tax is completely
dependent on the retailer, and no tax at all is collected if the retailer fails to remit
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their proceeds. This does not mean of course that evasion is not an issue regarding
the VAT, quite the opposite, especially in cases where retail firms impose large
mark-ups.5 However, there is a sense in which revenue is more secure under VAT
than sales taxes(de Mooij & Keen 2012).
Putting all this together, theoretical predictions imply that the effect of VAT
on trade is not clear, and for a long time such debates were confined to theory, but
the prevalence of rich data in the last few years have allowed researchers to put the
theory to the data. Keen & Syed (2006) focus on OECD data, and consider the VAT
together with corporate taxes. Their results are sensitive to the use of VAT variable,
and to whether they account for corporate taxes. If the latter are excluded, VAT
has a significant relative correlation with (net) exports, which goes to zero when
account for the corporate tax. In a dynamic analysis, the VAT is irrelevant when
using VAT revenue over consumption, or the standard VAT rate, but highly negative
and significant if using VAT revenue over GDP. In the latter case, the effect is sharp
but short-lived.
Desai & Hines (2005) use a very large cross-section of 136 countries for a
single year (2000), and find that reliance on VAT is a significant trade hurdle: VAT
reliance implies one-third fewer exports, while 10% higher VAT revenue imply two
percent fewer exports. A similar, though lower, effect, is found when using a long
but unbalanced of 168 countries, from 1950 to 2000. They conjecture that their
results are primarily driven by the asymmetry with regards to non-tradables, and by
5One of the most visible reform initiatives in Greece was the attempts by authorities to curb
tax evasion in retail, by inducing customers to demand for their receipts.
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incomplete rebates to exporters. They confirm the cross-country data with evidence
from affiliates of US multinational firms, who also export less when they operate in
countries that rely on VAT. They also find that VAT is associated with a less open
economy, though Keen & Lockwood (2007) point out that this may indicate reverse
causality, where open economies are less likely to adopt VAT. Naturally, this does
not apply to the EU, which is a customs union with VAT.
Nicholson (2013) looks more closely at the case of the United States compet-
itiveness, and how it is affected by the fact that it is the only OECD country that
does not use VAT. His panel is short, but has sectoral data, for 29 separate indus-
tries, which allows for a richer specification than Desai & Hines (2005), and he tests
a gravity model of trade in relation to the US. He finds that VAT on other countries
has a robust significant positive impact of US exports, and a negative (though less
robust) impact on imports, which suggests that VAT negatively affects exports of
adopted countries.
The upshot of those studies is that the evidence is decidedly mixed, and more
work is needed for an issue that is fundamentally very hard to identify. However,
even though the estimates provided are not causal, given that the null hypothesis
assumes no effect whatsoever, the results should at the very least the possibility
that the non-neutrality of VAT should be considered as a real possibility. It should
also be noted that a complication of studying the VAT impact of trade in OECD
countries is that there almost no cross-sectional variation (every country but the US,
and Australia before 2000, has VAT), so all variation comes from relative rates in a
pooled model, or from time series variation if data before and after VAT introduction
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are available. In that case, as the introduction of VAT coincided with major trade
agreements (most notably the EU, where VAT was widespread from the very early
stages of the union, or adopted it upon entry), estimates of the effects of VAT on
trade are unavoidably confounded.
As regards to the relative intensities of VAT across tradables and non-tradables
in Greece, there are no, to my knowledge, specific estimates, owning both to the
complexity of the VAT system, and to the fact that exact definitions of tradables
and non-tradable sectors are equally complex. The statutory level rose from 18% to
23% in 2010, with two special categories rising to 13% (reduced) and 6.5% ("ultra-
reduced"), up from 9% and 4.5%. The statutory rate is 30% on the three categories
for all islands in the Aegean except for Crete. The ultra-reduced rate applies to
certain cultural categories and hotels, while the reduced rate applies to foods and
related categories, and most non-tradable services (dining a notable exception).
Health and education are fully exempt from VAT. These, together with the fact
that the large informal sector is by nature non-tradable and VAT exempt, imply
that there exists a significant tax burden on the tradable sector.
Portugal and Ireland, by contrast, started from a higher VAT rate. Ireland
had a maximum rate of 21%, only raising it to 23% in 2012. In Portugal, a rate
of 20% rose to 23% in 2011. As such, the desired shift to tradables was mitigated
to a larger extent in Greece than Ireland or Portugal, due to the larger rise in the
statutory rate.6 Even more important is the level of informality and the extent of
6It is the change, and not the level, that is under consideration here. Thus, it is the change in
VAT, not its level, that is relevant.
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non-compliance, both of which contribute to the divergence from trade-neutrality.
A sufficient statistic to measure this divergence is the VAT Revenue Ratio (VRR),
published by the OECD, which measures the deviation of actual VAT revenues from
an ideal system with perfect compliance and a uniform comprehensive rate. In 2012,
VRR in Greece was 0.37 (with 1 indicating an ideal system), compared to 0.47 for
Portugal, and 0.45 for Portugal.7 Finally, Greece has a much larger informal sector
than Portugal or Ireland, which, as discussed above, is by construction not affected
by VAT and exclusively non-tradable. Specifically, the size of the informal sector
was estimated to 25.1% of GDP in 2010 in Greece, versus 22.2% in Portugal, and
16.5% in Ireland (Schneider & Buehn 2012).
3.3.3 Energy
Rising energy costs have been widely blamed as one of the reasons for the
underperformance of exports in Greece. The particular geography of Greece is
certainly a factor. The large network of islands makes the existence of a single
unified grid difficult, if not outright impossible, while the highly mountainous inland
makes maintenance of the continental grid costly as well.
The energy market is dominated by the state-controlled Public Power Cor-
poration (DEI) in both the retail and wholesale sectors, though there has been a
significant reduction in DEI’s market share in the past few years, from 85.6% of the
total energy market in 2009 to 66% in 2011 and 20128. The fall in DEI’s market
7Source: http://www.oecd.org/tax/consumption/consumption-tax-trends-19990979.htm
8DEI annual reports for several years, https://www.dei.gr/en/i-dei/enimerwsi-
ependutwn/etisia-deltia.
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power seems to have leveled off, as it was primarily due to the growth of the natural
gas network (also primarily controlled by the recently privatized DESFA), whose
development has stalled, and the emergence of a few small private operators, the
largest of which have seized operations following an embezzlement scandal which
cost the state revenue amounting to over 0.1% of GDP.9 Around half of DEI’s en-
ergy derives from lignite, a domestically extracted low-quality (and so both costly
and highly polluting) type of coal.
Despite the gradual opening of the energy market, two developments during
the crisis years have resulted in a large rise in energy costs, for both retail consumers
and companies. First, as part of the initial debt consolidation efforts by the gov-
ernment, taxes on energy rose significantly. This rise was primarily due to a hike
in excise taxes, which are non-refundable. As taxes vary by type and intensity of
use, it is more instructive to look at tax revenues by energy taxes. Even though
energy taxes in Greece were quite low compared to the rest of the EU before 2009,
tax receipts rose by 60% from 2008 to 2011 (when they peaked, falling slightly in
2012), whereas they fell in Portugal and Spain, rose modestly in Ireland (by 13%)
and more significantly in Italy, rising by 25%.
Second, the government started leveraging its control of the energy market,
through the DEI bills, to use energy prices as an indirect source of revenue. One
approach that caused much controversy was the imposition of several emergency




relevant to this paper was the rise in the price demand for energy by DEI. According
to official Eurostat data, tax-inclusive electricity prices for industrial production in
Greece, though certainly higher than the EU average, are not excessive in compari-
son. The price of a unit of electricity for energy intensive companies was 7 cents in
2013 for Greece, compared to 8.4 for Ireland, 7.8 for Spain, 8.3 for Italy, and 5.9 for
Portugal. However, as pointed out by Pelagidis (2014), simply comparing energy
prices charged for industrial use across countries is highly misleading. The reason is
that it is standard practice for energy-intensive companies across Europe to negoti-
ate individual agreements at well-below official market rates with energy provides,
and these agreements are considered industrial secrets, and hence not included in
averages quoted in Eurostat. In many countries, such agreements account for over
50% of total industrial energy use, which means that Eurostat-quoted prices sub-
stantially overestimate true energy costs. By contrast, Greece does not have such
agreements, and hence the price recorded is the actual price paid. While precisely
quantifying this disadvantage is not straightforward, an estimate is that energy-
intensive Greek companies have to pay up to 80% more than similar firms in other
EU countries (Pelagidis & Mitsopoulos 2014).
The combination of tax hikes and tax-like price hikes for energy use, combined
with high borrowing costs, are, according to Pelagidis (2014), the chief contributor




Another important hurdle in spurring export growth in Greece is its frag-
mented and inefficient logistics sector, which refers both to the distribution sector,
but also the various bureaucratic entities related to trade, such as customs officials.
An indicator of how important this issue is perceived to be by officials is the fact that
it led the World Bank to publish a special report on the logistics sector in Greece
(World Bank 2013), a rare move for a developed country. This section explores the
tax imposed on trade by the lack of an efficient logistics sector in some detail.
Although a catchall measure of trade costs is not straightforward, a standard
such measure is provided by gravity models of international trade. Here I use a cost
metric available from the World Bank Trade Cost Database, constructed according
to the Inverse Gravity framework of Novy (2013). The gravity model predicts bi-
lateral trade by the size of two countries and the distance between them, and is the
workhorse model of the international trade literature. Novy (2013) derives a method
to capture trade costs using only observable data, and comes up with a measure that
combines transportation, tariffs, and other less tangible trade barriers, including red
tape or poor law-enforcement. The cost measure is a tariff-equivalent, measuring
the difference between actual trade flows and those predicted by a frictionless model.
Figures 3.4 and 3.5 provide graphical evidence of the burden the broader lo-
gistics sector imposes on Greek exports. The graphs show trading costs by trading
partner for Greece and the other peripheral economies when trading with the three
largest EU economies, Germand, France, and the UK, plus the United States. Figure
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3.4 gives data for 2007 and 3.5 for 2012, the last year of data availability.10
Figure 3.4: Trade Costs by Trading Partner: Euro Periphery, 2007
The figures clearly show that trade in Greece faces much larger trade costs
compared to the other peripheral countries. In 2007, Greece faced 22% higher costs
when trading with Germany compared to Portugal, 35% compared to Ireland, 55%
compared to Spain, and 72% compared to Italy. The numbers when trading with
France are 46%, 44%, 122%, and 96%, respectively. The situation is similar for
trade with the UK and the US. Interestingly, even though there are no official trade
barriers of any kind within the European Union, Greece has a higher cost of trading
with the UK, an EU member, than Italy does in trading with the US, which is
not an EU member (and thus does have some trade barriers when trading with
the EU). Note that geographical distance is accounted for when constructed gravity
models, so the geographical proximity of, say, Spain to France is controlled for. The
10There are no US data in 2012.
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Figure 3.5: Trade Costs by Trading Partner: Euro Periphery, 2012
measure is likely contaminated by potential cultural factors. For instance, Catalan
and Basque speakers along both sides of the Spain-France border arguably make
trade easier. Such issues however cannot explain the lower costs Portugal faces
compared to Greece when trading with Germany.
These issues had not improved by 2012. Although Greece’s overall trade costs
did fall somewhat, this improvement lagged the performance of the other peripheral
countries. Greek costs vis-a-vis France fell by 9.5% from 2007 to 2012, compared
with a fall of 24% for Italy, and around 19% for Portugal and Spain. Trade costs
for Greece actually increased slightly, by 0.31%, when trading against Germany,
compared to a fall of over 9% for Italy and Portugal and over 2% for Spain. The
numbers are again similar against the UK. Ireland also lagged the rest, but still
showed a marked trade-weighted improvement as the bulk of its bilateral trade is
with the UK.
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It is also interesting to consider how Greece fares against its non-Eurozone
neighbors in Southeastern Europe. Figures 3.6 and 3.7 show trading costs for Greece,
Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey for 2007 and 2012, respectively.
Figure 3.6: Trade Costs by Trading Partner: Southeast Europe, 2007
Here the differences are less pronounced compared to the Euro periphery, but
it is important to consider the fact that Greece has a much higher level of GDP
per capita than its neighbors. Greece has lagged against the Southeastern countries
in reducing its costs. Bulgaria has made great strides, lowering by 32% costs of
trading with France, 25% with Germany, and 27% for the UK. Turkey has been less
successful than Bulgaria, but still performed better than Greece.
Another interesting metric quoted in the report is the Logistics Performance
Index (LPI), an index of inefficiencies in the supply chain. It is intended to assess
the logistics performance of each country by surveying of professionals in the major
trading partners of the country. It ranks Greece 71st in the survey, while Spain,
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Figure 3.7: Trade Costs by Trading Partner: Southeast Europe, 2012
Italy, and Portugal rank 20, 27, and 28, respectively.
According to the World Bank report, even though the problems with the Greek
distribution sector are varied and cannot be characterized by a single issue, an
overarching hurdle to an improved value chain is the overwhelming reliance on road
transportation through trucks, which accounts for 98% of land transport, versus
72% for the EU as a whole (World Bank 2013). The trucking sector is especially
fragmented, with 90% of operators being characterized as "own-account", meaning
that they transport their own goods. According to the Hellenic Statistical Authority
(quoted in World Bank 2013), 1.27 million such companies operate, a stunning
number for a country of 11 million inhabitants. The report documents that the
commercial sector is small and fragmented, with little consolidation (two thirds of
the companies have one truck), and old trucks. The authors list a number of possible
factors, such as more stringent regulation for commercial licenses as opposed to own-
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accounts, high fuel costs, VAT rates, road user charges, driver insurance costs and
others. The total cost of per kilometer for Greek operators is almost double that of
French ones.
The upshot is that land transportation imposes a significant cost on Greek
trade, which is not due to mark-ups in the distribution value chain (though such do
exist in upstream industries), but rather due to costly regulation, costly inputs, and
the fragmentation of the trucking industry, which is inefficient as it cannot exploit
scale economies.
The over-reliance of Greece on trucks for land transport is partly explained by
geography. Greece has a network of over 300 inhabited islands11, and the inland is
highly mountainous. Nevertheless, equally important is the underdeveloped nature
of the rail network. The report highlights issues both with the train company and
the network of stations and lines. The main train company is state-owned and oper-
ated, suffering from the same inertia and inefficiencies as the rest of the Greek state
bureaucracies. A particular problem regarding the train company is that the op-
erator (TRAINOSE) and the infrastructure manager (OSE), even though they are
both state-operated, do not coordinate regarding network development. Further-
more, the train system, including the stations, was not designed with commercial
traffic in mind, but was meant to accommodate passengers instead, and the reports
mentions that potential major clients lamented the poor design of stations in terms
of transporting cargo, as well as the lack of punctuality regarding service.
11Greece has the second largest coastline to area ratio out of all countries in the world that are
not islands or micro states. Equivalently, it has the 11th longest coastline even though it is the
97th largest in area.
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A further significant hurdle regarding efficient rail transportation comes from
the quality of the lines themselves, as to a large extent they are not electrified,
which both raises the cost and limits the speed of transportation. As a consequence
of all these issues, rail accounts currently for only two percent of exports. The low
quality of the rail network has significant spillovers to other parts of the logistics
network, however. The port of Piraeus, the largest port in Greece, is a global center
of the maritime industry, in which Greece is a world leader, and has experienced
significant investments in the last few years. However, the connection of the rail
network with the port is heavily underdeveloped, meaning that goods have to travel
to and from the port by trucks, suffering the inefficiencies mentioned above. Thus,
the improvements in the Piraeus port mainly service transit demand, and have not
contributed to export growth. As this investment activity is tied to privatization
of the port operation, the lack of trickle down to the domestic economy threatens
further developments in the port, which were planned to take place with further
privatization.
Finally, trade is severely hampered by a corrupt and inefficient customs sys-
tem. Customs brokers have an essential monopoly over the clearing of goods through
customs, and even though the profession was recently liberalized de jure, it remains
de facto closed according to the report. The most important protection the bro-
kers enjoyed was the benefit of a credit line with the customs authority, whereas
non-licensed actors had to pay fully in cash or check up-front. Anecdotally, the
customs sector is considered one of the most corrupt parts of public administration.
Though little was known about the extent of illicit activities regarding customs, a
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recent report by a leading Greek daily newspaper uncovered a systemic culture of
corruption between customs officers and brokers, with bribes involved in essentially
every transaction between two parties.12
There are a number of further issues contributing to the low efficiency of the
logistics sector, including the bad planning of logistics zones, restrictive licensing
systems, and poor enforcement of trade-related laws. As the focus of this paper
is on factor that hamper trade, I did not discuss the well-performing sectors of the
Greek transportation sector, notably the shipping industry, which is the world leader
in the field.
The upshot in the preceding discussion is that the state of the logistics sec-
tor, comprising primarily of transportation, infrastructure, and the quality of state
bureaucracy, imposes a significant tax on trading activity, and could potentially ac-
count for a substantial part of the lackluster performance of the Greek exporting
sector during the recovery. In addition, it is worthwhile to note that logistics inef-
ficiencies lead to higher prices for all goods, albeit to varying lengths according to
the transportation component of the final good, and hence lead to higher import,
as well as export, prices, and higher CPI.
3.3.5 Other
As the focus of this paper is rather narrow, I will only briefly mention two
other factors, which have been dealt with in detail elsewhere. The first is price




rigidities, a catchall term for various markups and inefficiencies in the product mar-
kets, studied in detail by Arkolakis et al. (2014). They argue against a common
anecdote that Greece cannot produce tradable goods, and instead point to product
market rigidities in explaining why prices kept rising several years into the recession,
before starting to fall by 2013. Using a standard Eaton-Kortum trade model, they
show that exports would have risen by 25% from 2007 to 2012, rather than falling
by 5%. For the sake of completeness, I conduct a separate exercise in the context of
my model, where I study how structural policies, which would reduce private sector
markups, would have affected output and exports.
The second relates to credit tightening. The combination of heavy exposure
of Greek banks to Greek government debt, whose value plummeted, and substan-
tial deposit flight, squeezed bank liquidity and led to sharp rises in borrowing
costs. Pelagidis & Mitsopoulos (2014) document that interest rates for loans to
non-financial companies have been the highest in Europe (together with Cyprus)
since 2008. See Pelagidis & Mitsopoulos (2014) and references therein for further
details.
3.4 Model
The model is fairly standard, so I will only describe the structure here. The
full model is presented in Appendix C, together with the full list of equilibrium
conditions.
The context is a standard New Keynesian small open economy framework,
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as in Gali & Monacelli (2005). A representative household consumes a composite
consumption good, made up of tradable and non-tradable goods, and supplies labor.
Preferences are logarithmic with respective to consumption, and of the constant
relative risk variety for labor. The consumption preferences are also characterized
by habit formation, a common feature of such models, in order to induce smooth
adjustments to shocks.
I consider small open economy within a currency union, assuming, for simplic-
ity, that the currency union is closed to the rest of the world, and focus analysis
within the union. In contrast to Gali & Monacelli (2005), credits markets are in-
complete. As is well known, small open economy models with incomplete markets
feature a random walk in consumption, which precludes the use of approximation
techniques, and stationarity needs to be induced. Here, I assume that the domestic
economy borrows at a premium from abroad i.e. the interest rate is debt elastic
(Schmitt-Grohe & Uribe 2003). This feature is also intended to capture the fact
that the eurozone periphery faced skyrocketing borrowing costs, at large premium
over the core, notably Germany, at the onset of the crisis.
The production structure is very similar to Rabanal & Tuesta (2012). There
is a final goods sector comprised by a continuum of competitive firms that produces
a final tradable and final non-tradable good, which are consumed directly by do-
mestic households. The final tradable good is produced by combining home and
foreign tradable intermediate goods, while the final non-tradable is produced using
home non-tradable intermediates. Notice that international trade takes place only
in tradable intermediates, not final goods. This is very common in such models,
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where the final goods is typically thought of as a retail good. This approach is espe-
cially convenient in the present context relates to modeling VAT, which is rebated
for both exports and intermediate goods. This setup then allows me to impose VAT
on final consumption without complicating the model with rebates. The preferences
of domestic consumers affect the production structure through the presence of bias
in favor of home intermediates in the production of tradable goods.
Finally, intermediate goods are produced by monopolistically competitive firms,
using labor and energy as inputs. Pricing is of the Calvo variety, with only a fraction
of firms being able to adjust their prices in any given year. In addition, there is par-
tial indexation to inflation, meaning that firms set their prices as a function of last
year’s prices. These are standard features in New Keynesian small open economy
models.
3.4.1 Calibration
For the calibration of the parameters in the model, I rely both on the previous
literature as well as on micro data. The output level of the foreign economy is taken
as given, and the only effect of home on the foreign economy is through its effect
on the foreign tradable price level, and hence on the relative size of the final and
intermediate goods sectors, as well as on foreign imports and .
The habit formation parameter h is set to 0.6, as is standard for the euro
area (Smets & Wouters 2003). I follow Papageorgiou (2014) and set the Calvo
parameter θN and θT to 0.7059 for both tradable and non-tradable producers, and
146
to 0.697 for the foreign country, which imply that prices are reset on average every
3.4 and 3.3, respectively. These are parameters estimated from firm level evidence
in European firms (Druant et al. 2009), and it should be noted that while these are
very close to the posterior mean of Rabanal & Tuesta (2012) for the tradable sector,
the latter obtain a very low posterior estimate for non-tradables. Similarly, I set the
indexation parameters κT and κN to 0.259, and the foreign counterparts to 0.216.
These correspond to the fraction of firms that consider past inflation when resetting
prices, as reported in Druant et al. (2009).
I set the elasticity of substitution between core and energy consumption, as
well as between labor and energy in production to 0.3, a value around the median
of standard calibrations in the literature (e.g Alvarez et al. 2009, Jacquinot et al.
2006, Natal 2012), and estimates from Kilian & Murphy (2014). For the elasticity
of substitution between core tradables and non-tradables I set ϵ to 0.6.
Regarding trade costs, the interesting counterfactual regarding exports is not
the unrealistic case of zero trade costs, but rather the steady state gains in exports
and output Greece would enjoy if it could reduce its trade costs with Germany (a
proxy for the core Euro-area) to the level of Portugal, a country with equally little
cultural ties to Germany. According to the World Bank Trade Costs Database, the
tariff equivalent trade cost to Germany was 66% for Portugal and 81% for Greece
in 2007, and that is my choice for the baseline tariff equivalent. This translates
approximately into an iceberg cost of 44.75% in the context of the model.
I set the fraction of tradables in consumption to 0.4 for both countries (Rabanal
& Tuesta 2012), and the fraction of home tradable intermediates in final tradables γx
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to 0.6 (Farhi et al. 2014). Note that these are the only foreign parameters that I need
to pin down, as they determine the relative size of the final goods sectors and foreign
imports. The elasticity of substitution between home and foreign intermediates (ξ)
is more challenging, because of the wide range of estimates reported in the literature.
Rabanal & Tuesta (2012) estimate a posterior mean of 0.85 and Papageorgiou (2014)
estimates 3.351 for the Greek economy using micro data, while Adolfson et al. (2007),
in a prominent open-economy DSGE estimation exercise use a calibrated value of 5.
I set ξ to 2, a value intended to match the export improvement of Portugal.
Another challenging set of parameters regards the energy shares in intermedi-
ate production (1− γh) and (1− γn). Bodenstein et al. (2008) and Natal (2012) set
it to 0.02 for the US, citing evidence from sectoral value added data, as well imports
of oil and gas, and Cuche-Curti et al. (2009) also use a value of 0.02 for Switzerland.
Edelstein & Kilian (2007) report a value of 0.03 for the US using energy share in
value added. To my knowledge, there is no paper directly looking at the energy in-
puts of different industries, let alone a separation into tradables and non-tradables.
A more valuable source is the energy use of as a fraction of value added across trad-
ables and non-tradable industries. Since such information is unavailable for Greece,
I use US data from the BEA.13 The classification of production as tradables or not
is fraught with problems, particularly for countries like Greece, where the standard
assumption that services are non-tradable is highly mis-leading, as services account
for approximately half of exports, due to the size of the tourism and shipping sector.
A more appropriate methodology (the modified indirect approach) has been recently
13GDP-by-Industry Data, http://www.bea.gov/industry/gdpbyind_data.htm.
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pioneered by the OECD, and it is this approach I utilize, modified for Greece.14 For
the US, and excluding government and utilities, the shares of energy are 0.026 for
non-tradables and 0.053 of tradables. For Greece, using the US energy input to value
added in GDP ratio for each industry, the values are 0.025 and 0.091, respectively,
owing overwhelmingly to the much larger shares amongst Greek tradables of trans-
portation and warehousing, and to a much lesser extent agriculture, the two most
energy intensive industry groups.15 Removing the transportation sector reduces the
inputs to 0.022 and 0.039, respectively. For the purposes of the model, the latter
approach is more sensible, as transportation is really a cost on other trade activities.
This measure is indicative of the large burden the transportation sector imposes on
Greek trade.
3.5 Analysis
I will be conducting two sets of quantitative exercises to illustrate the relative
importance of VAT imperfections, energy costs, and trade costs on the failure of
Greece to boost its exports. In the first set of exercises, I will examine the quanti-
tative comparative statics of different policies on the steady state level of exports,
output, as well as the relative size of the tradable sector. In the second set of exer-
cises, I will compare the dynamics of the model when hit by an interest rate shock
14According to this approach, the following industries are classified as tradable: agriculture,
mining, manufacturing, wholesale trade, transport, information, and professional services. I also
assign accommodation to tradables, to account for the tourism industry, though the figure does
not change much.
15The modified indirect approach classifies wholesale trade in the tradable sector and retail
trade in the non-tradables. National Accounts for Greece do not report those separately, so assign
the sum to non-tradables.
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Table 3.1: Preference and Technology Parameters
Preference Parameters
β Discount factor 0.995
h Habit formation parameter 0.600
χ Debt elasticity of the Greek interest rate 0.001
ν Labor elasticity 1.000
Elasticities of Substitution
ϵ Tradable and non-tradable core consumption goods 0.600
αy Labor and energy in intermediate production 0.300
ξ Home and foreign intermediate inputs in final goods production 2.000
Production and Consumption Shares
γc Share oftradables in consumption, home 0.400
γx Share of home intermediates in final good production 0.600
γh Share of labor in home tradable intermediates 0.978
γn Share of labor in home non-tradable intermediates 0.961
Calvo parameters
θh GR Tradable intermediates 0.706
θN GR Non-tradable intermediates 0.706
Indexation parameters
κh GR tradable intermediates 0.259
κN GR non-tradable intermediates 0.259
(intending to capture the large rise in the cost of borrowing during the crisis, as
well as the fall of overall demand) under alternative scenarios regarding government
policies.
To begin with, the top panel of figure 3.8 shows the steady state of exports,
output, and the relative size of the tradable sector under a range of VAT imper-
fections. As I abstract from issues relating to incomplete rebates, as long as VAT
is uniform across tradables and non-tradables, the level of exports is independent
of the level of VAT. So in this exercise, starting from a uniform VAT of 18%, I
sketch out the response of the steady of the model for a rise in tradables VAT, up
to the statutory maximum of 23%. It is impossible to pin down the exact level of
the tax on each sector, owning both to the number of different exemptions and the
difficulty of precisely defining what is a tradable and a non-tradable good, so this
exercise is only meant to be illustrative. We see that the steady state volume of
150
exports is lower by approximately 0.8% at the statutory maximum. GDP responds
little, falling by approximately 0.3% lower, though it should be noted that as VAT
proceeds are spent in the same way as private consumption, this is equivalent to a
rebate, and so a small output response is expected. Finally, the share of labor used
in the tradable sector responds more strongly, falling by over one percentage point,
or 2.7%. Overall these response are not trivial and are consistent with the theory,
and though they cannot account for the failure of Greek exports to pick-up, they
may partially explain why exports did not pick-up.
The second panel in figure 3.8 conducts the same exercise against rising energy
costs. As the interest is in relative price changes over the rest of the periphery, this
exercise has a more straightforward interpretation, as we know that energy costs in
Greece rose by over 60% since 2009. The response of output is significantly larger
here, falling by 1.2%, but much smaller regarding exports, which is only about 0.2%
lower in the steady state, as well as the size of the tradable sector. This is because
the energy share of production is only somewhat larger in tradables, and hence
the effect of energy costs falls almost uniformly on all production. This is true, of
course, of the total tradable sector. As shown in Pelagidis & Mitsopoulos (2014),
certain sectors are so energy intensive that the energy cost hike and the labor cost
fall meant that the former was over 3 times higher than the lower. The point is that,
on aggregate, little of Greek tradable production is particular energy intensive.
Finally, figure the bottom panel in figure 3.8 plots the results of the exercise
where the tariff equivalent trade cost rises from 41% to the baseline of 81%. The
response here is stark. Steady state exports are 12% higher at the low cost level, and
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output 2.7% higher. It is clear that trade costs are much more important than either
VAT non-uniformity or energy costs in explaining the trouble with Greek exports
during the crisis. Note that the share of labor in the tradable sector actually rises
with trade costs, due to import substitution.
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3.5.1 Dynamic Analysis with Perfect Foresight
To consider how the dynamics of the recovery where affected by the different
taxes and costs, I introduce a borrowing shock to the economy that matches the 4%
decline in output in 2010, and analyze the impulse responses under different policies,
in a context where after the initial shock, there is perfect foresight regarding both
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the future path of the interest rate and government policies.
First, it is interesting to consider whether policy to reduce trade costs would
imply different adjustment dynamics. Starting at the baseline tariff equivalent cost
of 81%, figure 3.9 shows the response of consumption and exports to the same shock
under different reform scenarios, where the cost falls by 10%, 20%, and 30% within
ten periods, and the results again are stark regarding exports. A reduction of 20%
(roughly to the level of Portugal), would have raised exports enough to raise output
by
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Next, consider VAT and energy costs. As argued above, VAT and energy costs
may explain why exports fell, but not why they did not rise. Figure 3.10 shows the
response of exports after the interest rate shock assuming no trade shocks, comparing
the case of a 80% energy hike and VAT on non-tradables higher by 7 percentage
points to 20%, with the counterfactual of non energy hike and uniform VAT at
13%. The VAT hike moderates the initial shock by raising labor through the wealth
effect, though this effect evaporates within a quarter. The dynamic effect here is
more pronounced than the static one for both VAT and energy. VAT has a larger
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effect on exports and a small effect on output, while energy cost has a substantial
effect on output, and a moderate effect on exports. Overall, exports would have been
approximately 3% higher after 10 quarters in the absence of the policies changes.
As Arkolakis et al. (2014) point out, price rigidities in the form of uncom-
petitive product markets, are also important in explaining the lack of adjustment.
Though the small-scale model used here is too simple to fully account for such issues,
it is instructive to examine how the economy behaves under different assumptions
about steady state markups. Figure 3.11 shows the impulse responses to the shock
under structural policies that would reduce markups within ten periods, by 10%,
20%, and 30%. In the context of the model, policies that reduce markups have
a sizable impact on both output and exports. Reducing markups has a balanced
effect on both sectors, unlike trade cost reduction which only benefits the tradable
sector, and so output and exports rise together markups fall, implying little change
in exports as a fraction of GDP.
3.5.2 Rational expectations analysis using CDS data
The preceding dynamic analysis was based on a perfect foresight, deterministic
model (after the initial unexpected shock), and thus necessarily abstracts from the
case where the rational agent is uncertain regarding the future path of the interest
rate. It is also abstracted from the actual path of borrowing costs after the initial
shock.
In this section, I simulate the model in a stochastic context, where agents
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Figure 3.10: Deterministic case: Responses to interest rate shock - VAT and Energy Costs
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Tradable VAT hike: 20% from uniform 13%. Energy cost hike: 80% over initial steady
state.
expected zero mean random shocks to their borrowing costs each period. In addition,
I feed into the model the actual path of interest rates the Greek economy experienced
from the first quarter of 2010, when the impending crisis became apparent, until
the last quarter of 2014. At the same time, I maintain the assumption that the
government commits to a policy after the initial shock, as the ultimate goal of this
paper is to study the efficacy of government policies.16 The choice of data is not
a straightforward one. Even though the stock of outstanding credit in the Greek
16I use the simultxdet function of Dynare, which combines deterministic and stochastic shocks.
The government policies are deterministic in that the agent knows the precise path from the initial
period. The interest rate is a zero mean autoregressive stochastic process, but instead of having
random shocks each period, I feed actual data into the model, in a sense "tricking" the agent.
Though an adaptive expectations process may be more realistic, the model is not as naive as may
seem, given the highly persistent nature of the shock (from the point of view of the agent.
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Actual 10% fall 20% fall 30% fall
economy collapsed to a third of its precession level, the average interest rate never
exceeded 8% 17, and so credit adjustment took place in the quantity margin, with
credit being rationed a-la Stiglitz & Weiss (1981). Another approach is to use
data on credit default swaps (CDS), an indirect metric of borrowing costs for the
sovereign or the bank. Due to the massive private sector debt write-down (PSI) in
2012, sovereign CDS were triggered in 2012 and are thus not suitable as a metric of
borrowing costs. I thus use data on 5 year CDS for the National Bank of Greece,
by far the largest bank in Greece at the time in overall assets and private sector
lending portfolio.18
Results from the stochastic simulations are shown in figures 3.12-3.14. Results
follow broadly the same pattern as the deterministic exercise. The main difference
is the much steeper fall in output, up to 17%, which is a lot closer to the actual
fall of 20% by 2013. The recovery in the simulated data comes at an earlier time,
however, and is quite fast. This is due to the sharp fall in the CDS after the PSI, and
17This refers to loans to non-financial corporations. Source: Bank of Greece.
18CDS rate on 1-2 year bonds were also extremely volatile during the PSI, reaching a value of
several thousands basis points for a few months. This is a typical inverted yield curve situation.
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Actual 10% fall 20% fall 30% fall
the absence of another demand channel in the model. In reality, fiscal tightening
is largely blamed as having been another important drag on growth, and such a
feature could easily be included in the model. Nevertheless, it is important that the
model manages to get so close to the actual contraction, especially regarding the
validity of the counterfactual results.
Results are very similar with the deterministic case, and the conclusion is the
same. Trade costs are by far the most important reason why exports did not pick
up. The counterfactual reduction of trade costs to the level of Portugal would have
been over 10% higher after 10 periods. The model cannot account for the actual fall
in exports observed in the data, but does show that they would have been higher in
the absence of the VAT and energy hike.
3.6 Conclusion
This paper studies the Greek recovery during the recent euro crisis, predomi-
nantly focusing on the most salient feature of the adjustment, the failure of Greece
to boost its export sector. This failure is more stark when one considers that other
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Figure 3.13: Stochastic case: Responses to interest rate shock - VAT and Energy Costs
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peripheral countries, such as Portugal, Ireland, and Spain, showed a marked im-
provement in their exports.
The focus of this paper mainly fell on three factors that could explain, on the
one hand, why Greek exports failed to rise, and, on the other, why they actually
fell, when standard trade models predicted a rise of 25% (Arkolakis et al. 2014).
These are a) rise of the VAT rate, which falls predominantly on the tradable sector,
hence impeding the desired adjustment, b) the energy tax hike, which placed a
significant burden on production across sectors, and c), the presence of substantial
trade costs, which are much higher for Greece than the rest of the euro periphery.
After a detailed discussion of the theoretical and empirical background regarding
these issues, I conducted a set of exercises in the context of a stylized, small-scale
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Actual 10% fall 20% fall 30% fall
New-Keynesian small open economy model, to quantitatively assess the relative
importance of these factors for explaining the facts.
In the context of the model, trade costs are singularly important in explaining
why exports did not rise. The steady-state level of exports would be over 8% higher
if the tariff-equivalent trade cost of 81% could fall by 20% (the level enjoyed by
Portugal), and approximately 13% higher if it could fall by 30%. By contrast,
although the VAT and energy cost hike are an order of magnitude less important
for the steady-state level of exports, they can partially explain why exports fell. In
the absence of the VAT and energy hikes, exports would have been 3% within 5
quarters.
The policy implications of this paper are clear: for Greece to grow its export
sector, it has to invest in improving the efficiency of its logistics and transportation
sector. As argued in the main text, the over-reliance on a fragmented trucking in-
dustry and the absence of proper connection of the underdeveloped rail system with
the port has meant that significant investments in the major ports have not cre-
ated benefits to the domestic economy. Improving the logistics sector and reducing
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domestic industry markups would help bring Greece out of its current depression.
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Appendix A: Appendix for Chapter 1
A.1 Model
Recall that the utility function used for the illustrative example in Section 1.4
is given by










This is a standard utility function used for labor supply problems (Keane 2011),
because of its convenience: γ is intimately connected with elasticities, and η with
income effects. The choice of functional form is only meant to give closed form
solutions for the elasticities, and is of no particular significance.










+ λ[wh+ y − pB − c]. (A.2)
1In this exposition, I ignore, for simplicity, the possibility of corner solutions, which can be
readily defined by constructing reservation wages (for labor) and a similar expression for bequests.
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The first order conditions are
c⌋ Uc = λ
h⌋ Uh + λw = 0





These conditions, together with the budget constraint, define a system of four equa-
tions with three endogenous variables (c, h, B, and λ). The total derivative of the
system (exploiting the additively separable structure of preference) can allow us to
determine the effect of a small change in one variable on the complete system:
Uccdc− dλ = 0
Uhhdh+ wdλ = −λdw
UBBdB − pdλ = λdp
−dc+ wdh− pdB = −hdw − dy +Bdp
In matrix notation, of the form Ax = Zb:

Ucc 0 0 −1
0 Uhh 0 w
0 0 UBB −p




















To estimate the effect of a small change in the exogenous variables on the en-
dogenous variables and derive the Slutsky equation, it is convenient to use Cramer’s
rule.
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This is positive due to the second order conditions of the utility function -
utility is concave with respect to consumption and bequests, and (negative) convex
with respect to labor.2







Ucc 0 0 −1
0 −λ 0 w
0 0 UBB −p

















2In the more general case where the cross-partial derivatives are non-zero, the positivity of the





































2 + whUBBUcc + UcUBB
− (UccUhhp2 + UccUbbw2 + UhhUBB)
. (A.3)
Before proceeding to functional forms, first let us define the following param-








Using now the functional form of the utility function, and after a few steps of








η(1− SB) + ηαSw − (η − α)
αγ − ηαSw − ηγSB
. (A.4)














− (UccUhhp2 + UccUbbw2 + UhhUBB)
, (A.6)
respectively.
Using the functional forms, we arrive at the following closed form solutions for

















αγ − ηαSw − ηγSB
, (A.8)
respectively. Note that SB ≤ 0, Sw ≥ 0, Sy ≥ 0, while the denominator αγ −
ηαSw − ηγSB is negative. It follows then that ϵI < 0, as expected. The sign of ϵh,p
depends on the magnitude of α - this precisely reflects the interplay between income
and substitution effects.
Also note that, if B = 0, ϵh,w and ϵI reduce to standard Marshallian and
income elasticities of the type seen in Keane (2011).
The decomposition of ∂h
∂p
into an income and substitution effect uses duality
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theory. Let h(p, w, y) be the solution to (1.2) and let hc(p, w, u) be the solution to
e(p, w, u) = min
c,h,B
pB + c− wh (A.9)
s.t. u(c, h,B) ≥ u.
Intuitively, the expenditure function is the amount an individual needs in
addition to labor earnings to achieve utility u, given prices.3


























3This insight is due to David Card.
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αγ − ηαSw − ηγSB
< 0. (A.14)
This is the substitution effect of the rise in the estate tax. The bequest is a con-
sumption good, so a higher tax on consumption reduces the price of leisure and
reduces labor supply.





























αγ − ηαSw − ηγSB
> 0. (A.17)
Plugging (A.14) and (A.8) into (1.6), we have an expression for the response of labor
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αγ − ηαSw − ηγSB
+
ηαSy


















where the last equality is obtained by multiplying top and bottom by C/N , in order
to express the S quantities in terms of non-labor income.
Finally, it is also interesting to consider the direct effect of the tax on bequests.







Ucc 0 0 −1
0 Uhh 0 w
0 0 λ −p



















































−UccUcw2 + pBUccUhh − UcUhh
− (UccUhhp2 + UccUbbw2 + UhhUBB)
. (A.19)




γ − ηSw + ηγSB
αγ − ηαSw − ηγSB
. (A.20)
This is unambiguously negative in the context of this model; bequests cannot be
a "Giffen" good. Different functional forms could in principle accommodate such
behavior. What would be needed is strong positive complementarity between be-
quests and leisure: when the price of bequests rise so that bequests tend to fall,
leisure also falls, actually resulting in higher bequests. As Hines (2013) notes, this
would require quite dramatic lifetime consumption responses for those who leave
bequests, and so it is almost certain that ∂B
∂p
is in fact negative.
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A.2 A change in the exemption
The previous section focused for simplicity on a linear tax schedule, in order
to sketch the response for the MW group. But the response for the HW group,
who only face a rise in the exemption, is very straightforward to include, as it is
essentially a shock to non-labor income. To see this, consider the budget constraint
of an individual in the HW group, who gives a bequest B above exemption level E.
It is given by
p(B − E) + E + c = wh+ y
⇒ pB + c = wh+ y + E(p− 1). (A.21)
Since p ≥ 1, a rise in E is exactly equivalent to a rise in y. It is then straightforward
to rewrite the system as

Ucc 0 0 −1
0 Uhh 0 w
0 0 UBB −p










0 0 0 0
−λ 0 0 0
0 0 λ 0














− (UccUhhp2 + UccUbbw2 + UhhUBB)
. (A.22)
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Proceeding as before, this expression can be written in terms of elasticities as
ϵE =
ηαSE
αγ − ηαSw − ηγSB
, (A.23)
where SE = E(p−1)C . This representation allows us to confirm the intuitive notion
that the income effect should be stronger for the MW group. To see this, it is










αγSc,N − ηαSw,N − ηγSB,N
. (A.24)
Consider an individual at moderate levels of the HW group, for example around $5
million, SE,N = E(p−1)N ≈
E
N
, since t = 0.49. Then by definition, SE,N cannot be
more than 0.2. Conversely, for an average individual in the MW group, wh+y=$1.6
million. As long as this individual receives an inheritance or enjoys capital gains, so
that his non-labor wealth is at least $320,000, then the income effect will be larger.
Obviously such a calculation is very rough and only meant to be indicative.
All other parameters have to be approximately equal, which is not implausible for
these two individuals. Clearly, this will not hold if we compare an HW individual
with someone at the very top of the wealth distribution, but since SE,N tends to 0




Appendix B: Appendix for Chapter 2
B.1 Crime and UI before the Great Recession
In this section, I look at the relationship between crime, unemployment, and
unemployment compensation before the crisis. Exploring how crime and UI covary
in "normal" times, which is an interesting exercise in its own right, will highlight
the problems of inferring causal estimates in the absence of a natural experiment.
Consider the following model, under the aforementioned implicit assumptions
regarding aggregation:





The unemployment rate is given by U , while UI gives unemployment compen-
sation per unemployed person. In the rest of the paper, use of the term UI will refer
to this measure. The vector of covariates X includes relevant controls, while γ, δ
and λ are county, state, and time dummies respectively. Use of covariates will be
irrelevant to the main discussion and they shall only be used here for illustration.
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The natural experiment I exploit is in fact a considerable improvement over previous
papers, in that it is notoriously difficult to agree on the proper set of covariates in
crime regressions (Horowitz 2004). The subscripts i, s, and t denote county, state,
and time respectively. I explicitly subscript for state to underline the fact that
unemployment benefits are a state issue, and variation of UI per recipient across
counties within a state at a given point in time is only a result of differences across
counties in take-up rates, spell lengths, average wages etc, and is thus unlikely to
provide sufficient variation.1 The dependent variable is the log property crime rate,
and I will be only referring to property crime henceforth, unless otherwise stated.
The hypothesis to be tested in this exercise is that counties with higher un-
employment tend to have higher crime rates, but controlling for unemployment,
higher UI is associated with less crime. Unemployment insurance serves as a de-
terrent for crime for the unemployed, by raising income in the no-crime state, and
thus reducing the relative gain from crime. As already mentioned, crime and legal
work are far from mutually exclusive. Freeman (1999) argues that "the border be-
tween illegal and legal work is porous, not sharp", and presents this as the main
reason why unemployment, though robustly positively related to crime, fails to be
an overwhelming factor in explaining crime trends.
Table B.1 shows the results from the baseline model in (B.1) under various
specifications, for all counties in the US with population over 50,000, from 1994 to
2007.2 Assuming first a pooled model with no covariates, we see that the longitudinal
1Of course, with full individual data, benefits received for some period of time for a given
recipient are fully explained by wages and spell length.
2I restrict the sample to all counties with data for the full time span.
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relationship between crime, unemployment, and UI (deflated) is as expected. Crime
is positively related to unemployment and negatively related to UI.
With year dummies, to control for aggregate trends, the coefficient are little
affected, as the natural source of variation operates at the state level. Adding state
dummies instead isolates the action to within-state variation, allowing for national
trends. The UI sign is still negative, as there is still enough variation across counties
or time to exploit. The former is likely be the result of differences in take-up rates or
average wages (assuming these are persistent) and the latter due to unemployment
persistence. Demographic differences could affect both. Unfortunately, there are
no, to my knowledge, data on take-up rates at the county level, and this would be
an interesting question for future research. Restricting the time-span of the sample
in either direction reverses the sign, so it seems likely that variation is across time
(not shown). It follows that with both state and year dummies, the situation is
the same. In this case, the identification is only off within-state, deviations-from-
national-mean changes in benefits. As these can only be driven by worsening local
labor markets, the sign reverses.3 Similar results are obtained with county fixed
effects.
Table B.2 gives the results of the same model, only this time I add population
controls.4 We see that now addition of any regional dummies reverses the UI sign, in
3The same would be true if state-specific year effects were added, in which case variation would
come from yearly within state variation across counties.
4I include population age fractions (under 10, 10 to 14, 15 to 19, 20 to 24, 25 to 44, 45 to 64
and over 54, fraction male and fraction non white. Using finer race controls is tricky because the
intercensal estimates have more detailed information starting from 2000, but in a way that data
before 2000 are non-nested in that after 1999. I also run the model with fraction non-hispanic
white, non-hispanic black and hispanic and nothing changes.
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the same manner as before (significant for state fixed effects, insignificant and almost
zero for county fixed effects). This tells us that once we account for demograph-
ics, the remaining time-series variation is too small to provide decent identification.
Furthermore, we can infer that demographics alone create enough longitudinal vari-
ation, which implies that ignoring them is likely to cause problems in identification.
Put differently, unobserved heterogeneity is likely to have an important time-varying
component, and location fixed effects are not sufficient.5. Finally, it is clear that
some source of external shock, such as the one employed in this paper, is necessary
for identification, and the absence of such a shock in the past can explain why the
potential effect of UI on crime has not been addressed before. Indeed, most states
had not activated EB since the early 1980s recession, long before data quality (espe-
cially in terms of more local units of analysis than states) was sufficient and modern
estimation techniques for such issues became widespread.
5As a corollary, once we account for demographics and local fixed effects, the main determinants
of UI, average wages and replacement rates, are irrelevant and estimates are unaffected (results
not shown).
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Table B.1: Log property crime rate, 1994-2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Unemp 0.0473*** 0.0384*** 0.0560*** 0.0486*** 0.0466*** 0.0262***
(0.0105) (0.0112) (0.0148) (0.0155) (0.0135) (0.0089)
UI -0.0833*** -0.0835*** -0.0189** 0.0378** -0.0409*** 0.0066
(0.0156) (0.0190) (0.0081) (0.0158) (0.0065) (0.0129)
Constant 8.2709*** 8.4710*** 8.0034*** 8.0417*** 8.1280*** 8.2752***
(0.0930) (0.1030) (0.0689) (0.1034) (0.0657) (0.0700)
R2 0.098 0.124 0.284 0.323 0.798 0.832
State FE No No Yes Yes No No
Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
County FE No No No No Yes Yes
N=10,695, Groups=794, balanced panel. Standard errors clustered at the state level.
Regressions weighted by total county population.
B.2 Further details on crime data
Measurement error is a known issue in the NACJD data. Ehrlich (1996) sug-
gested that log transformation mitigates this issue, by compressing the within group
variation. Such a transformation also helps with potential measurement error due
to underreporting, as the underreported rates are likely to be proportional to the
true crime rate. A well known result in econometrics is the fact that measurement
error in the dependent variable does not affect consistency, only reduces efficiency,
assuming the measurement error is classical, meaning additive and independent of
the true value of the dependent variable. Abrevaya & Hausman (2004) show that,
as opposed to a linear model, where such error only results in reduced efficiency,
a transformed non-linear model (including logarithmic transformations) can result
in inconsistent estimates. The reason is that a term comprised of the measurement
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Table B.2: Log property crime rate, more controls, 1994-2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Unemp 0.0170 0.0062 0.0278** 0.0197 0.0370*** 0.0147**
(0.0147) (0.0171) (0.0133) (0.0158) (0.0090) (0.0060)
UI -0.0511*** -0.0518*** 0.0326** 0.0678*** 0.0034 0.0114
(0.0145) (0.0172) (0.0131) (0.0214) (0.0054) (0.0113)
Constant 12.5262*** 11.7895*** 14.9637*** 13.2653*** 8.4786*** 4.7760***
(1.5333) (1.6025) (1.1527) (1.1154) (1.4961) (1.7046)
R2 0.265 0.274 0.506 0.520 0.829 0.836
State FE No No Yes Yes No No
Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
County FE No No No No Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N=10,695, Groups=794, balanced panel. Standard errors clustered at the state level.
Regressions weighted by total county population.
error and a function of the dependent variable is passed on the error of the right
hand side of the model. Right hand side variables, by virtue of being correlated
with the dependent variable, will be correlated with the error term, under relatively
weak assumptions. This can be dealt with by instrumenting the causal variables of
interest, which is exactly the strategy adopted and explained in detail in the empir-
ical strategy section.6 Furthermore, using logs also helps with the interpretation of
coefficients, as level changes would be hard to interpret given the vast variation of
crime by county. In any case, it has been shown that a logarithmic specification is
indeed optimal, in the sense that crime has an approximate log-normal distribution
(Ehrlich 1996), and is the standard used in the literature.
Crime data are by nature heavily underreported. For 2008, the National Crime
6A good instrument will also give consistent estimates if the error is additive but non-classic
i.e. it is correlated with the dependent variable.
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Victimization Survey estimates that approximately 57% of all crimes committed
across the county were not reported. This is more prominent in violent crimes,
except murder, where there is essentially zero underreporting (Gould et al. 2002),
and in attempted, but not completed, crimes. For instance attempted rape has only
30% reporting rate, compared to 65% for rape. Property crimes, especially successful
one, has much higher reporting rates. Successful burglary with forcible entry has
74% reporting, completed auto theft 91% reporting, and completed theft of $250 or
more is 54%. Theft is distinct from robbery in the sense that there is no contact
with the perpetrator, so the crime is discovered after being committed. Robbery,
which is classified as a personal crime, has a 67% reporting rate if successful (73%
if injury is involved).
The literature has identified two main issues with underreporting (summarized
in Gould et al. 2002). The first is the fact that underreporting results in measure-
ment error, discussed above. A second issue is the fact that reporting methods,
and presumably reporting propensity, varies by state and locality. To the extent
that these differences are linear and time-invariant, the first differencing approach
employed eliminates this issue.
B.3 Unemployment Insurance System
B.3.1 EUC triggers
EB triggers are described in detail in the main text. Here I describe the ECU
triggers.
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The initial version of EUC08 became active on July 6, 2008. In order to
calculate the extensions that we common across all states, I have to calculate the
mean numbers of weeks each program lasted for a given year. So for 2008, the
minimum 13 week extension lasted for 19 weeks (July 6 to November 22), and the
20 week extension for another 6. This resulted in a minimum average extension of
(19× 13 + 6×20)/52=7.06≈7 weeks in 2008. In 2009, there were 20 minimum weeks
of extensions for the entire year, meaning that each state had at least 13 weeks of
extensions without any requirements. In reality the smaller rise in ∆MEW was
fifteen weeks, as all states activated some program at one time or another.
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B.3.2 Average Weeks of Extensions for 2009, by State
Alaska 51.69 Montana 38.35
Alabama 41.15 North Carolina 53.12
Arkansas 40.29 North Dakota 22.15
Arizona 46.94 Nebraska 22.15
California 50.23 New Hampshire 36.81
Colorado 39.50 New Jersey 49.94
Connecticut 47.81 New Mexico 33.48
District Of Columbia 49.85 Nevada 51.33
Delaware 42.17 New York 44.81
Florida 46.77 Ohio 49.46
Georgia 47.92 Oklahoma 29.23
Hawaii 31.31 Oregon 53.92
Iowa 29.46 Pennsylvania 49.10
Idaho 48.81 Rhode Island 55.23
Illinois 48.48 South Carolina 46.69
Indiana 50.04 South Dakota 22.15
Kansas 36.65 Tennessee 45.62
Kentucky 49.46 Texas 38.83
Louisiana 29.23 Utah 25.08
Massachusetts 47.46 Virginia 40.06
Maryland 32.00 Vermont 44.10
Maine 46.60 Washington 50.94
Michigan 51.92 Wisconsin 49.58
Minnesota 47.69 West Virginia 39.54
Missouri 46.38 Wyoming 26.23
Mississippi 35.23
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Appendix C: Appendix for Chapter 3
This first section of this appendix describes the model, and the second set
gives the full set of equation characterizing the equilibrium in the model.
C.1 Model
C.1.1 Consumers
























where CT,t is the tradable consumption index, and CN,t is the non-tradables
good, and the definition of shares and exponents follow from above.
Similar conditions hold for the foreign economy, which I omit for brevity in
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this and the following section. Throughout the text, starred variables will denote
foreign variables.
Aggregate demands Optimal allocations of tradable and non-tradable goods












where PT,t and PN,t are the price indices for tradable and non-tradable goods,








gives the total consumption CPI (consumer price index). I define τT and τN to
be the VAT rates for tradables and non-tradables respectively. Note that Pt and PC,t
are tax-inclusive price indices, while the other indices are tax-exclusive. As VAT
is ideally fully rebated, it is equivalent to a consumption tax. The more realistic
case of explicitly accounting for partial rebates is more interesting, but analytically
cumbersome and outside the scope of this paper. As such, the VAT gap intends to
capture the idea that tradables are taxed more heavily due to both exemptions and
the fact that imperfect rebates disproportionately affect tradables. Writing price
indices in this way also simplifies exposition.
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Preferences Let preferences be given by




where H is the habit stock, a function of consumption last period, Ht = hCt−1,
h ∈ [0, 1]. The constant ν is strictly positive, and gives the inverse elasticity of labor
supply, respectively. The flow budget constraint is given by
PtCt +Bt ≤ Rt−1Bt−1 +WtLt + Tt, (C.6)
where Bt are one period uncontingent bonds, Wt is the nominal wage, and Tt firm
profits.
Market Incompleteness The simplest way to capture the fact that Greek house-
holds are borrowing in their own currency but at a premium over other EMU mem-




t + Φ(bt), (C.7)











+ zr,t, where χ is a known constant, and zr,t is
a shock to borrowing costs.1 It is assumed that the representative consumer does
1It is well known that small open economy models with incomplete markets require such a
modeling assumption to induce stationarity, otherwise the equilibrium features a random walk and
the steady state features initial conditions. See Schmitt-Grohe & Uribe (2003) for a discussion.
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not internalize the effect of her borrowing on the risk premium i.e. she takes Φ(.)
as given.
Consumer Maximization The first order conditions are:
UC,t = λtPt (C.8)
UL,t = λtWt (C.9)
λt = βRtEtλt+1. (C.10)



















= Λt = Et{Λt,t+1} gives the price of the one period no-coupon bond paying
1/Pt units of aggregate consumption, and Λt,t+1 is the stochastic discount factor
between periods t and t+ 1.
C.1.2 Producers
Production is organized as follows. There is a final tradable good consumed
by domestic consumers, whose production requires an intermediate tradable input
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(either home or foreign). There is also a final non-tradable good, produced by
domestic non-tradable intermediates. Energy is not used in final goods production.
The final sector can be thought of as the retail sector. The tradables intermediate
goods can be sold at home or abroad, and the non-tradable intermediates can also
be sold at home. Both types of intermediates are produced with labor and energy,
allowing for different factor intensities.
Final goods production is characterized by flexible prices and perfect com-
petition, but intermediate production is monopolistically competitive, with Calvo
sticky prices. This is a common approach in New Keynesian models to the model
tractable. The setting is very close to Rabanal & Tuesta (2012). Here I will only
give the main conditions, see the Appendix for full a derivation.
Distribution costs Consider first distribution costs. As argued previously, the
costs imposed on trade by the logistics sector are not a result of excessive market
power in the distribution industry, and hence large mark-ups, but rather several
inefficiencies in the truck industry, the rail network, and corruption. As these are
much more important for international trade, and since the measure available (from
the World Bank trade costs database) is a tariff equivalent, I use the standard
"iceberg costs" device common in the trade literature, where a fraction ζ of goods
shipped abroad "melts" in transit. This is consistent with a tariff equivalent measure
denoted by τd, where (1 − ζ) = 11+τd (Novy 2007), but more intuitively appealing,
as tariffs also produce revenues.
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Final Goods The good is produced by a continuum of identical firms, using

















The share γx give the relative intensities of the inputs, and ξ the elasticity of sub-
stitution between the amounts of home and foreign traded intermediates, Xh,t and
Xf,t respectively, used in production. These are standard Dixit-Stiglitz aggregators



































































P̄f,t = Pf,t/(1− ζ). The producer price is then Pf,t but consumers pay P̄f,t.




















Intermediate Goods The standard approach in the literature is to consider linear
production functions for intermediate goods. Instead, in order to account for energy,
I follow Cuche-Curti et al. (2009) and consider a CES production function in energy
and labor.
The production technologies are given by the following expressions, for trad-































for n, h ∈ [0, 1].
I introduce price rigidity in the standard Calvo approach, with partial indexa-
tion, similar to Rudolf & Zurlinde (2014). In every period, a fraction θh of tradables
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intermediate producers cannot optimally set prices, and they instead set their price







where κN ∈ [0, 1] is the indexation parameter.
The price-setting non-tradable intermediate goods firms choose their price by



























where YN,t+k is total demand for final non-tradables, as defined above. MCN,t


























is non-tradable inflation, and ˆpN,t is the optimal price
by the price-setting firms.
The profit maximization problem for the tradables intermediates is analogous,
except that now the demand is given by Y dh,t = Xh,t(h) + X∗h,t(h), where X∗h,t(h) is
the foreign demand for home intermediate variety h.
Closing the model Market clearing requires that production equals consumption
in both sectors, and the aggregate labor supply equals labor demand. The following
conditions hold:
YN,t =CN,t +GN,t (C.25)
YT,t =CT,t +GT,t. (C.26)
Gh,t and GN,t are exogenous government spending shocks, which provide a conve-
nient way to introduce demand shocks to the model. These are financed by lump-
sum taxes. Market clearing in the debt market implies
Bt +B
∗
t = 0, (C.27)
while the evolution of net foreign assets is equal to net exports
Bt = Rt−1Bt−1 +NXt. (C.28)
Concerning monetary policy, the path of borrowing costs for the government
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and the private sector in Greece diverged so much from the path of ECB stance
during the crisis that it is not worthwhile to complicate the model by adding explicit
monetary rules. I simply set Rt to equal 1/β − 1.
C.2 Equlibrium
C.2.1 Households
The Euler equation is given by
λt = βRtEt {λt+1} , (C.29)





The labor supply decision satisfies
Lνt = λtWt, (C.31)
where
Lt = LN,t + Lh,t. (C.32)
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C.2.2 Final Goods Producers









































where P̄f,t = Pf,t/(1− ζ). The trade cost ζ is the iceberg cost of trade, linked
to the tariff equivalent by the formula τd = ζ1−ζ . The law of one price will hold for
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tradable goods (excluding distribution costs), and Ph,t = P ∗h,t, and Pf,t = P ∗f,t.
C.2.3 Intermediate Non-tradable Good Producers












































































C.2.4 Intermediate Tradable Good Producers











































































Following Rabanal & Tuesta (2012), I assume that government consumption
only falls on the final sector. The market clearing conditions for tradable and non-
195
tradable final goods is given by
YN,t = CN,t +GN,t (C.45)
YT,t = CT,t +GT,t. (C.46)
The government runs a balanced budget, so spending is equal to revenue:
Gt = τT,tPT,tCT,t + τT,tPT,tCT,t. (C.47)
The condition for market clearing in the intermediate tradable sector is:
Yh,t(h) =Xh,t(h) + ζX
∗
h,t(h) + (1− ζ)X∗h,t(h), ∀h ∈ [0, 1]. (C.48)
Writing the condition this way makes clear that a fraction ζ of exports is lost to
trade costs, and the rest reaches the foreign economy. Similarly, the condition in
the intermediate non-tradable sector is:
YN,t(n) =XN,t(n), ∀n ∈ [0, 1]. (C.49)
Concerning the energy sector, the simplest approach is to abstract from issues
relating to the processing of crude oil imports, and the domestic production of
electricity, and assume all energy is costlessly produced domestically, where one
unit of energy requires one unit of output in the respective sector it is used.
The economy imports intermediate tradables, and exports intermediate trad-
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Aggregate real GDP is the sum of tradable and non-tradable final goods con-
sumption for the public and private sector:
Yt =
(1 + τT,t)PT,t(CT,t +GT,t)
Pt
+
(1 + τN,t)PN,t(CN,t +GN,t)
Pt
. (C.51)
Finally, by definition of national accounting, the change in the net foreign asset
position (NFAt) has to be equal to the trade balance plus net investment income,
or, in the context of this model, net returns on bonds held in the previous period.
So we have that
NXt =Bt −Rt−1Bt−1. (C.52)
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